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Abstract 
This dissertation is a collection of three essays that investigate the value implications of 
product market competition, the impact of trade secrets protection on capital structure 
decision-making, and the long-term value relevancy of the right to adopt a poison pill.  
Chapter 1 explores the value impact of product market competition (PMC) on long-term 
firm value. Using exogenous state adoption of anti-plug-mold statutes, and their 
subsequent invalidation, I causally show that decreased PMC generates economically 
and statistically significant long-term firm value, especially for firms with greater 
innovative ability. My findings are robust to different specifications, including matching 
and portfolio analysis, and provide support for the view that a reduction in PMC leads 
to higher firm value by increasing investments in new and existing production 
technologies. 
Chapter 2 isolates the causal effect of an increase in trade secrets protection on financial 
leverage by examining the staggered implementation of state-level trade secrets laws – 
the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. First, we show the adoption of these statutes is plausibly 
exogenous to corporate debt policies. Next, we document that large firms located in 
states that have passed these laws increase their debt ratios relative to firms in states 
without such legislation. We also find that better protected large firms experience a 
reduction in operating leverage, probability of default, and cash flow volatility. Further, 
our evidence suggests that companies with higher likelihoods of default adjust their debt 
levels upward after their headquartering state adopts a statute. Overall, the results are 
consistent with stronger trade secrets protection leading to increases in financial 
xvi 
leverage via decreasing bankruptcy costs. Lastly, we show large firms benefit from this 
trade-off and experience positive long-term value effects.  
Chapter 3 analyzes the value impact of the right to adopt a poison pill – or “shadow 
pill” – on long-term firm value, exploiting the natural experiment provided by the 
staggered adoption of poison pill laws that validated the use of the pill in 35 U.S. states 
over the period 1986 to 2009. We document that the availability of a shadow pill results 
in an economically and statistically significant increase in firm value, especially for 
firms more engaged in innovation or with stronger stakeholder relationships. Our 
findings are robust to different specifications, including matching and portfolio analysis, 
and provide support to the bonding hypothesis of takeover defenses.  
1 
Chapter 1: Product Market Competition and Long-Term Firm Value: 
Evidence from Reverse Engineering Protections 
 
1. Introduction 
 Empirical measures that proxy for product market concentration have been 
shown to be positively correlated with firm value (Lindenberg and Ross, 1981; 
Blundell, Griffith, and Van Reenen, 1999; Giroud and Mueller, 2011; Grullon, Larkin, 
and Michaely, 2017). However, industry concentration is endogenously determined 
with corporate valuation making it difficult to establish causality from reduced form 
correlations. As a result, the extant empirical literature’s attempt to investigate whether 
product market competition is beneficial or detrimental to shareholder interests is 
difficult to interpret. 
 Further obscurity is created by the long-standing theoretical literature, which 
establishes conflicting effects of inhibiting product market competition on shareholder 
value. On the one hand, shielding incumbent firms from the disciplinary pressure of 
competition could decrease their incentives to innovate (Arrow, 1962; Loury, 1979; 
Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980; Aghion et al., 2001; and Repullo, 2004), consequently, 
enabling self-interested managers to slack (Hart, 1983)1 and thereby enjoy the “quiet 
life” (Hicks, 1935) at the detriment of shareholder value. On the other hand, 
safeguarding corporations from the intensity of competition could raise firm value by 
increasing both the flow and expected duration of economic rents that incentivize 
                                                 
1 Scharfstein (1988), Rotemberg and Scharfstein (1990), Hermalin (1992), Schmidt (1997), and Raith 
(2003) suggest the relationship between competition and slack is not so straight forward. 
2 
innovation (Gilbert and Newberry, 1982; Romer, 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; 
Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Davidson and Segerstrom, 1998; and Zeng, 2001). 
 In this paper, I contribute to the literature on the relationship between product 
market concentration and firm value by shifting the focus from endogenous proxy 
variables to a tandem of unique exogenous events that directly influence the intensity of 
competition in product markets. In particular, I investigate the value implications of 
state-level anti-plug-mold (APM) laws that were enacted in 12 U.S. states over the 
period 1978 to 1987, and subsequently reversed by a U.S. Supreme Court ruling in 
1989. The APM laws prohibited a certain type of reverse engineering2, substantially 
weakening the intensity of product market competition by inhibiting competitors’ 
ability to copy innovative manufacturing products. The present paper, as far as I know, 
is the first to consider this quasi-natural experiment to study the effect of reduced 
product market competition – brought about by increased reverse engineering 
protections – on long-term firm value, as proxied by both Tobin’s Q and stock returns. 
 My main finding is that the passage of APM laws results in a statistically and 
economically significant increase in the Tobin’s Q of the affected firms. This finding is 
robust to various methodologies, including the incorporation of possible selection 
effects through the creation of a matched sample, and a long-run stock portfolio return 
approach. I also find that the increase in Tobin’s Q is more pronounced for firms with 
higher levels of innovative ability.  
 Overall, my results support what I term the “innovation incentives” hypothesis, 
which posits that a reduction in the intensity of competition in product markets through 
                                                 
2 The standard legal definition of reverse engineering was established in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron 
Corp., where the U.S. Supreme Court described the process as “starting with the known product and 
working backward to divine the process which aided in its development or manufacture.” 
3 
the prohibition of quick and relatively costless reverse engineering practices, increases 
the flow and duration of economic rents that incentivize investments in new and 
existing production technologies and, in the long-term, increases shareholder value 
(Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Davidson and Segerstrom, 1998). 
 I begin the analysis by addressing the primary concern that specific state-level 
conditions can explain a state’s propensity to pass an APM law, by investigating the 
likelihood that the enactment of these laws followed from state-level institutional and 
economic characteristics. Using a linear probability model with state and year fixed 
effects, I find no significant predictors for the adoption of AMP laws. This suggests that 
these laws’ adoption was plausibly exogenous to the then-prevailing market and 
economic environments, consistent with my central identification assumption. 
Moreover, I consider the concern of a possible anticipation effect of the U.S. Supreme 
Court ruling by examining the market’s reaction to the Court’s decision in a short-term 
stock event study. I find that for firms located in APM adopting states, capital markets 
responded significantly and negatively to the invalidation of the laws, consistent with 
my assumption that the ruling was indeed an exogenous event.  
 I then move to the heart of the analysis, estimating the effect of APM laws on 
the long-term value of firms headquartered in the enacting states over the period 1975 to 
1992 using pooled panel Tobin’s Q regressions that include firm and industry-year fixed 
effects. I find that the passage of these laws results in a positive and statistically 
significant increase in firm value, with an economic significance of 5.8% in the baseline 
specification. Furthermore, when the laws are invalidated by the U.S. Supreme Court I 
find that the positive value impact of the legislation dissipates. 
4 
 Next, to refine the main result further, I show affected firms with pre-existing 
patent portfolios benefit less from the APM statutes than protected firms less reliant on 
the patent system, as their patented products are already protected from reverse 
engineering. However, positive increases in Tobin’s Q are still present for these firms as 
their unpatented and future products gain protection against copying by rivals. Indeed, 
consistent with a substitution effect of competition, I find that corporations 
headquartered in APM adopting states decrease their level of patenting activity when 
the laws are effective, and subsequently increase their reliance on patents when the 
reverse engineering protections are lost. 
 I then turn to examine the possible economic channels through which a 
reduction in product market competition, as engendered by the passage of APM laws, 
may contribute to firm value. Consistent with the traditional focus of the literature on 
the implications of reduced product market competition, I begin by considering, what I 
refer to as, the “rents-in-and-of-itself” hypothesis (consistent with the analytical 
prediction of Lindenberg and Ross, 1981). This hypothesis suggests that increasing 
protection from reverse engineering creates market power for the affected firms which 
allows them to extract Ricardian or economic rents at the benefit of its shareholders. 
Under this hypothesis, it is the standalone extraction of economic rents that creates 
value – that is, for example, through increased profitability and financial health – and 
not the use of those rents for operational activities.  
 I then move to examine an additional hypothesis which emphasizes the 
importance of how the economic rents are utilized. The “innovation incentives” 
hypothesis posits that a reduction in product market competition through an increase in 
5 
reverse engineering protection incentivizes protected firms to invest their newfound 
economic rents in new and existing production technologies (Aghion and Howitt, 1992; 
Davidson and Segerstrom, 1998). 
 I find no evidence supporting the rents-in-and-of-itself hypothesis. Conversely, 
and consistent with the innovation incentives hypothesis, I find that protected firms 
increase their investments in new and existing production technologies, and that those 
firms with the highest levels of innovative ability experience larger increases in Tobin’s 
Q. 
Overall, this paper provides the first causal evidence that a decrease in product 
market competition increases value for shareholders of innovative firms. These findings 
suggest a potential “bright side” in the recent U.S. trend of increased industry 
concentration (Grullon, Larkin, and Michaely, 2017; and Kahle and Stulz, 2017), and 
are especially informative about increased barriers to entry through innovation 
accumulation (Bena and Li, 2014; Chen, Gao, and Ma, 2017; and Grullon, Larkin, and 
Michaely, 2017), and the detrimental incentive effects of reverse engineering methods 
that become excessively efficient (Samuelson and Scotchmer, 2002).  
 My paper is most closely related to the literature on the intersection of 
competition and innovation, and its relationship with market value. Blundell, Griffith 
and Van Reenen (1999) analyze a panel of British manufacturing firms and find that the 
interaction of market share and innovation is positively associated with firm value. Gu 
(2016) investigates the joint effect of competition and R&D investment on equity 
returns. Using a double-sorting portfolio approach, she documents that the positive 
6 
relation between competition (R&D) and returns only exists in R&D-intensive 
(competitive) industries.  
 My study differs from the above two papers in several ways, with the most 
important being the following. Instead of studying the interaction or sorting of ex-post 
endogenous proxies, my empirical setting allows me to capture exogenous variation 
stemming directly from changes in the intensity of competition in product markets. This 
enables me to improve upon the existing literature by testing how innovative firms 
respond to changes in their competitive landscape, and how those responses are valued 
by the market.3 
 
2. Institutional Background 
2.1 Reverse Engineering 
 There are two methods for engineering manufacturing products: forward 
engineering and reverse engineering. Forward engineering is the conventional process 
of progressing from high-level ideas to the material implementation of those concepts 
and designs. This usually includes the preparation of engineering drawings from which 
models can be constructed and then sprayed with a hardening substance to create an 
original mold for mass production. In contrast, reverse engineering is the process of 
recreating a finished product or part without the original plans, drawings, models or 
                                                 
3 My paper also broadly contributes to the extant literatures on: (i) the value relevancy of product market 
competition (e.g., Lindenberg and Ross, 1981; Nickell, 1996; Sundaram, John, and John, 1996; Hou and 
Robinson, 2006; Aguerrevere, 2009; Giroud and Mueller, 2011; Bustamante and Donangelo, 2017), (ii) 
innovation and firm value (e.g., Griliches, 1981; Megna and Klock, 1993; Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 
2005; Simeth and Cincera, 2016), (iii) product market competition and innovation (e.g., Blundell, 
Griffith, and Van Reenen, 1995; Aghion et al., 2005; Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales, 2013; Aghion et 
al., 2014; Aghion, Akcigit and Howitt, 2015), and (iv) quasi-natural experiments in competition (e.g., 
Aghion et al., 2005; Frésard, 2010; Lileeva and Trefler, 2010; Valta, 2012; Xu, 2012; Frésard and Valta, 
2016; Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen, 2016). 
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molds (Raja and Fernandes, 2007). Rather, the reverse engineer analyzes the design and 
components of the existing product to discover and extract the “know-how” used in its 
formation. In general, reverse engineering is widely accepted as a useful tool leading to 
significant advances in innovation. However, the incentives of forward engineers can be 
substantially compromised when reverse engineering becomes a relatively costless and 
quick way to make a competing product (Samuelson and Scotchmer, 2002). 
2.1.1 Direct Molding Process Reverse Engineering 
 The “direct molding” process is a specific form of reverse engineering which 
provides an efficient and inexpensive way to duplicate manufacturing products (Brown, 
1986). Direct molding involves using an existing product itself as a “plug” to form a 
mold, upon which duplicates of the original product can be manufactured. The typical 
process would involve a competitor firm purchasing an existing product in the open 
market, spraying or coating it with a mold forming substance (which sets quickly and 
hardens), and then removing it from the original product and using it as the mold to 
produce and commercialize replicas (Sganga, 1989; and Shipley, 1990). This benefited 
competitor companies as they circumvented the research, development, design and 
manufacturing costs incurred by the originating firm (Devience, 1990). Thus, direct 
molding process reverse engineering transformed competition in the manufacturing 
industry by making it ever more difficult for innovative companies to recoup the initial 
expenses involved in creating original products. 
2.2 Anti-Plug-Mold (APM) Statutes 
 On October 1, 1978, the California legislature passed the first APM statute, 
prohibiting the duplication and sale of all products manufactured by the direct molding 
8 
process. The California law defined direct molding as “any process in which the 
original manufactured item was itself used as a plug for the making of the mold which 
is used to manufacture the duplicate item” (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17300(c)). The 
legislative history behind the California APM statute notes that “unscrupulous” 
manufacturers’ use of the direct molding process enables them to avoid the costs 
involved with the development of a mold and with new product promotion (Devience, 
1990). Moreover, they argued that allowing this form of reverse engineering to continue 
would “destroy any incentive of manufacturers to develop new and improved designs” 
(Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17300), which could prove detrimental to consumer welfare 
(Shipley, 1990). Therefore, to remedy the situation, the California law authorized 
injunctions against those found guilty of its violation. Furthermore, actual damages, and 
mandatory attorney fees and costs for prevailing plaintiffs were provided by the statute 
(Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17301). 
 Eleven other states followed, enacting similar statutes of their own to protect 
local consumers and manufacturers from plug molding reverse engineering (in any 
state). However, only Michigan, in March of 1983, and Tennessee, in July of 1983, 
adopted APM laws like California’s, which provided protection to all manufactured 
products from the direct molding process (Carstens, 1990). The other nine states, 
Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina 
and Wisconsin, passed legislation only prohibiting plug molding duplication of 
originally manufactured hulls and components of boats (Crockett, 1990). Figure B1 
shows a U.S. map with the states that have passed these laws, while Panel A of Table 
B1 provides institutional detail about the twelve APM law adopting states. 
9 
 Since the plug molding statutes are a matter of state jurisdiction, a conflict of 
laws may arise when the manufacturer of the originating product and the direct molding 
process duplicator are located in different states. Although, noteworthy court cases 
related to the APM laws (listed in the following subsection), seem to suggest that the 
relevant jurisdiction for firms filing lawsuits to protect their products from plug molding 
reverse engineering is typically the state where the originating manufacturer (plaintiff) 
is headquartered (Althauser, 1989; Carstens, 1990; and Heald, 1990).4 As a result, APM 
statutes administer reverse engineering protection for a corporation even when the 
accused direct molding process duplicator is located in a different state whose 
legislatures have not enacted plug molding laws.5 
2.2.1 Interpart v. Imos Italia 
 In July of 1984, almost six years since its adoption, the constitutionality of the 
California APM law was brought into question when Interpart Corp. (Interpart) sued 
Imos Italia (Italia), Vitaloni, S.p.A. (Vitaloni) and Torino Industries, Ltd. (Torino) in 
the Central District of California (Shipley, 1990). Interpart was seeking a determination 
of their rights to copy unpatented products first developed and sold by the defendants. 
The two firms, Interpart and Italia, competed in the Southern California aftermarket for 
automobile rearview mirrors. Interpart admitted to copying the mirrors sold by Italia 
and, co-party, Torino, which were first developed by Vitaloni for notable clientele like 
Ferrari and Lamborghini (Devience, 1990). 
                                                 
4 The originating or duplicating firm’s state of incorporation does not impact the jurisdiction of the APM 
statutes. 
5 These laws also provide protection against products duplicated via the direct molding process by foreign 
entities, if the duplicated product is then exported into the U.S. for domestic sale. 
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 Interpart filed suit against the defendants claiming that its manufacture and sale 
of automobile rearview mirrors was not in breach of the California Business and 
Professional Code. In response, Vitaloni applied and was granted a design patent for 
their rearview mirrors and subsequently counter-sued Interpart for patent infringement 
and copying its mirrors with a direct molding process (Shipley, 1990).  
 On July 30, 1984, the Central District Court of California ruled that Vitaloni’s 
design patent was invalid since it had been granted more than one year since its initial 
sale to the public, and that the plug molding claim was unsubstantiated. Further, the 
district court held that the California APM statute was preempted by federal patent law 
(Wong, 1990).6 Vitaloni appealed the direct molding claim and the preemption 
judgement of the California plug law (Murphy, 1990). The appeal was transferred to the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which has exclusive federal appellate 
jurisdiction in cases arising under patent laws (Shipley, 1990). 
 In November of 1985, the Federal Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the 
California APM statute, reversing the district court’s decision. Further, the court found 
Interpart guilty of copying Vitaloni’s products by way of a direct molding process 
(Devience, 1990). The Federal Circuit reasoned that the California law was not “an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress” (Interpart Corp., 777 F.2d at 684) and therefore not preempted by federal 
patent law. Moreover, the court stated that: “It is clear from the face of the statute that it 
does not give the creator of the product the right to exclude others from making, using, 
or selling, the product as does the patent law…The statute prevents…competitors from 
                                                 
6 Federal patent law provides protection against reverse engineering but requires disclosure of “know-
how” for the protection. Meanwhile, firms located in APM adopting states were granted similar 
protection without any disclosure. Hence, the district court’s ruling of preemption. 
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obtaining a product and using it as the “plug” for making a mold. The statute does not 
prohibit copying the design of the product in any other way; the latter, if in the public 
domain, is free for anyone to make, use, or sell (Interpart, 777 F.2d at 684, 685).” 
 In addition to Interpart Corp. v. Imos Italia (product: rearview mirrors), there 
were at least seven other court cases involving the use of molds to duplicate a wide 
variety of manufacturing products (Althauser, 1989; Carstens, 1990; and Heald, 1990): 
Metro Kane Imports, Ltd. v. Rowoco, Inc. (product: orange juicer); Gemveto Jewelry 
Co. v. Jeff Cooper, Inc. (product: jewelry); Summerford Racing, Inc. v. Shadow Boat, 
Inc. (product: boat parts); Power Controls Corp. v. Hybrinetics, Inc. (product: electrical 
part packaging); Brahma, Inc. v. Joe Yeargain, Inc. (product: truck camper shells); 
Gladstone v. Hillel (product: jewelry); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. 
(product: boat hulls). Moreover, some legal scholars believe that there would have been 
many more reported cases if not for the strong pro-plaintiff bias of the statutes (Sganga, 
1989). However, of those reported above, the most notable and significant took place in 
Florida, where two boat manufacturers battled in the courts over the constitutionality of 
the state’s APM law. 
2.2.2 Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats 
 In September of 1976, Bonito Boats, Inc. (Bonito) began the development, 
design and manufacture of an original recreational boat hull (Murphy, 1990) which, 
upon completion, was marketed under the trade name Bonito Boat Model 5VBR 
(Heald, 1990). In its creation, Bonito prepared a complete set of engineering drawings, 
which were then used to construct a hardwood model. This model was sprayed with 
fiberglass to craft a mold, which was then used to manufacture hulls for the finished 
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product. The Model 5VBR was mass produced and sold to a broad interstate market, 
however, no patent applications were filed by Bonito to protect either the utilitarian or 
design aspects of the boat hull (Carstens, 1990).7 
 Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. (Thunder Craft) was a company located in Tennessee 
which observed the success of the Model 5VBR in the open market, and consequently, 
copied the hull for its own commercial purposes by way of a direct molding process. In 
so making the duplicate product, Thunder Craft purchased a Bonito hull and used it as 
the model, which in turn was splashed with fiberglass to create a mold. The company 
then used this mold to manufacture exact replicas of the 5VBR and distribute as its own 
creation under the trade name “Capri” (Carstens, 1990). Hence, Thunder Craft 
completely bypassed the need to prepare engineering drawings and make its own model 
hull from those specifications. Instead, relying solely on the R&D investment and 
promotional campaign already made by Bonito, Thunder Craft effectively slashed its 
development costs to practically nothing (Shipley, 1990). 
 On May 3, 1983, The Florida legislature adopted an APM statute prohibiting the 
use of a direct molding process to duplicate boat hulls or other components for the ends 
of selling the copied products. Soon thereafter, on December 21, 1984, Bonito brought 
suit against Thunder Craft for violating the Florida law (Carstens, 1990). However, the 
Orange County Circuit Court in charge of the case dismissed Bonito’s suit, ruling that 
the state’s APM statute was preempted by federal patent law (Heald, 1990). Bonito 
appealed to Florida’s Fifth District Court of Appeal, and on April 24, 1986, the district 
court affirmed the earlier ruling in a 2-to-1 decision (Shipley, 1990). Unsatisfied with 
                                                 
7 It is unlikely either a utility or design patent would have been granted as the resulting boat hull would 
likely have failed the demanding standards of novelty and nonobviousness required by the U.S. Patent 
Office (Lichtman, 1996). 
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the outcome, Bonito then appealed to the Florida Supreme Court. On November 12, 
1987, in a 4-to-3 ruling, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts’ 
invalidation of the plug molding statute (Wong, 1990). The majority four judges 
reiterated that “when an article is introduced into the public domain, only a patent can 
eliminate the inherent risk of competition and then but for a limited time” (Bonito 
Boats, 515 So. 2d 220 at 222).  
 With no other alternatives, on February 9, 1988, Bonito petitioned for certiorari 
from the U.S. Supreme Court, requesting a resolution in the conflicting judgements 
between the Florida Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit in Interpart Corp. v. Imos 
Italia. On May 16, 1988, the U.S. Supreme Court granted Bonito’s petition (Shipley, 
1990). 
2.2.3 U.S. Supreme Court’s Ruling in Bonito 
 On December 8, 1988, the U.S. Supreme Court heard Bonito’s appeal. The 
Florida headquartered boat manufacturer presented a twofold argument as to why the 
Florida APM statute was constitutional, and not preempted by federal patent law. The 
first argument centered on the assertion that the plug molding law did not afford the 
same level of protection provided by patents. The second argument asserted that the 
Florida statute was a legitimate exercise of Florida’s authority to protect local business 
interests by regulating and discouraging unfair and “unscrupulous” competition 
(Carstens, 1990). In contrast, the briefs filed in support of the Florida Supreme Court 
ruling maintained that the state’s APM statute granted patent-like protection to boat 
hulls and was therefore unconstitutional. Further, the defendants argued that the Federal 
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Circuit made a wrong decision in Interpart, again asserting its inconsistency with 
United States patent law (Shipley, 1990). 
 On February 21, 1989, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the ruling 
of the Florida Supreme Court and rejected the Federal Circuit’s decision in Interpart. 
The Court stated Florida’s statute granted substantially similar rights to originating boat 
hull manufacturers as to those conferred to a patentee, by excluding competitors from 
making and selling duplicates procured by the direct molding process (Heald, 1990). 
The Court noted: “the duplication of boat hulls and their component parts may be an 
essential part of innovation in the field of aquadynamic design”, and that “the 
competitive reality of reverse engineering may act as a spur to the inventor, creating an 
incentive to develop inventions that meet the rigorous requirements of patentability” 
(Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 160). As outcome of the Supreme Court’s decision in Bonito 
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., every states’ APM statute was effectively 
invalidated (Carstens, 1990).8 Panel B of Table B1 details the significant court cases 
outlined above. 
 
3. Data and Summary Statistics 
3.1 Data 
 I use several sources of data to construct two main data samples covering the 
period 1975 to 1992. The first main data sample consists exclusively of manufacturing 
firms (SIC codes 2000-3999) in the Compustat database, with publicly traded stock 
                                                 
8 In 1998, Congress enacted the Vessel Hull Design Protection Act (VHDPA) as part of the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act to protect boat hulls and its component parts from the direct molding process 
(Samuelson and Scotchmer, 2002). However, the VHDPA was too late for Bonito Boats, as the company 
went out of business on July 16, 1991 (http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/1992-05-
25/business/9205231057_1_boat-makers-regal-marine-boating-industry). 
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price observations in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database, 
headquartered in the United States, and without missing data for the main variables of 
interest. This selection criterion yields 32,808 firm-year observations, of which 5,781 
are affected by an APM statute. I denote this dataset as the “Manufacturing” sample. 
The other main data sample is a subset of the “Manufacturing” sample, in which I 
exclude two-digit SIC code industries (within the 2000-3999 SIC code range) without 
tangible, direct molding process “copyable” products (e.g., SIC code 20-food and 
kindred products). Table B2 provides a description of this second main dataset, which I 
refer to as the “Products” sample. From this selection, I obtain 21,791 firm-year 
observations, where 4,265 are affected by the APM laws. 
My samples begin three years before California adopts the first APM statute, 
and end three years after the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Bonito Boats v. Thunder 
Craft Boats effectively invalidated all 12 plug molding laws. 
My main independent variables, APM Law, All Item APM Law, and Boat Hull 
APM Law, capture whether a firm is headquartered in a state that has passed any type of 
APM legislation, or specific to whether the adopted statute covers all manufacturing 
items or only those specific to boat hulls and its components. I obtain information on 
each enacting states’ statute name from Sganga (1989), Carstens (1990), Crockett 
(1990), and Heald (1990). With these statute names, I then use the LexisNexis Academic 
“State Statutes and Regulations Search” option to verify the details of each law, and to 
establish the month and year in which it was adopted. Further, I confirm which statutes 
protected all manufacturing items relative to those that stipulated protection for hulls 
and component parts of boats. Figure B1 provides a U.S. map depicting the dispersion 
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of enacting states by type of product coverage. The 12 adopting states’ respective 
statute names, adoption dates, product coverage, and the number of unique firms over 
the sample period are reported in Panel A of Table B1. 
 To ensure that I use historically accurate accounts of firms’ headquartering 
states when defining my main independent variables, I supplement the current 
headquarter data provided by Compustat with historical location information from the 
CRSP Historical U.S. stock database that is available from the University of Chicago 
directly (rather than through WRDS). This historical CRSP dataset spas the period 1990 
to 2015. I approximate the state of location for the years 1975 to 1989 by backfilling 
firm-year headquarter data using the oldest data point of historical headquarter 
information available. Using this procedure, I successfully match 58.2% of the 32,808 
firm-year observations. For the remaining missing headquartering state values, I 
supplement my sample with Compustat’s data on current states of location. The fact that 
the data is current and not historical should not be a major concern, however, as 
empirical evidence suggests firms likely do not switch headquartering states very often. 
For example, Pirinsky and Wang (2006) find less than 2.4% of firms changed their state 
of location over a 15-year period. Applying this finding to my dataset suggests roughly 
1% (=0.024 × 0.418) of the firm-years might be incorrectly assigned (or not assigned) 
protection from the direct molding process. 
 From the above information, I create the APM Law, All Item APM Law, and 
Boat Hull APM Law indicator variables, which are set equal to one for firms affected by 
any, all item, or boat hull specific APM legislation in the year of and after the respective 
adoption date, and zero in the years prior to the adoption date, or always zero for 
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corporations in states that never enact an APM law. In addition, I permit the adjustment 
of the indicator variables for the states of California and Florida dependent on important 
court decisions validating or invalidating the statutes in their respective jurisdictions 
(depicted in Figure B2).  
 As shown in Panel B of Table B1, these two states have significant court cases 
addressing the constitutionality of their laws, and in 1984, both have their protection 
from the direct molding process judiciously stripped away. However, roughly one and a 
half years later the Federal Circuit re-administers protection to California companies 
finding that the state’s APM legislation is constitutionally valid. On the other hand, 
after two additional court rulings within state, Florida firms never regain protection. 
 My main interaction variables involve the multiplication of APM Law, All Item 
APM Law, and Boat Hull APM Law with a time indicator variable, Post 88, which is set 
equal to one in the year after 1988, and zero before. These interactions allow me to 
capture the change in legal and competitive environment engendered by the U.S. 
Supreme Court ruling on February 21, 1989, which effectively eliminated the enacting 
states protection from direct molding process reverse engineering. 
 My primary focus is studying the value relevance of product market 
competition, and as such the main dependent variable in my analysis is long-term firm 
value. Consistent with prior empirical studies investigating the value implications of 
competition (Lindenberg and Ross, 1981; Blundell, Griffith, and Van Reenen, 1995, 
1999; Giroud and Mueller, 2011), I measure firm value using Tobin’s Q (Tobin’s Q). 
Following Fama and French (1992), Tobin’s Q is defined as the market value of assets 
divided by the book value of assets. Additionally, in a separate robustness test, I employ 
18 
an alternative measure of firm value by performing long-run stock return event studies 
around the adoption of the APM statutes. Using monthly stock returns (Monthly Stock 
Returns), I estimate the portfolios’ abnormal returns (Alpha), where the stock return 
data for this analysis comes from the CRSP database. 
 The models I estimate also include a number of control variables which other 
product market competition studies have shown are important when investigating a 
policy’s influence on Tobin’s Q. My default specification includes: Size, Ln(Age), Debt-
to-Equity, ROA, Operating Cash-Flow, HHI, Sales Growth, Loss, Firm Liquidity, 
R&D/Sales, CAPX/Assets, and Industry-Year Tobin’s Q. In particular, since I am 
investigating the value impact of state-level legislation, and since industries often 
cluster by geography, I specify Industry-Year Q to capture time-varying three-digit SIC 
code industry shocks (following Giroud and Mueller, 2010). Data for all of the controls 
come from Compustat.   
 Lastly, to mitigate the influence of extreme outliers, I winsorize all continuous 
dependent and independent variables in my samples at the 1% level in both tails, and, 
additionally, I adjust dollar values for inflation using 2015 dollars. 
3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 I present summary statistics in Table B3 for all of the variables used in the main 
regression analyses over the period 1975 to 1992. Specifically, Panel A of Table B3 
provides the mean, standard deviation, median, and 25th and 75 percentiles for the main 
dependent, independent, and interacted variables for the “Manufacturing” sample, 
whereas Panel B shows the analogous variable summaries for the “Products” dataset. 
From these two panels, it is observed that the mean Tobin’s Q is 1.54 for each of the 
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respective samples. Further, the average proportion of firm-years in which a company is 
protected by an APM Law ranges from 17.6% to 19.6% across the datasets. Specific to 
the “Manufacturing” (“Product”) sample the percentage of firms affected by the All 
Item APM Law is 13.2% (15.3%), while those protected under the Boat Hull APM Law 
is 4.5% (4.2%). Furthermore, the remaining independent variables appear to be equally 
comparable across both the “Manufacturing” and “Products” samples. 
Figure B2 depicts the percentage of firms affected by the APM statutes for each 
of the respective samples. From this graph, it is evident that both the “Manufacturing”, 
and “Products” samples behave similarly over the period. Specifically, it is observed 
that the number of affected firms increases to roughly 8% across the two samples when 
California passes an APM statute in 1978. The percentage of protected firms continues 
to rise as more states adopt the legislation and by 1983 the proportion of affected 
companies surrounds the 22% threshold. Then, in 1984, both Californian and Floridian 
businesses lose plug molding protection when their respective states’ courts find them 
preempted by federal patent law dropping the percentage to around 10%. The number of 
affected corporations’ increases again by 1985 as additional states adopt laws and the 
Federal District Court rules that California’s APM statue is enforceable. The final state, 
Indiana, enacts an APM statute in 1987 bringing the percentage of affected firms to 
roughly 29%. However, this protection comes to an abrupt halt in 1989 as a U.S. 
Supreme Court ruling leaves all APM laws unenforceable.  
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4. Identification Strategy and Methodology 
4.1 Identification Strategy 
 The main working assumption of my identification strategy is that absent the 
adoption of APM statutes and their subsequent reversal by the U.S. Supreme Court, 
long-term firm value of companies located in states that enacted and did not enact these 
laws would have evolved in a similar fashion. In other words, I contend that the group 
of firms headquartered in plug molding passing states and the group of firms 
headquartered in states that do not adopt such statutes would have had parallel trends in 
value if no such legislative action occurred. Therefore, to preserve the validity of my 
strategy and maintain causal interpretations, it is imperative that I rule out two 
important concerns that would call into question the parallel trends assumption. The 
first concern is that states adopted APM laws with the intention of achieving certain 
firm value implications. The second concern is that companies located in plug molding 
passing states might have anticipated either the adoption of the statutes or the U.S. 
Supreme Court decision. In the following subsections, I provide discussion and 
evidence which attempts to demonstrate that neither of the above two concerns are in 
fact a problem. 
4.1.1 Determining the Adoption of the APM Statutes 
 There is a possibility states with APM statutes passed such legislation 
specifically to alter the long-term firm value of businesses in their state (i.e., reverse 
causality). This would be detrimental for my identification strategy as the instrument I 
use to study the effect of product market competition, the APM Law, All Item APM 
Law, and Boat Hull APM Law indicator variables, would no longer satisfy the exclusion 
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restriction. As a first pass, I review the extant law literature detailing the state-level 
adoption of the statutes and document that none of the legislative histories seem to 
suggest the laws were passed with any sort of corporate value intents. Rather, it appears 
the lawmakers stated aim was to protect local consumer welfare (Shipley, 1990), 
providing suggestive evidence consistent with the validity of the exclusion restriction. 
 To test this formally, I follow Cremers et al. (2018) and estimate a linear 
probability model with state-level covariates, and state and year fixed effects, where the 
dependent variable denotes the enactment of an APM law.9 The results of these tests are 
presented in Table B4. I exclude firm-year observations from the sample once their 
headquartering states pass plug molding legislation (i.e., a “failure event” occurs). The 
sample period covers 1975 to 1992, where all of the independent variable are lagged 
one period (t-1), and all of the continuous predictor variables are standardized to have a 
mean of zero and unit variance. I estimate robust standard errors independently double 
clustered by state of location and year. 
 Columns (1) – (2) of Table B4 show results specific to the “Manufacturing” 
sample, with the first column including annual averages of headquartering state-year 
firm characteristics, while the second column appends controls for other macro and 
legal factors at the state level. From these two columns, it’s clear that none of the 
specified predictor variables significantly determine the adoption of state APM laws in 
the “Manufacturing” sample. In particular, consistent with my exogeneity assumption, 
the average annual SY Tobin’s Q, SY ∆ Tobin’s Q, and SY Industry-Year Tobin’s Q 
cannot predict the adoption of an APM statute. Similar results hold for columns (3) – 
                                                 
9 Cremers et al. (2018) conduct a similar analysis, but specific to a different legal experiment, where the 
failure event represents incorporating state adoption of poison pill statutes. 
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(4) in the “Products” dataset.10 Overall, I conclude that there is no evidence for reverse 
causality.11 
4.1.2 Anticipation of the Supreme Court’s Ruling 
 In the above subsection, I provided suggestive evidence that states did not pass 
APM statutes with the specific intent of altering firm value. Since I am also using the 
reversal of the APM statutes in a 1989 U.S. Supreme Court ruling, it is important that I 
show the previously mentioned concerns are also not a problem for this judicial event. 
First, I argue that it is highly improbable the U.S. Supreme Court would reverse or 
uphold lower court rulings in a specific state with the intentions of altering 
headquartering state firm value. Thus, this first concern does not apply in this context. 
Second, while it is also unlikely that firms would be able to anticipate the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision, I put statistical formality to this argument and test this concern using 
an event-study approach.12 
 Following Serfling (2016) and Klasa et al. (2018), I conduct a short-run event 
study of abnormal stock returns around the Supreme Court’s decision date, February 21, 
1989, for firms located in adopting states. I estimate cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) using either the four-factor Carhart (1997) model or the three-factor Fama and 
                                                 
10 Table G1 of the supplementary appendix reports the results specific to the adoption of all item APM 
statutes. The findings are qualitatively similar to Table B4. 
11 In section 7, I provide additional evidence for the validity of my identification strategy by testing the 
timing of the change in firm value relative to the timing of the passage of the APM statutes. 
Organizationally, I choose to present these results after first documenting that the statutes are indeed 
value relevant. However, for the purpose of this section, I briefly note the suggestive evidence from Table 
B14 that the effect of APM statutes on Tobin’s Q transpires after the passage of the laws and not before. 
This offers some reassuring evidence that both the affected and unaffected firms’ value would have 
evolved in a similar fashion absent the adoption of this legislation (i.e., the parallel trends assumption 
likely holds). 
12 I contend it is especially unlikely firms would be able to anticipate the Supreme Court’s ruling given 
the Florida Supreme Court had just upheld the invalidation of Florida’s plug molding law on a closely 
split 4-to-3 decision, and that the Federal Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in Interpart Corp. v. 
Imos Italia. 
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French (1993) model, with both an equally- and value-weighted CRSP market index. 
The regression parameters are estimated over the trading window [-271,-21], relative to 
the Supreme Court’s ruling date. However, one important adjustment is required. Since 
all firms in plug molding adopting states will be affected by the same event on the same 
announcement day, the Supreme Court ruling is not independent across firms and 
correspondingly the standard errors in these regressions will be contaminated by a 
cross-sectional correlation bias. To deal with this issue, I correct the standard errors 
following the technique outlined in Kolari and Pynnӧnen (2010).  
 The results of these tests are presented in Table B5. Specifically, I show in the [-
17,-3] and [-12,-3] (prior two and three week trading day) periods before the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s ruling, the CARs are statistically insignificant for all model 
specification and in both the “Manufacturing” and “Products” samples. In contrast, and 
consistent with the Court’s ruling being a surprise to capital markets, I find negative and 
statistically significant CARs for all models and in both respective samples over the 
five-day period surrounding the announcement date, [-2,+2]. These estimates vary from 
-0.33% to -0.39% in the “Manufacturing” sample, and -0.37% to -0.44% within the 
“Products” dataset.13  
 In sum, it appears that investors expected the loss of protection from reverse 
engineering (and, consequently, an increase in product market competition) to be 
detrimental to value. Importantly, for my identification strategy, the findings provide 
suggestive evidence that firms did not anticipate the U.S. Court ruling preempting APM 
statutes, but rather it was an exogenous event. 
                                                 
13 Table G2 of the supplementary appendix reports the results specific to affected firms in all item APM 
adopting states. The findings are qualitatively similar. 
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4.2 Methodology 
 I employ a difference-in-differences methodology to investigate how the 
passage of APM statutes affects the long-term value of businesses in adopting states. 
Since these laws are passed in a staggered fashion by 12 states with varying adoption 
dates the research design I use follows the approach outlined in Bertrand, Duflo and 
Mullainathan (2004), where firms headquartered in eventual plug molding law enacting 
states are considered as part of the unaffected group until their legislatures adopt a 
statute, upon which they enter the affected group in the analysis. For example, 
companies located in Michigan will have their APM Law (and All Item APM Law) 
indicator variable set equal to zero in the period prior to March of 1983, whereas after 
the law is passed the variable switches to one for the remaining nine years in the panel. 
Further, firms headquartered in states that never receive legislated protection from the 
direct molding process are always coded as unaffected. In equation form, I estimate the 
following panel regression model: 
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑄𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡 = 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜔𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑃𝑀 𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡 ,                         (1) 
where 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑄𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡 measures firm value for firm 𝑖, in industry 𝑗, located in state 𝑠, 
during year 𝑡, and 𝐴𝑃𝑀 𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑠𝑡 is an indicator variable for whether the state in which a 
company is located has adopted an APM law as of year 𝑡.  Further, some regression 
models also include a set of control variables 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡, detailed in the above subsection 3.1, 
to account for other firm characteristics the extant literature has deemed important when 
examining a policy’s influence on firm value. Some of my models, however, exclude all 
controls, because some of these controls are also likely impacted by APM laws and 
could thus bias my coefficient estimates (as discussed in Roberts and Whited, 2013).   
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 Moreover, following the work of Gormley and Matsa (2014), I control for time 
invariant unobservable heterogeneity within different firms using firm fixed effects 𝛾𝑖. 
Additionally, I include an industry-year interacted fixed effect 𝜔𝑗𝑡 to control for 
unobserved, time-varying differences across industries, where the industry grouping is 
defined at the two-digit SIC code level.14 Including such high-dimensional fixed effects 
provides additional robustness to my methodology, allowing me to effectively control 
for common sources of industry or time-dependent unobserved heterogeneous variation 
(Gormley and Matsa, 2014, 2016; Karpoff and Wittry, 2018).15 Lastly, I estimate robust 
standard errors clustered by state of location since my main independent variables are 
defined at the state-level (Serfling, 2016;  Klasa et al., 2018).16  
 Additionally, I break apart the APM Law indicator variable into All Item APM 
Law and Boat Hull APM Law variables to test for the differential value implications 
from the varying product coverage of the statutes. 
 In addition to equation (1), I estimate a supplementary panel regression model to 
capture the change in legal and competitive environment after the U.S. Supreme Court 
effectively invalidated all states’ plug molding laws in February of 1989: 
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑄𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡 = 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜔𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑃𝑀 𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 1988𝑡 × 𝐴𝑃𝑀 𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡 +
                                                                        𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡,                                                                 (2) 
where 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 1988𝑡 × 𝐴𝑃𝑀 𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑠𝑡 measures the value relevance of the plug molding 
laws after 1988, with 𝑖 indexing for firms, 𝑗 indexing for industry, 𝑠 indexing states of 
                                                 
14 The two samples are restricted to manufacturing firms with SIC codes ranging from 2000 – 3999, and, 
moreover, in the product specific sample, the number of SIC code defined industries is further truncated. 
Hence, measuring industry fixed effects at a more refined level than two-digits greatly reduces the 
amount of available variation. 
15 Results are similar in models with firm and year fixed effects only. 
16 Results are qualitatively similar if I cluster by firm, or independently double cluster by firm-year, state-
year, or firm-state. 
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location, and 𝑡 indexing years, and all other variables as before. The indicator variable 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 1988𝑡 is set equal to one beginning in 1989 and afterwards, and otherwise equal 
to zero, but is excluded from the regression due to its multicollinearity with year fixed 
effects. The estimated standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation, with clustering performed at the state of location level. Again, I 
supplement the model in equation (2) by decomposing the APM Law indicator variable 
in each of the coefficient terms into All Item APM Law and Boat Hull APM Law. 
 
5. Main Results 
5.1 APM Laws and Firm Value 
 Table B6 begins my investigation of the value relevance of product market 
competition by presenting coefficient estimates from difference-in-differences (DID) 
regressions of Tobin’s Q on an APM Law indicator variable over the period 1975 to 
1988. In this first set of tests, I exclude firm-year observations after 1988, since 
protection from reverse engineering is eliminated by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
February of 1989. In all specifications I include firm and industry-year fixed effects, 
where the industry grouping is defined at the two-digit SIC code level. The reported t-
statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered at the state of location level. In 
columns (1) – (3), I report results specific to the “Manufacturing” sample, while 
columns (4) – (6) correspond to the “Products” dataset. Furthermore, columns (1) – (2) 
and (4) – (5) employ regression model (1), outlined in subsection 4.2, while columns (3) 
and (6) decomposes the APM Law indicator into All Item APM Law and Boat Hull APM 
Law indicator variables.  
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 Moving to my main results, in columns (1) and (2) of Table B6, I find a positive 
and significant relation between APM Law and Tobin’s Q. In particular, with the full set 
of controls specified, column (2) documents that Tobin’s Q increases by an 
economically significant 5.3% (=0.082/1.542), relative to its sample mean. Further, in 
column (3), I investigate the differential effect of APM laws that protect all 
manufacturing items relative to those that only cover boat hulls and its components and 
find that the entirety of the value gains come from All Item APM Laws. Specifically, 
when the statutes are enforceable, firms headquartered in California, Michigan and 
Tennessee experience sample mean relative increases in Tobin’s Q of 5.8% 
(=0.090/1.542). In comparison, Boat Hull APM Law affected corporations have a 
positive but insignificant point estimate.17  
I further examine the extent to which APM statutes increased long-term firm 
value in the “Products” sample. In this dataset, I carefully select firms in two-digit SIC 
code industries that are the most likely to have tangible products that could be copied 
via the direct molding process, and exclude the remaining manufacturing corporations 
for which the APM statutes do not apply.18 Columns (4) – (6) provide suggestive 
evidence that the sample selection process reduces estimation noise as all significant 
point estimates are larger in magnitude than their “Manufacturing” analogues. For 
example, in the second column with the full set of controls included, I find APM Law 
affected firms display positive increases in Tobin’s Q of 5.6% (=0.086/1.542) relative to 
                                                 
17 It makes intuitive sense I find a positive point estimate, since there are a portion of affected (boat 
manufacturing) firms within the sample. However, the value effect for this select number of companies is 
not large enough to override the statistical insignificance of the other manufacturing firms for which the 
law does not provide protection.  
18 For example, companies in the food and kindred products industry (SIC code 20) manufacture items 
(e.g., meat, dairy and bakery products) which a rival firm would never copy using a mold.  
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the sample mean. This represents a positive 4.9% (=[0.086-0.082]/0.082) difference 
relative to the corresponding coefficient estimate in column (2). Furthermore, consistent 
with the earlier results, I provide evidence in column (6) that the total value effect stems 
from All Item APM Law firms and not the Boat Hull APM Law companies. 
 Overall, I conclude that the decreased product market competition experienced 
by corporations headquartered in states that adopt all manufacturing item APM statutes 
increases firm value. Furthermore, given these findings, I choose to focus the remainder 
of my analysis on the All Item APM Law variable in the “Manufacturing” and 
“Products” samples. I choose this research design for the following two reasons. First, 
focusing on all manufacturing item protection should provide the cleanest identification 
as it is apparent from Table B6 the average proportion of firms in the boat hull specific 
APM statute states are not significantly affected by the legislation, and just add noise to 
the estimates. Second, concentrating on the companies headquartered in the three states 
with all item protection enhances the external validity of my findings, as my 
conclusions are not limited to boat hull and its component businesses.  
5.1.1 APM Laws, Supreme Court’s Ruling and Firm Value 
 In this subsection, I make use of opposing exogenous variation derived from the 
U.S. Supreme Court decision in Bonito, which effectively made all APM statutes 
unenforceable. This judicial event provides a superb testing ground for whether the 
positive value implications documented in Table B6 actually derive from the plug 
molding laws, or if some other unobservable factor is creating a spurious correlation. 
Table B7 reports the triple differences (DDD) estimates over the sample period 1975 to 
1992, capturing the value impact of both the protection granted by adopting states prior 
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to 1988, and then its subsequent removal afterwards. As before, all specifications 
include firm and industry-year fixed effects, where the industry grouping is defined at 
the two-digit SIC code level, and the estimated t-statistics are based on robust standard 
errors clustered at the state of location level. The first two columns of the table pertain 
to the “Manufacturing” sample, while the last two are specific to the “Products” dataset. 
In columns (1) – (2), I find the Post 1988 × All Item APM Law interaction is always 
negative and insignificant. In contrast, the All Item APM Law coefficients are always 
positive and statistically significant, and qualitatively similar in magnitude to those 
documented in Table B6. Further, in testing the joint significance of APM statute 
relation with Tobin’s Q across the two periods I find an insignificant value effect. This 
is clear evidence, that any of the positive value implications affected firms derived in 
the period when the statutes were enforceable are entirely wiped out after the protection 
is lost. The “Products” columns, (3) – (4), shows similar findings. In particular, the 
point estimate on the interaction term in the fully specified regression model of column 
(4) is negative but insignificant, while the All Item APM Law coefficient suggests an 
increase in Tobin’s Q in the pre-1988 period of 5.3% (=0.081/1.542), relative to the 
sample mean. Finally, in a test of the total value effect across the period 1975 to 1992, I 
document that any of the value gains experienced by corporations with “copyable” 
products and located in the all item APM statute states prior to the Supreme Court’s 
ruling are completely removed along with the reverse engineering protections. 
5.2 APM Laws, Patent Activity and Firm Value 
 Another interesting test that can be performed to supplement the findings above, 
is to see whether affected firms with pre-existing patent portfolios are impacted by the 
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law to the same extent as companies using a different form of intellectual property 
protection. Intuitively, businesses that are already protected from direct molding process 
reverse engineering by patents should not experience the same benefit from the APM 
statutes as non-patenting firms. However, given a forward-looking measure like Tobin’s 
Q, which captures long-term anticipated value, this is not to say that the law will not 
also be valuable for these patenting companies too, as their current unpatented and 
future products gain protection. Table B8 tests this intuition.  
 To measure firm-level patenting activity I use the following three measures: 
Ln(Patent), Ln(CW Patent), and Ln(SM Patent). These variable definitions can be found 
in Table A1, but, described briefly here, the first two continuous variables measure 
patent count and citation-weighted patents (Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2001), while the 
third is constructed by weighting patents based on stock market reactions to their grants 
(Kogan et al., 2017). Columns (1) – (3) provides the regression estimates for the 
“Manufacturing” sample, where each of the columns specify the complete set of 
controls with firm and industry-year fixed effects. Further, the reported t-statistics are 
estimated using robust standard errors with state of location level clustering. 
 Column (1) documents a negative and significant differential value effect for 
“Manufacturing” firms protected by APM statutes and with higher levels of patent 
counts, while an All Item APM Law company without any patenting activity experiences 
increases in Tobin’s Q of 7.4% (=0.114/1.542), relative to the sample average. 
However, it is important to be careful of the interpretation here, as the negative and 
significant point estimate on the interaction term does not suggest that firms with 
patents were hurt by the plug molding laws, but rather their gains in value are smaller in 
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magnitude since they already had some form of reverse engineering protection. This is 
demonstrated formally in column (1) in a test of joint significance for a corporation 
headquartered in an All Item APM Law with an average level of Ln(Patent). Using this 
approach, I find the affected company with an average portfolio of patenting activity 
still experiences an increase in firm value of 5.6% (=0.086/1.542), relative to the sample 
mean Tobin’s Q. Columns (2) – (3) presents similar findings using the Ln(CW Patent) 
and Ln(SM Patent) measures of patenting activity, respectively. 
 In the subsequent three columns of Table B8, I investigate the value relevancy 
of the APM statutes for firms with existing patenting activity in the “Products” sample. 
Columns (4) – (6) finds qualitatively similar results using the products-based dataset. 
Specifically, the DDD estimate in the sixth column suggests that firms with an average 
level of stock market-weighted patents experience significantly smaller increases in 
Tobin’s Q, a 6.7% (=01.04/11.542) gain, relative to a 9.4% (=0.145/1.542) increase for 
a similarly protected firm with an Ln(SM Patent) measure equal to zero. Furthermore, it 
appears the products-based sample estimates are less confounded by noise, as the 
magnitudes of these point estimates are larger than those from the general 
manufacturing regressions. Finally, I find some evidence that patent counts and citation-
weighted patents, in general, are not value relevant in the 1975 to 1988 period, 
consistent with the descriptive findings documented in Hall (1993), where she shows 
the stock market’s valuation of the intangible capital created by manufacturing firm 
R&D decreased substantially in the mid-1980s.19 
                                                 
19 Table G3 of the supplementary appendix regresses Tobin’s Q on the triple interaction term: Post 88 ×
 All Item APM Law × Patent Activity. I do not find evidence that corporations with pre-existing patent 
portfolios are impacted differentially by the loss in reverse engineering protections. 
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5.2.1 APM Laws, Supreme Court’s Ruling and Patent Activity 
 Next, before I explore possible economic channels for the positive value effect 
stemming from a reduction in product market competition, I investigate whether 
patenting activity decreases (increases) when firms headquartered in APM adopting 
states gain (lose) protection from reverse engineering. As discussed before, the APM 
laws provided similar protection to those granted by patents but without requiring the 
necessary disclosure of “know-how,” while the Supreme Court ruling in Bonito Boats v. 
Thunder Craft Boats effectively invalidated this state conferred protection. Therefore, 
economic intuition suggests that companies wanting to preserve an operational 
(informational) advantage on their rivals would decrease their use of patents when the 
laws were valid and increase their level of patenting activity when the reverse 
engineering protections are lost. Table B9 tests this hypothesis.  
 In these regressions, I specify the dependent variable as either Ln(Patent), 
Ln(CW Patent) or Ln(SM Patent). Furthermore, consistent with existing work 
(Atanassov, 2013; Fang, Tian and Tice, 2014; Mukherjee, Singh and Žaldokas, 2017; 
and Chemmanur and Tian, 2017) I lead these three measures by two years because the 
Supreme Court ruling likely affects patenting activity with a lag.20 Another concern 
with patent data is the inherent truncation bias. That is, depending on when the sample 
period ends there will be patents that have yet to be granted but already applied for and 
thus missing from the data. Moreover, patent citations will also display a bias since 
earlier granted patents have more time to accumulate citations relative to more recently 
granted patents (Hall, Jaffee, and Trajtenberg, 2001). However, these truncation biases 
                                                 
20 Table G4 of the supplementary appendix reports the results for one-year leaded (t+1) and three-year 
leaded (t+3) patenting activity measures as well. 
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are likely not a concern for my study since the most recent dependent variables in my 
regressions are from 1994 (1992 + 2-year lead), while the patent dataset I employ has 
observations from 1926 to 2010.  
 Columns (1) – (3) provides the regression estimates for the “Manufacturing” 
sample, where each of the columns specify the complete set of controls (including 
Tobin’s Q) with firm and industry-year fixed effects. Further, the reported t-statistics are 
estimated using robust standard errors with state of location level clustering. In column 
(1), I document, relative to the sample mean, after corporations gain protection from 
plug molding, Ln(Patent) decreases by 5.2% (=0.008/0.155) but increases by 18.7% 
(=0.029/0.155) after the laws are struck down. Additionally, Ln(CW Patent) and Ln(SM 
Patent), which measure patent quality and importance, also decrease (increase) before 
(after) the Supreme Court ruling. 
 Similar results hold in columns (4) – (6) for the “Products” dataset, as all three 
measures of patenting activity differentially decrease in the pre-1989 period. For 
example, relative to its sample mean, Ln(CW Patent) decreases by 3.2% (=0.033/1.026) 
for businesses that gain reverse engineering protections, but increase by 9.9% 
(=0.102/1.026) when competition intensifies in the post-1988 period. Overall, these 
findings are consistent with a substitution effect of product market competition in 
intellectual property protection. 
 
6. Hypothesized Sources of Value 
 Having established empirical evidence that the adoption of all item APM laws 
are positively related to firm value, I now turn to examining two possible explanations 
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for how decreased product market competition, as brought about by the passage of these 
laws, may contribute to firm value. First, consistent with the traditional focus of the 
industrial organization literature on the implications of reduced competition, I begin by 
considering, what I refer to as, the “rents-in-and-of-itself” hypothesis (consistent with 
the analytical prediction of Lindenberg and Ross, 1981). This hypothesis suggests that 
increasing a firm’s protection from reverse engineering erects a technological barrier to 
entry which creates a source of Ricardian or economic rents at the benefit of the 
protected firm’s shareholders. Under this hypothesis then, the increase in value is solely 
attributed to the rents from market power (e.g., from increased profitability and 
financial health) and not the use of those rents for operational activities. 
 Additionally, I further consider what I term an “innovation incentives” 
hypothesis, which posits that increased protection from reverse engineering, and thereby 
a decrease in the intensity of a firm’s product market competition, can increase the 
investment incentives of protected firms and improve long-term firm value (Aghion and 
Howitt, 1992 and Davidson and Segerstrom, 1998). Therefore, under this hypothesis, 
value is created from the use of Ricardian or economic rents towards investments in 
new and existing production technologies. 
6.1 Rents-in-and-Of-Itself 
 In this subsection, I consider if the positive relation I document between firm 
value and APM laws might be explained by an increase in the economic “rents-in-and-
of-itself,” that protected firms earn through a reduction in product market competition 
(Lindenberg and Ross, 1981). The all item APM laws prohibited an efficient method to 
reverse engineer manufacturing products, creating a technological barrier to entry that 
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increased the relative market power of protected firms. In order to test this potential 
economic rents-in-and-of-itself channel of value, I analyze the impact of the APM laws 
on protected firms’ profitability and financial health.    
  I first test the rents-in-and-of-itself hypothesis by examining the impact of APM 
laws on the profitability of protected firms over the period 1975 to 1988. In order to 
proxy for firm-level profitability, I employ three separate empirical measures (following 
Giroud and Mueller, 2010). The first proxy variable for profitability is return on assets 
(ROA), which is measured as income before extraordinary items (ib) plus depreciation 
and amortization (dp) divided by the book value of total assets (at). The second 
profitability proxy is net profit margin (NPM). I measure NPM as operating income 
before depreciation and amortization (oibdp) divided by sales (sale). The last proxy for 
profitability is operating profit margin (OPM), where this variable is defined as total 
revenue (sale) minus the cost of goods sold (cogs) minus selling, general, and 
administrative expenses (xsga) over total revenue. Furthermore, I lead all three 
dependent variables one period (t+1) since the APM laws likely affect profitability with 
a lag. Each specification includes firm and industry-year fixed effects and I estimate 
robust standard errors clustered by state of location. 
 Panel A of Table B10 presents the results from the regressions of Profitability 
on an All Item APM Law indicator variable. Interpreting the results for both the 
“Manufacturing” and “Products” datasets, I find, in columns (1) and (4), that next year’s 
ROA does not increase for affected companies relative to firms in non-APM adopting 
states. Similarly, in columns (2) and (5), and columns (3) and (6), the respective 
profitability measures of NPM and OPM do not increase in the next fiscal year either. 
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This provides some suggestive evidence that economic rents firms might be earning in a 
weakened product market competition environment are not simply being allocated to 
the corporation’s bottom line.  
 As an additional test of the rents-in-and-of-itself hypothesis, I explore the effect 
of the plug molding protection statutes on affected firms’ financial soundness. The idea 
behind this test is that if competition is reduced and rents are created for protected 
firms, then, all else equal (including corporate policies), their financial soundness 
should improve after the adoption of the laws. I proxy for financial soundness using the 
following three variables. First, I use Altman’s Z-score (Z-score) which indicates the 
likelihood of a company going bankrupt or having significant financial distress (for an 
exact definition see Table A1). The second proxy for financial soundness is an 
operating cash flow ratio (OCF Ratio) measured as operating cash flow (ocf) divided by 
current liabilities (lct). The third proxy measure is Loss, which is an indicator variable 
set equal to one if a firm has negative net income (ni) during a fiscal year, and zero 
otherwise (Cain, McKeon, and Solomon, 2017). Similar as above, I lead all three of the 
dependent variables by one year (t+1), and always specify firm and industry-year fixed 
effects. 
 Panel B of Table B10 indicates that the APM laws do not significantly 
determine next year’s financial soundness for protected firms. For example, in column 
(3), an All Item APM Law does not yield an economically (point estimate=-0.015) or 
statistically significant (t-stat=-1.01) reduction in the likelihood an affected firm will 
experience a negative net income in the following fiscal year vis-à-vis unaffected firms. 
Similar results hold in all other specification and in both the “Manufacturing” and 
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“Products” samples. In sum, the evidence I document in Table B10 suggests that it is 
unlikely that APM laws create value by increasing the profitability and financial 
soundness of a protected firm, thereby rejecting the rents-in-and-of-itself hypothesis. 
6.2 Innovation Incentives 
 In the following two subsections, I investigate whether the “innovation 
incentives” hypothesis of reduced product market competition might explain the 
positive relation between Q and all item APM laws (Aghion and Howitt, 1992 and 
Davidson and Segerstrom, 1998).  
6.2.1 Investment Activity 
 Under the innovation incentives hypothesis, the weakening of product market 
competition intensity created by the enactment of reverse engineering protections 
encourages investments in new and existing production technologies by enhancing the 
flow and duration of economic rents firms earn as compensation for these operational 
strategies. To test if this applies to the competitive implications of APM statutes, I 
consider the effect of these laws on the investment behavior of protected firms.  
 First, I consider changes in investment in new production technologies for 
corporations covered by the APM laws using the following three proxies. The first 
proxy variable measures firm-level investments in R&D (R&D) by scaling research and 
development expenditure (xrd) with sales revenue (sale) (Chan, Lakonishok and 
Sougiannis, 2001; Eberhart, Maxwell and Siddique, 2004; and Phillips and Zhdanov, 
2012). The second proxy I specify, CAPX, is employed to capture the amount of 
expenditure firm’s allocate to undertake new projects and increase their scope of 
operations (Rauh, 2006). Specifically, I divide capital expenditures (capx) with the book 
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value of total assets (at). The last proxy variable used for investment in new production 
technologies is a firm’s investment rate (Invest Rate) measured as capital expenditures 
(capx) plus acquisitions (aqc) minus the sales of property (sppe) over the book value of 
assets (at) (Sanati, 2017). 
 Panel A of Table B11 reports the DID estimates over the sample period 1975 to 
1988, capturing the impact of the APM laws on own-firm investment activity in new 
production technologies. Consistent with previous specifications I include firm and 
industry-year fixed effects, where the industry grouping is defined at the two-digit SIC 
code level, and the estimated t-statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered by 
state of location. Moreover, in each of these models the dependent variables are led one 
year (t+1) since the effect of the statutes likely won’t impact corporate investment 
policy until the following year (Sapra, Subramanian, and Subramanian, 2014). The first 
three columns of the table pertain to the “Manufacturing” sample, while the last three 
are specific to the “Products” dataset. 
 Column’s (1) and (4) of Table B11 provides evidence that when corporations 
located in plug molding law states become better protected from reverse engineering 
they respond with increases in R&D investments. Specifically, affected firm’s R&D 
increases by 6.2% (=0.004/0.065), relative to the “Manufacturing” sample mean, and it 
rises by an even higher 7.8% (=0.005/0.064) in the “Products” sample. In addition, 
columns (2) and (5), and (3) and (6) indicate that APM protected businesses also 
increase their investment activity in CAPX and Invest Rate, respectively. For instance, 
the plug molding statute protection yields increases in CAPX of 7.7% (=0.005/0.065) 
and 9.5% (=0.006/0.063), relative to the respective sample means in the two separate 
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datasets. Therefore, these above findings are consistent with the hypothesis that APM 
laws increased the incentives of companies to allocate capital to long-term investment 
projects in new production technologies.  
 Next, I investigate whether changes in the competitive landscape of firms 
protected by APM statutes brought about changes in investments in existing production 
technologies. I use three proxy variables for this second batch of tests. The first variable 
employed to capture changes in firm-level investment behavior in existing production 
technologies is changes in advertising (Advertise) measured as advertising expenditure 
(xad) divided by sales (sale) (Bizjack, Brickley, and Coles, 1993; Coles, Lemmon, and 
Meschke, 2012). The second proxy variable is a measure of organizational capital 
(Organize) defined at the ratio of selling, general, and administrative expenses (xsga) to 
total assets (at) (following Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou, 2013). The third proxy measure I 
employ is labor intensity (Labor), which captures changes in a firm’s human capital and 
is measured at the number of employees (emp) divided by real total assets (at) 
(Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001), where assets are adjusted using (inflation-adjusted) 
2015 dollars.   
 Panel B of Table B11 presents the pooled panel regressions of Q on each of 
these three proxies for investments in existing production technologies over the period 
1975 to 1988, where all of the dependent variables are led by one year. In each of these 
models (1) – (6), I include the full set of controls, firm and industry-year fixed effects, 
and estimate robust standard errors with clustering by state of location. Consistent with 
my conjecture under the innovation incentives hypothesis, I find in four out of the six 
specifications that firms located in states with an APM law experience a statistically 
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significant increase in investments in existing production technologies. For example, in 
columns (3) and (6) companies better protected from reverse engineering have increases 
in next year’s labor capital of 6.3% (=0.001/0.016) and 5.9% (=0.001/0.017) relative to 
the respective “Manufacturing” and “Products” sample means. I thus conclude that 
Table B11 provides evidence consistent with the innovation incentives hypothesis of 
product market competition. 
6.2.2 Innovative Ability 
 In this subsection, I continue my evaluation of the sources of value of all item 
APM laws by considering their heterogeneous effects on companies that have greater 
innovative ability. According to Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Davidson and 
Segerstrom (1998), these firms can arguably be expected to experience the greatest 
amount of increase in their investment incentives with the decrease in product market 
competition engendered by the plug molding legislation. I therefore conjecture that if 
the innovation incentives hypothesis can explain the value added by the introduction of 
APM statutes, this value should be more prominent for this subset of firms.  I 
employ the research quotient (RQ) measure proposed by Knott (2008), and provided on 
WRDS for the period 1971 to 2015, to capture the innovative ability of the 
manufacturing businesses in my sample. As described in Table A1, RQ estimates the 
output elasticity of R&D (i.e., how successful are corporations at converting R&D into 
sales revenue). In additional robustness checks, I create two indicator variables from the 
continuous measure RQ: RQ Median and RQ High, which are set equal to one if the 
company’s research quotient is above the sample-year median or 66th percentile, 
respectively, and zero otherwise. Moreover, in each specification I include firm and 
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industry-year fixed effects, the full set of control variables, and estimate robust standard 
errors with clustering by state of location.  
 In the first four columns of Table B12, I find suggestive evidence that the 
positive value relevancy of APM statutes is attributable to “Manufacturing” firms with 
higher levels of innovative ability. For example, in columns (2) and (3), using the 
indicator variables RQ Median and RQ High, I find strong statistical evidence the 
companies with the greatest ability to convert R&D into sales are the sole beneficiaries 
of the increases in Tobin’s Q. Furthermore, as expected, the point estimate magnitudes 
increase monotonically from columns (2) to (3), consistent with the hypothesized 
mechanism. Lastly, in column (4), I specify the full regression model, interacting All 
Item APM Law with RQ High and RQ Low, respectively; All Item APM Law × RQ 
Medium and RQ Medium are omitted to avoid perfect multicollinearity. Relative to the 
sample mean, Tobin’s Q increases by 7% (=0.108/1.542) for firms with high levels of 
innovative ability in APM statute adopting states, while companies with low innovative 
ability do not experience any value gains (point estimate=0.003 and t-stat=0.17). 
 The last four columns of Table B12 pertain to the “Products” sample, and, as 
anticipated, the interpretations are even stronger in this dataset. In column (5), I 
document a one standard deviation increase in RQ yields a 7.5% (=0.706 × 0.107) rise 
in Tobin’s Q for firms located in APM law states. Meanwhile, decomposing the 
continuous RQ measure into RQ Median and RQ High indicator variables, in columns 
(6) and (7), shows that corporations in the respective upper median or upper tercile of 
innovative ability accrue the entirety of the gains in long-term value. I specify the full 
tercile split model in column (8), and find that, relative to the sample mean, high RQ 
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companies headquartered in adopting states, have increases in Tobin’s Q of 9.9% 
(=0.153/1.542), while the low innovative ability firms gain nothing from the laws.  
 The above analysis is carried forward into Table B13, where I explore how the 
value of firms with higher levels of innovative ability is impacted by the invalidation of 
APM statutes by the U.S. Supreme Court. In particular, I repeat the analysis performed 
in Table B12, except now I expand the panel to 1992, and interact All Item APM Law × 
Innovative Ability with an indicator variable equal to one if the year is 1989 and 
afterwards (Post 88). Columns (1) – (8) include the full set of control variables and firm 
and industry-year fixed effects. Further, the first four columns pertain to the 
“Manufacturing” dataset, whereas the last four are specific to the “Products” sample. I 
report estimated t-statistics based on robust standard errors with state of location 
clustering in parentheses. 
 The findings in columns (1) – (4) suggest companies with higher levels of 
output elasticity of R&D are adversely affected by the removal of reverse engineering 
protections. Furthermore, consistent with the innovation incentives hypothesis, the 
coefficient estimates are greater in absolute magnitude and significance for RQ High 
businesses relative to RQ Median firms. Meanwhile, the value of the least innovatively 
able companies in these states are unaffected by the invalidation of the APM legislation. 
Qualitatively similar results obtain in the “Products” sample, presented in the last four 
columns. 
 I conclude that, overall, the evidence across Tables B11 – B13 suggests that a 
reduction in product market competition is beneficial to shareholder value as it 
increases the investment incentives of innovative firms. 
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7. Robustness Tests 
7.1 Firm Value Dynamics 
 I begin the robustness analysis in Table B14, by studying the timing of changes 
in long-term firm value relative to the timing of the adoptions of the APM statutes to 
gauge whether the parallel trends assumption is likely satisfied. In addition, this test 
also sheds some light on the problem of lobbying contaminating the regression 
estimates, as it is likely the case these motivating agents would have inside information 
about the likelihood of the laws’ passage and would relay this knowledge to their 
corporate employers prior to their enactment. In each column I include the full set of 
controls and firm and industry-year fixed effects. Further, in columns (2) - (3) and (5) - 
(6), I append a state time trend variable to control for time varying state-level factors 
that might influence APM statute adoption.  
 In these tests, I regress Tobin’s Q on the following: an indicator variable equal 
to one if a firm is located in a state that will adopt an all item APM statute in one year 
and equal to zero otherwise, All Item APM Law[-1]; an indicator variable equal to one if 
a firm is headquartered in a state that adopts an APM statute in the current year and 
equal to zero otherwise, All Item APM Law[0]; an indicator variable equal to one if a 
firm is located in a state that adopted an APM statute one year ago and equal to zero 
otherwise, All Item APM Law[1]; and an indicator variable equal to one if a firm is 
located in a state that adopted an APM statute two or more years ago and equal to zero 
otherwise, All Item APM Law[2+]. Hence, if the point estimate on All Item APM Law[-1] 
(the placebo estimator) is statistically significant, there are serious concerns about the 
validity of the parallel trends assumption.  
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 The first three columns report results for the “Manufacturing” sample. 
Reassuringly, in columns (1) - (3) the point estimate on All Item APM Law[-1]  is 
statistically and economically insignificant. This provides suggestive evidence, that 
absent the adoption of the APM statutes, Tobin’s Q for firms headquartered in enacting 
states would have evolved in a similar fashion to those located in states without such 
legislation. Moreover, the positive and significant coefficients on All Item APM Law[1] 
and All Item APM Law[2+] indicates increases in firm value transpires after protection 
from reverse engineering is granted. In columns (4) - (6), I find qualitatively similar 
results in the “Products” dataset. That is, the placebo estimator remains both statistically 
and economically insignificant while the indicator variables All Item APM Law[1] and 
All Item APM Law[2+] suggest increases in Tobin’s Q. 
7.2 Matched Sample 
 The next robustness check shifts to assessing the reliability of my main finding 
in a matched sample. Indeed, since I employ a fairly long-panel (17 years) a potential 
concern is that some other confounding events or differences in observed and 
unobserved firm characteristics might be correlated with both the adoption of APM 
laws and firm value, potentially creating a spurious correlation between Q and APM 
Law. Additionally, corporations more reliant on intellectual property protection might 
self-select into states with plug molding legislation, making the control group of firms a 
poor counterfactual for testing the causal effect of these laws.  
 In constructing my matched sample, I consider treated and control firms with 
equidistant pre- and post-estimation windows surrounding the adoption date of the all 
item APM statutes. In particular, I match all sample firms in each of the states that enact 
45 
an all item APM law to a control firm in a state that does not have such legislation 
during the five-year period after the APM legislation is adopted in the treated firms’ 
state of location. This matching procedure is conducted in the year prior to the adoption 
date of each of the three all item APM laws. I use propensity scores with nearest 
neighbor matching on Q, Size, Ln(Age), HHI, Sales Growth, and Loss, as well as 
Ln(Patent) to proxy for the importance of intellectual property protection to address the 
concern of a self-selection effect. In addition, I use exact matching on two-digit SIC 
codes. 
 Panel A of Table B15 presents the pre-treatment year summary statistics for the 
resultant matched sample. Columns (1) and (2) show the means and standard deviations 
(in parentheses) of the matching variables for the “Manufacturing” sample. I then 
present the differences between the treated and control group variables and 
corresponding t-statistics (in parentheses) in column (3). Columns (4) , (5), and (6) 
report the analogue statistics for the “Products” dataset. The panel shows that the treated 
and control groups are insignificantly different from one another for each of these 
characteristics. Hence, the matched sample mitigates the two concerns surrounding the 
relatively long-pooled panel analysis discussed above. Panel B of Table B15 presents 
the means, standard deviations, and number of observations of the matched variables 
used in the full matched sample for both the “Manufacturing” and “Products” datasets. 
 Panel C of Table B15 reports the matched sample difference-in-differences 
estimates of a Treat × Post  interaction term on Q, where Treat is always equal to one 
for firms located in a state with an all item APM law, and zero otherwise, and Post is set 
equal to one in the one year after the enacting states’ adoption date, and zero in the one 
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year period before. I include firm and industry-year fixed effects in all four columns but 
exclude the individual Treat and Post terms due to their multicollinearity with the 
respective fixed effects and estimate standard errors with clustering by state of location. 
Columns (2) and (4) specify the full set of control variables for firm and industry 
characteristics. 
 In column (1), without including the control variables, I find that the treated 
firms experience economically and statistically significant increases in Q of 7.4 
percentage points relative to the matched controls over a ± one-year estimation 
window, where the year of adoption is excluded from the panel.  This represents a 
substantial 6.1% (=0.074/1.208) increase in firm value relative to the matched sample 
mean value of Q.21 Consistently, when I estimate the fully specified model in column 
(2) I find a positive impact of Treat × Post on Q relative to the control group over the 
(t-1) to (t+1) period. Similar findings hold in columns (3) and (4) for the “Products” 
sample, but with larger coefficient magnitudes, indicating that less noise from “non-
product” firms is obfuscating the regression estimates. Overall, I find robust evidence in 
both the pooled panel and matched sample Q regressions that a reduction in product 
market competition increases firm value. 
7.3 Non-Manufacturing Companies 
 Another interesting robustness test is to repeat the analysis performed in Tables 
B6 and B7, but, instead of focusing on manufacturing firms, consider all other non-
manufacturing companies (firms outside of the 2000 to 3999 SIC code range). This 
falsification test has the advantage of objectivity, as a corporation either is or isn’t 
                                                 
21 The matched sample average Q is much smaller than the average in the pooled panel. This is an artifact 
of both increasing Qs over time, and the three all item APM laws being enacted, and thus matched, earlier 
in the time series (1978-1983). 
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located in an adopting state, and either does or doesn’t operate in the manufacturing 
industry.22 In addition, there is only one sample employed in this test, “Non-
Manufacturing”, since this dataset also includes non-products-based businesses outside 
of the manufacturing sector. Table B16 presents the results.  
 In columns (1) and (2), I do not find a statistically significant effect of All Item 
APM Law on Tobin’s Q for non-manufacturing firms headquartered in adopting states 
over the period 1975 to 1988. In particular, column (2) finds that, after controlling for 
the full set of covariates and firm and industry-year fixed effects, the regression point 
estimate is economically (-0.012) and statistically (t-statistic=-0.14) insignificant. In the 
next two columns, (3) and (4), I expand the panel out until 1992 to investigate a 
differential effect after the Supreme Court’s ruling. However, both columns indicate the 
lack of an impact on Tobin’s Q. Specifically, in column (4), both the Post 88 × All Item 
APM Law (t-statistic=0.85) and All Item APM Law (t-statistic=-0.27) point estimates are 
insignificant, as is the joint effect (t-statistic=0.24) for the full period 1975 to 1992. 
These results are reassuring that some state-level unobserved trend in economic 
conditions is not driving the positive value effects in the main analysis since it should 
also manifest itself in this sample. 
7.4 Portfolio Analysis 
 As a further robustness check to the pooled panel regressions, I investigate the 
relation between APM statutes and firm value using a long-run stock return event study. 
To do so, I construct the following calendar time portfolios. First, I use corporations 
located in All Item APM adopting states and within the “Manufacturing” and “Products” 
                                                 
22 Furthermore, Villalonga (2004) documents that manufacturing firms are less likely to engage in 
strategic accounting when classifying their industry affiliation. 
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samples, respectively, to create two long portfolios. Next, I construct two corresponding 
short portfolios, by including stocks of firms headquartered in neighboring states that 
were falsely assigned protection in the “Neighboring State Manufacturing” and 
“Neighboring State Products” datasets. Figure B3 and Panel C of Table B1 show the 
neighboring state assignment. Further, I am able to create one additional short portfolio 
using non-manufacturing businesses’ stocks that are located in states with all item APM 
law protection, coming from the “Non-Manufacturing” sample.  
 For each of these five portfolios, I either long or short the respective stocks 12-
months prior to the adoption of the state’s corresponding statute and continue these 
investments until 36-months after the laws are passed (“12m36”). Finally, I construct 
long-short portfolios by differencing the portfolio returns of the long and short 
portfolios for each respective month. In order to estimate the monthly abnormal returns 
(Alpha), I use the four-factor Carhart (1997) and three-factor Fama-French (1993) 
models. Moreover, I define the market factor using the CRSP value-weighted index.23 
All t-statistics are estimated using robust standard errors and are presented in 
parentheses below Alpha. Table B17 provides the results. 
 In Panel A of Table B17, the portfolio analysis focuses on stocks bought from 
all item affected states in the “Manufacturing” sample, and pseudo affected stocks sold 
short from the “Neighboring State Manufacturing” dataset. In both the four-factor and 
three-factor models, I find positive and significant Alpha for the long and long-short 
portfolios. In contrast, the short portfolio does not produce statistically significant 
abnormal returns. Next, in Panel B, the Monthly Stock Returns regressions are 
                                                 
23 Table G5 in the supplementary appendix reports the results using a CRSP equally weighted index. The 
results are qualitatively similar. 
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performed on the “Manufacturing” (results repeated from above for ease of comparison) 
and the “Non-Manufacturing” portfolios. In these results, I document positive and 
significant abnormal returns, using both models, for the long portfolios and insignificant 
results for the short portfolios. Moreover, the long-short Alpha in the three-factor 
specification is positive and statistically significant. Lastly, Panel C reports the 
regression estimates from the long “Products”, short “Neighboring State Products”, and 
long-short portfolios. In particular, the long-short Alpha estimated with the four-factor 
model is positive and statistically significant, representing an 8.2% (=0.687×12) annual 
abnormal return. In sum, I conclude that the documented positive relation between 
APM laws and firm value is robust to using equity returns. 
7.5 Additional Robustness 
 I provide additional robustness to the main finding of a positive relation between 
APM laws and firm value with three supplementary tables in the supplementary 
appendix. The first additional robustness check verifies the validity of my “Products” 
sample by regressing Q on a sample of “Non-Products” corporations. This additional 
dataset is created by including all firms in the “Manufacturing” sample while excluding 
those from the “Products” dataset. This leftover cohort of manufacturing firms consists 
of companies operating in industries without tangible products that could be copied via 
the direct molding process (e.g., food, tobacco, textiles, and apparel products).  Table 
G6 reports the regression estimates, where columns (1) and (2) correspond to the period 
1975 to 1988, and columns (3) and (4) are for the period 1975 to 1992. In each of these 
four columns, irrespective of the inclusion of controls, I find an absence of statistical 
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evidence that non-product-based firms located in APM adopting states have higher firm 
values than those of non-products-based companies without such legislation.   
 The second additional robustness check is a placebo test over the period 1975 to 
1988 where I assign firms headquartered in states neighboring actual adopters’, 
protection from reverse engineering and define these indicator variables as Neighboring 
State All Item APM Law and Neighboring State Boat Hull APM Law. My assignment 
scheme is shown in Figure B3 and cataloged in Panel C of Table B1. For instance, 
Wisconsin formally adopts an APM statute in 1983, while its neighboring state of 
Minnesota does not. In this test, I pretend Minnesota also enacts plug molding 
legislation in 1983 and compare how the value of firms located in its borders evolves 
relative to corporations located in other non-neighboring states without (actual or 
placebo) APM statute protection. Furthermore, actual adopting states are always 
excluded from the analysis. Table G7 reports the results. 
 In columns (1) and (2), I focus the analysis on the “Neighboring State 
Manufacturing” sample. From these first two columns it’s clear that companies located 
in neighboring states of actual adopters do not experience the same value gains. 
Specifically, in the second column with the full set of controls included, I document a 
positive (0.022) but insignificant (t-statistic=0.34) point estimate on Neighboring State 
All Item APM Law. Similar conclusions are reached in columns (3) and (4) with the 
“Neighboring State Products” dataset.  
 The final additional robustness check confirms that the main findings in the 
pooled panel analysis are supported using another alternative measure of firm value: 
Total Tobin’s Q (Total Tobin’s Q), as proposed by Peters and Taylor (2017). This 
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measure of firm value attempts at explicitly accounting for intangible assets (which are 
neglected by Tobin’s Q). Accordingly, it seems particularly useful in assessing my 
results since I document that investments in intangible assets (i.e., R&D, advertising, 
organizational capital, and labor) are a key driving force behind the value gains from 
APM laws.  
 The first two columns of Table G8 present estimates for the “Manufacturing” 
sample, while the last two columns are specific to the “Products” dataset. Moreover, 
columns (1) and (3) correspond to the period 1975 to 1988, when the APM laws were 
constitutionally valid, while columns (2) and (4) extend the sample to 1992 to capture 
the invalidation of the laws by a 1989 U.S. Supreme Court ruling. I find that, 
irrespective of sample period and dataset, all item APM laws remain a significant 




 Existing studies document a positive association between empirical proxies for 
product market concentration and shareholder value. However, this result is difficult to 
interpret from reduced form correlations, as industry concentration and firm valuation is 
endogenously determined.  
 In this paper, I contribute to the literature on the relationship between product 
market concentration and firm value by shifting the focus from endogenous proxies to a 
unique tandem of exogenous events that directly influence the intensity of competition 
in product markets. I do so by exploiting the quasi-natural experiment provided by the 
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staggered adoption of anti-plug-mold (APM) laws that prohibited an efficient method of 
reverse engineering products, and thus reduced competition in product markets, in 12 
U.S. states over the period 1978 to 1987, and their ensuing invalidation by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in 1989. 
 I document that the weakened product market competition environment results 
in an economically and statistically significant increase in long-term value for the firms 
located in the adopting states, and especially so for firms with greater levels of 
innovative ability. Overall, my results are most consistent with what I refer to as the 
“innovation incentives” hypothesis, under which reduced product market competition 
increases firm value by increasing the flow and duration of economic rents that 














Chapter 2: Are Some Things Best Kept Secret? The Effect of the 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act on Financial Leverage 
 
1. Introduction 
 Survey evidence suggests that trade secrets24 are the most important mechanism 
to protect businesses’ intellectual property (IP). The National Science Foundation’s 
National Center for Science and Engineering conducts the annual Business Research 
and Development and Innovation Survey (BRDIS) which targets responses from for-
profit companies with at least five or more paid employees, a minimum of one business 
establishment in operation during the survey year, and performs some form of R&D 
activity all within the United States. One of the survey questions asks the respondent to 
assess “how important to your company were the following types of intellectual 
property protection?” (Form BRDI-1, 2013, p.45) with answers ranging from “very 
important”, “somewhat important”, to “not important.” Table D1 reports the most 
recently published results in which 57.2% of businesses in all industries said trade 
secrets were a very important form of intellectual property protection, followed by 
utility patents (51%), trademarks (43.4%), copyrights (27.2%), and design patents 
(24.3%). The surveyed level of importance of trade secrets for firms in all industries 
with some R&D expenditure skyrockets to 93.7%25 for large businesses defined as 
having 10,000 or more domestic employees.  
                                                 
24 Examples of trade secrets include food and beverage recipes, marketing strategies, computer 
algorithms, business plans, customer contact lists and “leads”, and other confidential information that 
may or may not be patentable and which give the holder of the secret an economic advantage.   
25 Measured by combing the “very important” and “somewhat important” percentages.  
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 In addition to this survey evidence, there exists recent empirical work examining 
the effect of trade secrets protection on innovative activity. Png (2017a) finds a positive 
association between stronger trade secrets laws and R&D among large firms, and firms 
operating in high-technology industries. Further, Png (2017b) and Dass, Nanda, and 
Xiao (2015), in contemporaneous studies, document a negative relation between 
increased trade secrets protection and patenting activity. Png shows that firms in 
complex technology industries covered by strengthened trade secrets laws are 
associated with 18 percent fewer patents. Meanwhile, Dass et al. find that state-level 
statutes that augment trade secrets protection results in fewer patent applications for the 
average firm. What remains an open question in the literature, however, is how do firms 
finance these increases in non-patented, innovative endeavors?       
 Our study analyzes the impact of trade secrets protection on capital structure 
decision-making by comparing the debt ratios of firms located in states adopting 
stronger trade secrets laws with firms headquartered in states without such legislation. 
In particular, we investigate the effect of a stronger trade secrets environment on large 
firms’ financial leverage, which, given both the survey and empirical evidence, are most 
likely to be significantly affected by better protection. Moreover, secrecy is a form of 
informal IP designed to protect appropriation of rewards from invention and innovation 
(Hall, Helmers, Rogers, and Sena 2014).26 Thus, big firms generating larger sales 
revenue should be differentially impacted by laws that increase appropriability (Png 
2017a). Further, small firms disproportionately rely on patents (Figueroa and Serrano 
2013) rather than on secrecy as it provides IP protection at a lower cost. This motivates 
                                                 
26 Hall et al. (2014) define the main forms of formal IP as patents, trademarks, designs, and copyright, 
whereas informal IP can take the form of secrecy, confidentiality agreements, lead time, and complexity. 
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our study to consider how large firms adjust their financial leverage after becoming 
covered by trade secrets laws.  
 There are at least two ways in which trade secrets protection could potentially 
influence large firms’ financial leverage. On one hand, prior work finds that firms in 
which R&D is an important form of investment, fund this activity almost entirely with 
cash holdings and/or equity capital (e.g., Nelson 1959, Arrow 1962, Bradley, Jarrell, 
and Kim 1984, Titman and Wessels 1988, Opler and Titman 1994, Alderson and Betker 
1996, Chung and Wright 1998, Hall 2002, Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen 2009, Hall and 
Lerner 2010, Brown, Martinsson, and Petersen 2013, and Chava, Oettl, Subramanian, 
and Subramanian 2013). This is consistent with theories suggesting that innovative 
firms plagued by informational problems (Akerlof 1970, Leland and Pyle 1977, Stiglitz 
and Weiss 1981, Bhattacharya and Ritter 1983, and Anton and Yao 2002), moral-hazard 
dilemmas (Jensen and Meckling 1976), and limited collateralizable assets (Williamson 
1988, Berger and Udell 1990) are less likely to use debt financing. Thus, we might 
expect large firms experiencing strengthened trade secrets protection to reduce financial 
leverage.  
 On the other hand, large firms treated with greater trade secrets protection are 
less susceptible to a rival firm misappropriating their economically valuable, 
confidential information. The use of secrecy as a mechanism to protect IP is inherently 
risky. Trade secrets can be legally acquired if a competitor firm independently discovers 
or reverse engineers the same coveted information (Png 2017a). Consequently, the 
competitor firm could patent the newly acquired secret, if patentable, thus revoking the 
initial firm’s ability to continue to use the secret, as specified by patent law (Jaffe 1986, 
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Friedman, Landes, and Posner 1991, and Hall et al. 2014). This would be legal. 
However, under strengthened trade secrets laws improper means of misappropriation 
are illegal, reducing the likelihood of diminished future cash flows generated by the 
secret. Hence, we might expect that large firms affected by increases in trade secrets 
protection have reduced financial distress costs – i.e., they are less likely to default 
since they are less likely to lose out on future cash flows – and therefore, trade-off these 
lowered costs with the benefits of increasing financial leverage (Miller 1977).  
 We exploit the staggered state-level adoption of the Uniform Trade Secrets Acts 
(UTSA) between 1975 and 2003 to isolate the causal effect of trade secrets protection 
on capital structure decision-making. The UTSA increased the protection of firm’s trade 
secrets by codifying the existing common law, precisely defining a “trade secret”, 
enumerating what constitutes misappropriation, and clarifying the rights and remedies 
of victimized firms (Uniform Law Commission, 1985). Figure D1 depicts the number of 
states that have passed these statutes by decade.  Further, we proxy for trade secrets 
protection using a state-level index constructed by Png (2017a) which accounts for pre-
existing common law, and represents the change in legal protection resulting from the 
enacted UTSA.27  We find that large firms, measured by the natural logarithm of sales, 
protected by stronger trade secrets laws increase their debt ratios. Specifically, using a 
difference-in-differences framework, we find that once large firms become covered by 
UTSA, their book and market leverage ratios are increased by 3.85 (= 0.018 × 2.137) 
and 2.14 (= 0.010 × 2.137) percentage points, respectively, for every one standard 
deviation increase in the natural logarithm of sales. The results are robust to alternative 
                                                 
27 Table C1 in the appendix, which is an exact reproduction of Table A2 from the appendix of Png 
(2017a), provides a full description of the construction of the measure. In addition, we provide a concise 
explanation of the protection index in Section 4.2. 
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definitions of financial leverage, and to alternative proxies for firm size which includes 
the natural logarithm of total assets and the total number of employees, respectively, 
and splitting the size proxy into indicator variables based on median and median-year 
sales. Further, we show that the positive change in the debt ratios transpires after the 
passage of the UTSA law, assuaging concerns of lobbying or anticipatory leverage 
adjustments. In addition, a Cox proportional hazard analysis shows that firm-level, 
state-level, and industry-level debt measures do not explain the decision for a state to 
adopt the UTSA, suggesting that reverse causality does not contaminate the estimates.  
 In further tests, we investigate if the interaction of the UTSA and firm-specific 
innovative activity also determines the level of financial leverage. In particular, we 
analyze firms affected by the UTSA that are characterized as having high R&D 
intensity, and existing patent portfolios. This added layer of analysis is beneficial in 
understanding the underlying relationship governing our main finding that large UTSA 
protected firms increase debt ratios. The only negative relation we document between 
leverage and increased trade secrets protection is for high R&D intensity firms. Thus, it 
appears, without differentiating on size, firms with greater levels of pre-existing R&D 
expenditure decrease debt after the passage of the UTSA, which is consistent with the 
extant literature on R&D and its financing (e.g., Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim 1984, among 
others). In contrast, UTSA protected firms with large pre-existing patent portfolios 
increase debt. This seems on par with recent work documenting a negative relation 
between the UTSA and patent applications (Png 2017b, and Dass et al. 2015). That is, 
large innovative firms potentially transition to or increase their usage of secrecy after 
the passage of these laws, and they do so with debt. 
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 Overall, our results suggest that increased trade secrets protection affects larger 
firms’ debt ratios by decreasing their probability of default. Specifically, we analyze the 
relationship between the UTSA and the sensitivity of changes in earnings to changes in 
sales to capture the level of a firms’ operating leverage, and find that it is lower 
following the enactment of the UTSA. Further, we find a significant negative relation 
between large UTSA protected firms and the inverse of modified Altman’s Z-score, and 
operating cash flow risk, respectively. Next, we investigate the effect of UTSA specific 
to firms characterized by higher likelihoods of default on debt ratios and find these 
companies adjust their book and market leverage upward. We conclude that large firms 
are differentially affected by the UTSA, and as such the inherently risky but rewarding 
IP protection mechanism of secrecy becomes less dangerous. Accordingly, companies 
optimally respond by financing increased innovative activity with leverage. Finally, we 
provide evidence that there exists positive long-term firm value implications for large 
firms headquartered in these UTSA adopting states. 
 This paper makes new and important contributions to several strands of the 
literature. First, we provide new evidence on the impact of the UTSA for large firms 
and their capital structure decision-making. We are the first to document this specific 
relationship, but one of two contemporaneous studies to investigate the general effect of 
an increase in trade secrets protection on leverage. Klasa, Ortiz-Molina, Serfling, and 
Srinivasan (2018) consider the recognition of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine (IDD) 
by U.S. state courts, which decreases the mobility of workers with trade secrets 
knowledge from gaining similar employment with a rival firm. They argue that firms in 
which trade secrets are an important IP mechanism retain unused debt capacity in case a 
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competitor gains access to the secret. Thus, the risk of losing IP to rivals is reduced after 
rulings in favor of the IDD and as such firms’ capital structure decisions are less 
conservative. 
 Our study differs from Klasa et al. (2018) in the following seven ways. First, we 
make use of exogenous variation stemming from the staggered passage of the UTSA, 
whereas they consider the IDD. These experiments are fundamentally different as the 
former codifies the “rules of the game”, which includes the legal remedies for 
victimized firms and is implemented via the legislative process, while the latter 
immobilizes employees with trade secrets knowledge and is recognized by state courts. 
Consequently, they do not necessarily imply the same effect on capital structure 
decision-making. Second, we find suggestive evidence using a Cox proportional hazard 
model that the UTSA is a substitute for the IDD, as states with the doctrine in place are 
less likely to legislate for the statute. This is important as nearly all U.S. states have 
adopted the UTSA, while less than half recognize the IDD. Again, confirming that these 
laws are worth studying in isolation. Third, our evidence shows that both laws have 
separate and significant impacts on debt ratios. That is, we include an IDD indicator 
variable as a control in all of our tests, and find that the effect of the UTSA on large 
firms’ financial leverage persists. Thus, both experiments have important implications 
for a firm’s capital structure. Fourth, the two studies are methodologically different. We 
employ an index which accounts for pre-existing common law, whereas Klasa et al. 
specify a “0/1” dummy. Fifth, we uniquely investigate the impact of trade secrets 
protection on innovative firms’ debt ratios. The evidence from these tests show that 
companies located in UTSA states with large and meaningful patent portfolios increase 
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their book and market leverage. Sixth, we find evidence that large firms adjust their 
levels of debt upward because of a reduction in bankruptcy costs. In contrast, Klasa et 
al. document results consistent with conservatism in unused debt capacity yielding the 
positive relation between the doctrine and debt ratios. Moreover, they do not find 
evidence for the trade-off theory of capital structure, and we confirm their result as the 
IDD does not predict reductions in bankruptcy costs in our sample. Lastly, we find 
positive long-term value effects for large firms located in UTSA passing states, whereas 
the IDD indicator is insignificant. On the other hand, Klasa et al. have well-defined 
event dates which allows them to document positive and significant short-term 
abnormal returns for firms headquartered in states that recognize the doctrine. Hence, 
both studies provide incrementally valuable, novel evidence to this important and 
relatively unexplored strand of literature. 
 Specifically, our results add to the existing research that uses the UTSA as a 
source of exogenous variation for secrecy. Other topics of papers in this area include its 
effect on R&D expenditure (Png 2017a), internal patenting (Png 2017b, Dass et al 
2015), and financial disclosure (Guo, Nanda, and Pevzner 2016). Furthermore, we 
contribute to the trade secrets protection literature, which thus far has primarily 
employed the IDD setting. These papers consider the impact of the doctrine on capital 
structure decision-making and its respective channel (Klasa et al.), short-term value 
implications (Qui and Wang 2017), employee mobility by level of education (Png and 
Samila 2015), internal patenting activity (Contigiani, Barankay, and Hsu 2016), M&A 
activity (Gao and Ma 2016), and operational uncertainty (Lin, Wei, and Wu 2016).   
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 Moreover, we broadly contribute to the literature investigating capital structure 
and its determinants (Myers 1977, Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim 1984, Titman and Wessels 
1988, Rajan and Zingales 1995, Alderson and Betker 1995, Leary and Roberts 2005, 
Frank and Goyal 2008, and Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender 2008, Kisgen 2009, 
Hackbarth, Mathews, and Robinson 2014, and DeAngelo and Roll 2015, among others), 
and specifically to studies finding support for trade-off theory (Danis, Rettl, and Whited 
2014, Serfling 2016, Glover 2016, and Reindl, Stoughton, and Zechner 2016, among 
others). Lastly, we add to the literature on financing and innovation (Stiglitz and Weiss 
1981, Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim 1984, Stiglitz 1985, Titman and Wessels 1988, Cornell 
and Shapiro 1988, Williamson 1988, Blair and Litan 1990, Berger and Udell 1990, Hall 
1993, 1994, Opler and Titman 1993, 1994, Alderson and Betker 1996, Chung and 
Wright 1998, Blass and Yosha 2003, Acharya and Subramanian 2009,  Brown, Fazzari, 
and Petersen 2009, Chava, Oettl, Subramanian, and Subramanian 2013, Acharya, 
Baghai, and Subramanian 2014, and Sapra, Subramanian, and Subramanian 2014). 
 
2. Hypothesis Development 
 It is unclear how an exogenous increase in trade secrets protection will affect 
financial leverage for large firms.  On the one hand, stronger secrecy protection yielding 
increases in R&D expenditure (Png 2017a) might bring about a decrease in debt ratios. 
Inventive firms choose cash holdings and/or equity capital to avoid debt overhang 
problems and high borrowing costs (Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim 1984, Titman and 
Wessels 1988, Opler and Titman 1994, Alderson and Betker 1996, Chung and Wright 
1998, Hall 2002, Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen 2009, and Hall and Lerner 2010). These 
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findings suggest that the financing decision for R&D dependent firms is predicted by 
the challenges they face with information asymmetry (Leland and Pyle 1977, Stiglitz 
and Weiss 1981, Bhattacharya and Ritter 1983, and Anton and Yao 2002), moral-hazard 
or hidden action (Jensen and Meckling 1976), and reliance on intangible assets which 
cannot be used as collateral (Berger and Udell 1990). This leads to the hypothesis that 
large firms protected by the UTSA will reduce their levels of outstanding debt. 
 On the other hand, an increase in trade secrets protection for large businesses 
could relate positively with book and market leverage. The use of secrecy as a 
mechanism to protect IP is optimal if the confidential information is non-patentable 
and/or the potential returns from the indefinite future cash flows generated by the secret 
is greater than the in-flow of legally protected finite rewards granted to successful 
patent applicants (Friedman et al. 1991, and Hall et al. 2014). However, when 
comparing the potential infinite streams of future returns garnered by the use of secrecy 
with finite appropriations from patenting, the former should be probability-weighted 
(Almeida and Philippon 2007) to account for the likelihood that the confidential 
information is discovered or misappropriated by a rival firm. If the UTSA decreases the 
likelihood that secrets will be discovered through improper means, this increases the 
odds that a firm will be able to capitalize indefinitely on their confidential information 
and correspondingly reduces the probability of default (Andrade and Kaplan 1998), all 
else equal. Thus, based on this argument an alternative hypothesis is that large firms 
significantly affected by the UTSA will increase their financial leverage, taking 
advantage of the benefits of debt (Miller 1977). 
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3. Institutional Background 
3.1 The Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) 
 To assist in the improved protection and codification of trade secrets laws, the 
Uniform Law Commissioners designed and proposed the Uniform Trade Secrets Act 
(UTSA) in 1979 for state-level enactment. The UTSA was later amended in 1985 and 
provided the following three major improvements above the previously established 
common law procedures.28 First, it more comprehensively defined a trade secret as 
meaning “information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program device, 
method, technique, or process that derives independent economic value, actual or 
potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by 
proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or 
use, and is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain 
its secrecy” (Section 1.4, p. 5, 1985). The Commissioners further commented on the 
definition to specify certain refinements. These comments detailed that negative 
information about failed ideas was valuable and also covered under the act. In addition, 
works-in-progress, such as ongoing R&D activity, constituted a protected trade secret.  
 The second major improvement of the UTSA over the general common law of 
the time, was that it outlined what it meant for a secret to be misappropriated. Section 
1.2 of the UTSA prescribes misappropriation of a secret to mean the “acquisition of a 
trade secret of another by a person who knows or has reason to know that the trade 
                                                 
28 Prior to the UTSA, the primary governing code for trade secrets protection was established in the 
Restatement (First) of Torts, which is a treaty specific to this subject matter providing guidance to judges 
and lawyers in a common law system. Under this code a trade secret was defined to “consist of any 
formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one’s business, and which gives 
him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it” (Section 757, 
Comment b (1939)). However, although an important historical event in trade secret protection, this 
formalization was not legally binding and produced conflicting court decisions across states.  
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secret was acquired by improper means, or disclosure or use of a trade secret of another 
without express or implied consent by a person who used improper means to acquire 
knowledge of the trade secret” (pp. 4-5. 1985). The misappropriation of a trade secret 
through improper means can include bribery, theft, misrepresentation, breach of duty to 
maintain secrecy, or espionage. This would be considered a form of unfair competition. 
However, trade secrets can be legally acquired if the covered company involuntarily 
disclosed the secret, or a competitor firm independently discovered or reverse 
engineered the prized, clandestine information. Moreover, as specified by existing 
patent law, the competitor firm could attempt to patent its newly discovered 
information, disallowing the use of the secret by the originating firm. 
 Finally, the third major improvement was that the UTSA clarified rights and 
remedies for businesses which had secrets wrongly appropriated and used.  Remedies 
for infringement include injunctive relief, damages, reasonable royalties, and, in certain 
circumstances, attorney fees.29 The UTSA established a statute of limitations upon 
which any action under the act must be brought forth within three years after the 
discovery of the misappropriation. Moreover, the UTSA outlines that courts deciding 
cases should take reasonable precautions to preserve the secrecy of the contested 
information, and if the UTSA is enacted it supersedes existing state-specific common 
laws. 
                                                 
29 Anecdotal evidence suggests that protected firms do prosecute suspected perpetrators and earn sizeable 
awards for their victimization. For instance, Best Buy, the world’s largest consumer electronics retailer, 
was found liable of stealing corporate secrets from an electronics recycling start-up, TechForward, and 
forced to pay $27 million (see, Kopelman 2012 for details). Further, a back-of the envelope calculation, 
in Hall, Helmers, Rogers, and Sena (2014), based on a 2011 federal court ruling in Kolon Industries Inc. 
v. Dupont Co., suggests an average value of $6.3 million per trade secret. 
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3.2 The Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine (IDD) 
 Another important form of state-level trade secrets protection stems from the 
Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine (IDD). Under this doctrine, firms have the legal ability 
to obtain an injunction to prevent current or former employees from gaining 
employment at another company without having to show that the individual actually 
applied, disclosed or intended to use any of the plaintiffs’ trade secrets. Instead, the IDD 
only requires firms prove that the defendant’s new position is one in which trade secrets 
would inevitably be disclosed (Png and Samila 2015). This key legal distinction, 
contrasted above, is that of “threatened misappropriation” (Klasa et al. 2018). Thus, if a 
firm perceives there is a risk of threat of misappropriation by an individual with trade 
secrets knowledge whom finds work in a similar position at a rival firm, the IDD can be 
invoked. 
 By the doctrine, in order for a firm to file suit and obtain an injunction against 
the individual it must establish the following: (i) the employee worked in some capacity 
which granted him or her access to the firm’s trade secrets, (ii) the role and 
responsibilities of the employee in their new position is so similar to that which they 
had at the plaintiff firm, that it would not be difficult to use or disclose the trade secrets, 
and (iii) the employee and new employer cannot be trusted not to use the trade secrets, 
and this would cause the former employing firm irreparable economic harm. Again, 
however, this three-part test does not require the firm to prove any actual wrongdoing.  
3.3 Comparing UTSA and IDD 
 Trade secrecy in the United States is largely governed by state rather than 
federal law (Pooley 1997-), and the two most important state-level legal precedents, 
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outlined above and considered in the finance and economics literature, are the UTSA 
and the IDD. The UTSA is passed in the form of a state statute via a legislative process, 
whereas the IDD is recognized by state courts. Although, the IDD was adopted in some 
states prior to the UTSA (New York in 1919, Florida in 1960, Delaware in 1964, 
Michigan in 1966, and North Carolina in 1976), the codification of the UTSA in 1979 
strengthened the protective capacity and applicability of the IDD. That is, due to the 
non-uniformity of general trade secrets common law, prior to the creation of the UTSA, 
the IDD was subject to state-varying definitions of secrecy and misappropriation which 
made the doctrine more difficult to cite in judicial proceedings. Hence, IDD adoptions 
after 1979 follow the same guiding principles specified in the UTSA (Lin, Wei and Wu 
2016).  
 The number of states that have passed the UTSA more than doubles those that 
recognize the IDD. Figure D2 shows the number of states that have adopted the UTSA 
and the IDD by year. In total, 46 states have such legislation, whereas the remaining 
four states without it have either passed their own trade secrets law (North Carolina in 
1981, and Wisconsin in 1986) or currently have introduced bills (Massachusetts and 
New York in their respective 2017 sessions) to adopt this statute. In contrast, 21 states 
have experienced precedent-setting cases in which their courts recognize the IDD and 
three instances (Florida in 2001, Michigan in 2002, and Texas in 2003) where judges 
later reject the doctrine (Klasa et al. 2018). There are no such examples of states later 
abolishing their UTSA laws. We hypothesize, but do not test, that the reason behind this 
difference in permanent acceptability is likely due to the controversial nature of the 
IDD. That is, the UTSA defines secrecy and misappropriability, and, most importantly, 
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the rights and remedies of victimized firms, whereas the IDD reduces employment 
mobility. There can be a much stronger case made against the equitability and 
justifiability of the latter than the former, and this likely influenced the three reversals 
of judicial attitude. 
3.4 Evidence on the Exogeneity of the UTSA 
 We use the UTSA as an instrument to study the effect of an unobservable 
predictor, namely, trade secrets protection, on capital structure decision-making. The 
validity of this identification strategy hinges on two crucial components. First, it is 
important to rule out any anticipatory effects of the passage of the law. That is, we need 
to test whether or not firms begin adjusting their leverage ratios prior to the adoption of 
the statute – a violation of the parallel trends assumption. This could be the case as the 
legislative process requires at a minimum the introduction of the bill, passage at the 
House and Senate level, before finally obtaining approval by the Governor. In addition, 
if lobbying is a concern, then firms with motivating agents might observe private 
information about the likelihood of the UTSA being passed before actual adoption. We 
attempt to rule this out in Section 5.3, where we construct falsification tests to analyze 
the dynamics of the effect.30 In short, we find that leverage ratios for large firms, 
increases one year or more after becoming better protected, thus mitigating concerns 
about preemptive capital structure changes. 
  The second concern is that states enacted the law for reasons specifically related 
to corporate debt policy (i.e., reverse causality). While less plausible than the above 
concern, we attempt to address this possibility in the following two ways. First, we 
                                                 
30 We include this test later in the paper, because we think it makes the most sense organizationally to 
explore the dynamics of the effect, after first establishing its existence. 
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summarize what the literature has found with respect to UTSA adoption and firm-level 
R&D policy. Lastly, we conduct our own analysis to verify that firm-level, state-level, 
and industry-level measures of leverage do not explain the passage of the statute. 
 Png (2017a) provides supplemental analyses addressing the concern of reverse 
causality, but as it relates to R&D expenditure. First, he follows Romanosky, Telang, 
and Acquisti (2011) and constructs a scatterplot between the lag of UTSA adoption and 
R&D growth. He finds no apparent relation between the lag in enactment and the 
growth of R&D. Further, Png estimates a least squares regression of the legislative lag 
on R&D growth and finds an insignificant relation. Next, he estimates a Cox 
proportional hazard model to the effective year of the UTSA in the states between 1979 
and 1997. His results indicate that the adoption of these trade secrets protection laws are 
not significantly related to gross state product, population, state industrial structure, 
R&D, policies to support R&D (such as R&D tax credits), or pro-business orientation 
(Republican-dominated legislatures). Hence, there is suggestive evidence that the 
UTSA was exogenous to firms located in states passing these laws, and specifically to 
R&D.  
 We follow a similar approach, but focus on the predictive ability of financial 
leverage. That is, we estimate a Cox proportional hazard model over the period 1975 to 
2003 and specify firm-level book leverage, and average state-year book leverage and 
industry-year book leverage, among other controls, as potential explanatory variables of 
the state-level adoption of the UTSA. The passage of these laws represents the failure 
event in the analysis, and therefore firms headquartered in these states are excluded 
from the sample after they become better protected by trade secrets legislation. The 
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other control variables include average state-year natural logarithm of sales, an indicator 
variable equal to one for states that recognize the IDD and zero otherwise, R&D 
expenditure divided by sales, an indicator variable equal to one if a state offers an R&D 
tax credit and zero otherwise, average state-year natural logarithm of patents, average 
state-year modified Altman’s Z-score, natural logarithm of state GDP per capita, a 
state’s GPD growth rate, the percent of state-level representatives in the U.S. House of 
Representatives whom belong to the Republican party in a given year, state property 
crime rate by year, and a state corruption score. Table C2 in the appendix provides 
detailed account of these measures. Further, for ease of interpretation, we standardize 
all of the continuous variables to have a mean of zero and unit variance. The 
independent variables are lagged one-period (t-1). We also include year fixed effects in 
all of the specifications to control for time varying, unobserved heterogeneity, and the 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% level. We present the results in Table D2.  
 The columns report hazard ratios for varying specifications of the Cox models. 
These hazard ratios and their corresponding robust standard errors are clustered by state 
of location. Columns 1 through 4 provide suggestive evidence that firm-level, state-
level and industry-level leverage is not significantly correlated with the adoption of the 
UTSA. This provides some reassuring initial evidence that reverse causality is not a 
concern for this identification strategy. Further, there is only one independent variable 
that seems to predict the failure event in our sample, and that is the IDD dummy. Its 
hazard ratio ranges from 0.105 to 0.116 with 1% to 5% significance in the four separate 
specifications. These estimates indicate that firms that have already had IDD laws 
passed at the judicial level are less likely to legislate for the UTSA. Thus, we provide 
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suggestive evidence that the two might be substitutes, further warranting the need to 
study both laws and their effects on capital structure decision-making. Overall, we have 
no reason to believe that using the UTSA as an instrument to identify the effect of trade 
secrets protection on financial leverage is contaminated by endogeneity. 
 
4. Data and Empirical Methodology 
4.1 Sample Selection 
 The main sample is composed of 80,691 firm-year observations based on 9,553 
publicly traded industrial firms, excluding utilities and financial companies (SIC codes 
4900-4999 and 6000-6999, respectively), headquartered in the U.S.31, and without 
missing data for the main variables of interest over the period 1975 to 2003. We 
combine financial data from Compustat with the UTSA index constructed by Png 
(2017a) by state of location and year. The year of enactment, strength of pre-existing 
common laws, and change in trade secrets protection after passage of the UTSA are 
shown in Table D3. 
 Our sample period begins five years before the first state, Minnesota, passes the 
UTSA, and ends five years after Michigan adopts. Figure D2 depicts the number of 
states that have enacted the UTSA by year through 2016, and contrasts this with the 
number of IDD recognizing states. There are five states that pass the UTSA after 
Michigan: Tennessee in 2000, Pennsylvania in 2004, Wyoming in 2006, New Jersey in 
                                                 
31 We obtain data on a firm’s state of location from Compustat. Unfortunately, these sample points are 
specific to the current headquartering state, and do not provide historical information. This would be a 
concern if firms relocate, as some observations would be wrongly classified as being either a treated or 
controlled unit, when in fact they are not. However, it does not appear that firms switch headquartering 
states often. For example, Pirinsky and Wang (2006) find, over a 15-year period, that less than 2.4% of 
firms changed their state of location. 
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2012, and Texas in 2013. However, we truncate the sample at 2003 and exclude 
treatment-years for firms headquartered in these states for the following reasons. First, 
the two most recent states to adopt the UTSA, New Jersey and Texas, are not included 
because we do not have data on the UTSA trade secrets protection index after 2010. 
Second, Tennessee, Pennsylvania, and Wyoming treatment-year observations are left 
out of the sample because there is little gained by their inclusion. Namely, the number 
of additional treatment observations by including these firms is less than 5% of the total 
treatment sample, and, further, extending the sample to 201032 potentially creates noise 
that interferes with isolating the effect of trade secrets protection on financial 
leverage.33 This is especially true in our empirical framework, which specifies a 
staggered difference-in-differences methodology. 
4.2 The Main Explanatory Variables 
 Trade secrets protection, prior to the UTSA, was derived from common law. 
Therefore, it would be inaccurate to characterize the level of protection for businesses 
located in states with and without UTSA laws using a “0/1” indicator variable. This is 
the case for both treatment and control firms. Namely, there are firms headquartered in 
states without UTSA, but with pre-existing common law. Therefore, it would be 
incorrect to specify their level of protection with a “0”.34 Further, most companies 
covered by the UTSA, similarly, had pre-treatment protection under common law. In 
                                                 
32 Png (2017a, 2017b) constructs the trade secrets protection index from 1970 until 2010. We thank Ivan 
Png for making this data available: 
https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/BFP2IC.  
33 In robustness checks, we find that our main results hold over the sample periods: 1975 to 2005 
excluding PA and WY treatment-years, 1975 to 2009 excluding WY treatment-years, and 1975 to 2010 
including all treatment-years. 
34 Karpoff and Wittry (2017) investigate the misspecification of regression models analyzing the effect of 
business combination laws on various corporate outcome variables, and show that not accounting for 
legal and institutional context can lead to substantial biases that alter interpretations. Specifying trade 
secrets protection with Png’s index mitigates this potential bias. 
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order to cleanly identify the effect of trade secrets protection on financial leverage it is 
necessary to account for this state and year variation in strength of secrecy.  
  We follow Png (2017a, 2017b) and use his state-level index of protection, 
which represents the change in strength of trade secrets protection stemming from 
enactment of the UTSA. Png constructs the index based on three main dimensions: (1) 
substantive law, (2) civil procedure, and (3) remedies. Further, within the substantive 
law and remedies dimensions there are three and two items, respectively, that 
characterize a state with stronger protection.35 Png codes four of these items a “0” or 
“1” dependent on the strength and language of the laws and procedures. The other two 
are ratios of years allowed in civil procedures or years included in remedy calculations 
divided by three and six, respectively. Each of these values are summed and then 
divided by six, yielding a scaled protection index between 0 and 1, with a higher score 
representing stronger legal protection of trade secrets. The change stemming from the 
UTSA is the difference between the index pre- and post-enactment.36 This represents 
half of our main variable of interest. 
 The other remaining half is size. As noted in the introduction, there is a positive 
monotonic relation in the BRDIS survey data between the importance of the trade 
secrets mechanism for IP protection and the number of domestic employees. In 
addition, Png (2017a) finds that UTSA by itself is not significant in determining R&D 
expenditure, but only once he differentiates on firm size does the relation become 
significantly positive. Moreover, large firms are more likely to be impacted by the 
                                                 
35 Please refer to Table C1 in the appendix, which is a reproduction of Table A2 in the appendix of Png 
(2017a), for a detailed account of the dimensions and items.  
36 In robustness tests, we append Png’s specification to include the pre-enactment level of trade secrets 
protection, in addition to the change variable, UTSA, and find the results are nearly identical. 
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increase in trade secrets protection as they tend to have a greater reliance on secrecy 
than do small firms who disproportionately sell and acquire patents (Figueroa and 
Serrano 2013). Following, the lead of Png (2017a) we interact the UTSA protection 
index with the natural logarithm of sales to create the main explanatory variable, 
𝑈𝑇𝑆𝐴 × 𝐿𝑛(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠). However, since we are interacting two continuous variables we 
center 𝐿𝑛(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠) by differencing firm-year sales with its sample average. This is 
consistent with Png (2017a) and allows for more meaningfully interpretation of the 
coefficients of interest. For robustness, we also proxy for size using the continuous 
measures of natural logarithm of total assets (Ln(Assets)) and total employees 
(Ln(1+Employees)), both centered by their sample means, respectively, and with 
indicator variables that equal one for firms with Ln(Sales) greater than the sample 
median, or the sample-year median, respectively, and zero otherwise. 
4.3 The Dependent Variables 
 In this paper, we measure financial leverage in the following two ways. First, we 
use Book Leverage which is defined as the ratio of total debt to the book value of assets 
for each firm-year. According to Graham and Harvey (2002), most managers pay 
particular attention to book leverage as opposed to market leverage when making 
decisions regarding their firm’s capital structure. In addition, Welch (2004) documents 
that much of the variability in market leverage ratios is derived from changes in market 
values instead of actual debt policy alterations. However, to provide further robustness 
to our findings, we also measure Market Leverage using the ratio of the book value of 
total debt divided by the market value of assets for each firm-year. In robustness checks, 
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we also consider the natural logarithm of total debt, net book leverage, and net market 
leverage as dependent variables, respectively. 
4.4 Other Explanatory Variables 
 The other explanatory variables are those widely accepted and documented by 
the literature as theoretically and/or empirically showing to significantly associate with 
leverage (e.g., Harris and Raviv 1991, Rajan and Zingales 1995, Frank and Goyal 2008, 
Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender 2008, Kisgen 2009, Danis, Rettl, and Whited 2014, 
Matsa 2010, Agrawal and Matsa 2013, Gormley and Matsa 2014, DeAngelo and Roll 
2015, Serfling 2016, and Klasa et al. 2018). We include the log of sales (Ln(Sales)), 
assets (Ln(Assets)), or total number of employees (Ln(1+Employees)), depending on 
which variable is interacted with UTSA, to control for firm size. We control for a firm’s 
investment opportunities using its market-to-book ratio (𝑀/𝐵). Profitability is specified 
in the regression model to account for the availability of internal funds. We include 
Fixed Assets to control for firm tangibility. We also specify a dummy variable for 
whether a firm paid out earnings as a dividend to proxy for the level of financial 
constraint (Div Payer). Modified Altman’s Z-score (Mod Z-score) is added as a 
regressor to control for firm-level financial soundness; as noted in Mackie-Mason 
(1990), Altman’s Z-score includes the ratio of market equity to book debt, thus he 
proposes to exclude this term when studying capital structure, as the debt ratio directly 
enters the analysis as a dependent variable.  
 Another important independent variable that we specify in the model is an 
indicator variable equal to one if a state recognizes the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine 
(IDD), and zero otherwise. In a contemporaneous paper, Klasa et al. (2018) find that the 
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IDD is a positive, significant predictor of financial leverage. Moreover, in Section 3.2 
of this paper we document empirical evidence that IDD states are less likely to legislate 
for adoption of the UTSA. Hence, to avoid omitting a relevant variable we directly 
specify this dummy in the model as a control. This is further interesting, as it will 
provide direct evidence if the UTSA has explanatory power for firm-level financial 
leverage, above and beyond that of the IDD.   
  Lastly, to control for state, political, and industry conditions, we follow Serfling 
(2016), and include state-level GDP per capita (Ln(State GDPPC)), one-year state-level 
growth in GDP (State GDPG), and the proportion of state-level representatives in the 
U.S. House of Representatives whom belong to the Republican party (Republican), and, 
following Giroud and Mueller (2010), we include the average industry-year leverage (IY 
Leverage), and state-year leverage (SY Leverage), excluding firm 𝑖 from both 
calculations, where industry is defined at the three-digit SIC level. Table C2 in the 
appendix provides a more precise account of the variables used in the analyses. All 
continuous variables, with the exception of the UTSA, state-level economic and political 
variables, are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to remove the influence of 
extreme outliers, and the dollar values have been deflated using 2001 dollars. 
4.5 Empirical Methodology 
 Since the UTSA is adopted in a staggered fashion by different states over 
different times in the sample, we employ a difference-in-differences framework to study 
the relationship between the large firms protected by the UTSA and leverage at the 
firm-year level (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004).  We estimate the following 
panel regression model: 
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𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑗𝑡 = 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜔𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑈𝑇𝑆𝐴𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑈𝑇𝑆𝐴 × 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑗𝑡 +
                                                                𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑗𝑡  ,                                                                       (1) 
where 𝑖 indexes firms, 𝑠 indexes the state of location, 𝑗 indexes industry, 𝑡 indexes time, 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑡 is the dependent variable, which is either 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 or 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒. 𝑈𝑇𝑆𝐴𝑠𝑡 is a continuous variable, scaled between 0 and 1, which 
accounts for pre-existing trade secrets protection by measuring the change in strength 
once the UTSA law is enacted in year 𝑡 in state 𝑠.  
 The main variable of interest is (𝑈𝑇𝑆𝐴 × 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖𝑠𝑡 which interacts the index of 
trade secrets protection with a proxy for the size of firm 𝑖, located in state 𝑠, in year 𝑡, 
where 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑡 is the natural log of sales deflated using 2001 dollars and centered around 
its sample mean.37 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑗𝑡 is a vector of control variables detailed in the above Section 
4.4. We include firm fixed effects 𝛾𝑖 to control for time invariant unobservable 
heterogeneity within different firms. Further, we control for time variant heterogeneity 
that could affect leverage for all firms as well as transitory unobservable factors that 
could impact the likelihood of state adoption of the UTSA using year fixed effects 𝜔𝑡. 
We estimate robust standard errors clustered at the state of location level (Bertrand et al. 
2004). 
                                                 
37 Without centering Ln(Sales), 𝛽1 would represent the effect of the UTSA for a firm with zero sales on 
leverage. By subtracting the sample mean from firm-year sales, 𝛽1 becomes the effect of UTSA for a firm 
with average sales on leverage. There is no need to center UTSA since there are instances in which firms 
in both UTSA passing and non-passing states experience zero change in trade secrets protection. Thus, 𝛽2 
represents the relation between the Size of a firm without any change in protection and financial leverage. 
Finally, 𝛽3 represents the effect of UTSA on corporate debt policy as firms get larger. For a more in-
depth analysis on specifying regression models with continuous interaction terms please refer to Jaccard, 
Wan, and Turrisi (1990), Aiken and West (1991), and Jaccard and Turrisi (2003).  
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5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 Panel A of Table D4 reports the summary statistics for the variables used in the 
main analyses. From this table it is observed that the mean book leverage ratio is 23.4% 
and the average market leverage ratio is 25.9%. Further, the proportion of treatment-
years in our sample is 39.9% where the average change in the protection index after the 
enactment of the UTSA is 0.236. In contrast, the level of pre-existing state-level 
common law offers a substantially lower 0.116 degree of protection. The other control 
variables means and medians are similar to other studies (e.g., Kisgen 2009, Danis, 
Rettl, and Whited 2014, Frank and Goyal 2014, and Serfling 2016). 
 Panel B of Table D4 provides the temporal distribution of total firm-year and 
treatment-year observations, as well as the percentage of firms affected by the UTSA in 
a given year. The pre-treatment period begins in 1975, with a total of 2,177 firm-year 
sample points. Then, in 1980, 55 firms (2.54% of the sample) headquartered in 
Minnesota enter the treatment sample. As more and more states implement the UTSA, 
the number of treatment-year to total firm-year observations grows, reaching more than 
51% of the sample in 1990. The final treatment state, Michigan, passes the trade secrets 
legislation in 1998. Overall, the sample includes 32,153 treatment-year observations.   
5.2 UTSA, Firm Size and Financial Leverage 
 We present the results from the main analysis exploring the relation between 
large firms covered by the UTSA and book leverage in Panel A of Table D5. First, 
however, we estimate model 1 without the interaction term to assess the effect of 
coverage by the trade secrets law for the average firm on book debt policy. Although, as 
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seen from column 1, the UTSA coefficient is insignificant using this specification. This 
result indicates that the UTSA, by itself, does not impact capital structure decision-
making. This finding is consistent with Png (2017a), whom finds that the UTSA is an 
insignificant determinant of R&D expenditure for the average firm, the BRDIS survey 
evidence which indicates only half of the respondents, who actually perform some form 
of R&D, found secrecy a “very important” form of IP protection, and Figueroa and 
Serrano (2013) who show that smaller firms acquire and sell patents disproportionately 
more than large firms. Meanwhile, the coefficient on the IDD dummy is identical in 
significance, and nearly in magnitude to that found by Klasa et al. (2018), providing 
further evidence that our sample is consistent with the extant literature. 
 Next, we explore the main competing hypotheses of the paper, analyzing the 
relation between large firms covered by the UTSA and book leverage in columns 2 – 6. 
Column 2 regresses book leverage on the interaction term, the UTSA index, and natural 
log of sales, and standard leverage controls (Size, Profitability, M/B, and Fixed Assets) 
along with firm and year fixed effects. The estimated coefficient on the main variable of 
interest is 0.020 and significant at the 1% level. Next, we sequentially add further 
leverage determinants, as well as state, political, and industry controls in the remaining 
columns. Column 3 includes additional firm-characteristic controls (Div Payer, and 
Mod Z-score), while column 4 further appends on state and political variables (IDD, 
Ln(State GDPPC), State GDPG, and Republican). The results are almost identical after 
including the additional controls, as the coefficient on the UTSA and natural log of 
sales interaction ranges between 0.019 and 0.020, respectively, and remains significant 
at the 1% level.  
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 The column 5 regression model drops the state and political controls from the 
column 4 specification and instead includes the average state-year and industry-year 
book leverage, where firm 𝑖’s observation is excluded from the calculations and 
industry is defined at the three-digit SIC level. Column 6 is the full model specification 
and includes all controls. The magnitude is reduced to 0.018 in these specifications, but 
remains significant at the 1% level. Moreover, the estimated coefficients on the control 
variables are similar to previous studies on financial leverage.38 Of particular interest, 
we find that the UTSA has explanatory power for large firms’ capital structure, even 
after controlling for the IDD. Overall, these results suggest an economically significant 
effect, as an increase in Ln(Sales) by one standard deviation is associated with an 
increase in Book Leverage of 0.018 × 2.137 = 0.0385, or 3.85 percentage points. 
 Panel B of Table D5 provides the same analyses as Panel A, except now we 
measure debt using the market leverage ratio. Column 1 indicates that using the UTSA 
index as a standalone exogenous regressor does not significantly relate with market 
leverage. Columns 2 – 6 provides evidence that with varying leverage controls, the 
interaction term between the UTSA and natural log of sales is positive, ranging from 
0.010 to 0.013, and significant at the 1% level. The findings indicate that protection by 
the UTSA for large firms results in a 2.14 (=0.010 × 2.137) percentage point increase in 
Market Leverage for a one standard deviation increase in Ln(Sales).  
 In Table D6, we use four alternative proxies for size in place of the continuous 
and centered natural logarithm of sales measure. The first two variables are also 
                                                 
38 The coefficient on Profitability is significant and negative in column 2 of Panel A, consistent with the 
empirically documented “profits-leverage puzzle” (e.g., Fama and French 2002, and Frank and Goyal 
2015), but becomes positive and insignificant in the Book Leverage regressions once Mod Z-score is 
added as a control. This change in sign and significance occurs because the Mod Z-score is composed of a 
measure of profitability, namely the ratio of EBIT/assets (this is noted by Serfling 2016). 
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continuous and they are: the natural logarithm of assets, and the natural logarithm of the 
number of firm employees. Thus, we center these measures with their respective sample 
means before interacting with the UTSA index. In addition, we specify two indicator 
size proxies: the first, Median Ln(Sales), equals one if a firm’s natural logarithm of 
sales is greater than the entire sample’s median and zero otherwise, whereas the other, 
Median-Year Ln(Sales), equals one for firm’s that have Ln(Sales) above the by year 
sample median value and zero otherwise. The findings are consistent with Table D5. In 
both Panel’s A and B, where the dependent variable is book and market leverage, 
respectively, there is a positive relationship between the size of the protected firm and 
financial leverage. For example, column 2 of Panel A shows that the largest firms, 
measured by the number of firm-level employees (as in the BRDIS Survey), covered by 
UTSA increase their leverage by 3.64 percentage points for every one standard 
deviation increase in Ln(1+Employees) (=0.032 × 1.136). Hence, it appears the finding 
is robust to alternative measures of firm size. 
5.3 Do Firms Make Anticipatory Leverage Adjustments?  
 We follow Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003), Giroud and Mueller (2010), 
Atanassov (2013), Roberts and Whited (2013), Fich, Harford, and Yore (2016), and 
Serfling (2016) and perform a placebo test in order to address concerns of reverse 
causality and provide evidence that the primary difference-in-differences identification 
assumption of parallel trends is satisfied. This analysis is conducted by evaluating the 
timing of changes in debt ratios relative to the timing of the UTSA, and the interaction 
of the UTSA with size. Thus, the placebo is administered by specifying the model to 
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include an interaction term of the protection index and the natural logarithm of sales a 
year before the law is actually enacted.  
 The main variables of interest are 𝑈𝑇𝑆𝐴 × 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒(−1), 𝑈𝑇𝑆𝐴 × 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒(0), and 
𝑈𝑇𝑆𝐴 × 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒(1+). These continuous variables are created by interacting the change in 
trade secrets protection stemming from the UTSA with the centered size proxy if the 
firm is headquartered in a state that passes the law in the year before actual adoption, 
the year of actual adoption, and one year and beyond actual adoption, respectively. 
Thus, the first interaction term falsely assigns treatment a year before it should be 
assigned, where the remaining measures accurately indicate that treatment is or has 
already been dispensed. Therefore, if the coefficient on  𝑈𝑇𝑆𝐴 × 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒(−1) is statistically 
significant there are serious concerns about differences in trends pre-treatment, and 
anticipatory leverage adjustments. 
 The results of the falsification tests are presented in Table D7. The first two 
columns correspond to measuring the outcome variable using book leverage and 
columns 3 and 4 employ market leverage. Further, columns 1 and 3 are without state, 
political, and industry controls, while the even numbered columns include the full set of 
controls and a state-time trend. It is reassuring to find that the coefficient on the placebo 
interaction term is both economically and statistically insignificant. This is also the case 
for the UTSA index as a standalone regressor, as it is not significantly related to capital 
structure decisions in the year prior to treatment. In all four columns, the treatment 
effect is positive and significant for large firms in the first year and beyond the 
enactment of the law. Furthermore, the magnitude and significance of the 
[UTSA×Ln(Sales)](1+) coefficients are almost identical to the estimates reported in 
82 
Table D5, Panel A and B. In summary, the evidence from Table D7 seems to suggest 
that lobbying and preemptive leverage changes are not concerns, and the parallel trend 
assumption is likely satisfied. Thus, the evidence is suggestive that the adoption of the 
UTSA was an exogenous shock, a requirement necessary for causal implications. 
5.4 Alternative Leverage Definitions 
 In this section, we conduct the following robustness check. We test whether or 
not the relationship we have documented between large protected firms and UTSA 
coverage is specific to the book and market leverage measures of debt or if the relation 
persists using alternative definitions of financial leverage. This includes the natural 
logarithm of one plus total debt, net book leverage, and net market leverage. In columns 
1, 3, and 5 of Table D8, we specify the full model regression with each respective 
alternative debt measure, but without the interaction of UTSA and Ln(Sales). As 
documented previously, there is not a significant effect of UTSA adoption on financial 
leverage for the average firm. Columns 2, 4, and 6 of Table D8 employ the full model 
regression for each alternative measure of debt, respectively, but with the variable 
UTSA × Ln(Sales) specified. The results show clear and consistent evidence that a 
positive and 1% statistically significant relationship holds with the alternative measures 
of financial leverage. For example, a firm that moves from the 25th percentile to the 75th 
percentile in Ln(Sales) adjusts their net market leverage upward 3.68 (=0.013 × [6.545-
3.717]) percentage points after the adoption of the UTSA. Hence, the largest firms 
located in states with enacted UTSA laws differentially increase their financial leverage. 
Our findings suggests that the relation between the intersection of the UTSA and the 
natural logarithm of sales is robust to alternative financial leverage measures. 
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5.5 UTSA, Innovative Activity and Financial Leverage 
 Having established the positive relation between large firms with strengthened 
trade secrets protection and financial leverage, we now turn to examining cross-
sectional variation in innovative activity and UTSA, and its effect on firms’ debt ratios. 
These tests are carried out to gain a greater understanding of the mechanisms 
underlying our main findings detailed in Section 5.2. 
 In columns 1 - 4 of Panel A, Table D9, we explore the relation between UTSA 
protection, firm-level innovative activity and book leverage. Following Denis and 
McKeon (2016), we create an indicator variable set to one if a firm has R&D 
expenditure greater than 0.02. Column 1 indicates that businesses located in UTSA 
enacting states that have high levels of R&D intensity reduced book leverage by 2.8 
percentage points. Thus, it appears, without differentiating on size, firms highly-
dependent on R&D do not finance this activity with debt (e.g., Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim 
1984, among others), even after trades secrets laws become stronger.   
 Columns 2 – 4 consider the interaction of covered firms and three patent 
measures commonly employed in the corporate innovation literature (e.g., Hall, Jaffe, 
and Trajtenberg 2005, Atanassov 2013, Bena and Li 2014, Chu, Tian and Wang 2015, 
Bradley, Kim and Tian 2016, and Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru, and Stoffman 2016). 
Specifically, we use the natural logarithm of one plus patents, the natural logarithm of 
one plus citation-weighted patents, and the natural logarithm of one plus stock-market 
weighted patents.39 We find positive and significant coefficients of 0.060, 0.016, and 
0.021 for firms with increased protection from UTSA and with higher levels of the three 
                                                 
39 We thank Noah Stoffman for making this data available on his website: 
https://iu.app.box.com/v/patents. 
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respective patent variables. This seems consistent with the findings from Png (2017b) 
and Dass et al. (2015) in that increases in trade secrets protection decreased patent 
applications. Thus, previously successful patent applicants fund their innovative activity 
with debt after state-level strengthening of the secrecy mechanism. 
 In Panel B of Table D9, we find roughly similar results in magnitude and 
statistical significance using market leverage as the dependent variable. All of the 
models specified in these tests included the full set of controls, and firm and year fixed 
effects. We cluster robust standard errors by state of location since treatment is 
dispensed at this level. 
5.6 UTSA, Firm Size and Bankruptcy Costs 
Our findings appear to indicate that firms which are larger in size, and have pre-
existing patent portfolios increase their use of debt financing after becoming better 
protected by trade secrets laws. This is suggestive that firms whose innovative risk is 
reduced by the UTSA are less likely to default and therefore take advantage of the 
benefits of debt (Miller 1977). We attempt to more explicitly test this hypothesis by 
considering the effect of UTSA on operating leverage as well as the effect the law had 
on larger firms’ probability of default, and operating cash flow volatility using 
commonly employed proxies.  
 First, testing the effect of the UTSA on operating leverage, as defined by the 
composition of a firm’s fixed to variable costs, provides insight into how sensitive a 
company is to general business conditions. If a company has greater amounts of 
variable relative to fixed costs, its expenses rise and fall with its level of productivity. In 
contrast, high fixed costs firms are characterized as having higher operating leverage 
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and are more susceptible to negative cash flow shocks. Thus, if a firm experiences a 
negative change in sales, and as consequence, suffers an even larger reduction in 
earnings, than this company has greater operating leverage.  
Following Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013) and Serfling (2016), we investigate 
the relation between operating leverage and increases in trade secrets protection using 
the following regression specification40: 
∆ 𝐿𝑛(𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇)𝑖𝑠𝑗𝑡 = 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜔𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑈𝑇𝑆𝐴𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2∆ 𝐿𝑛(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝑈𝑇𝑆𝐴 ×
                                              ∆ 𝐿𝑛(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠))
𝑖𝑠𝑡
+ 𝛼𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑗𝑡  ,                                         (2) 
where 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 is earnings before interest and taxes, 𝛾𝑖 and 𝜔𝑡 are, respectively, firm and 
year fixed effects, 𝑈𝑇𝑆𝐴𝑠𝑡 is a continuous variable, scaled between 0 and 1, which 
accounts for pre-existing trade secrets protection by measuring the change in strength 
once the UTSA law is enacted in year 𝑡 in state 𝑠, ∆ 𝐿𝑛(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡) is the natural 
logarithm of the change in firm sales centered by its sample mean, and 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑗𝑡 is the full 
set of controls from the main leverage regressions. The standard errors are robust and 
clustered by the state of location.  
 The main variable of interest is the interaction between the 𝑈𝑇𝑆𝐴𝑠𝑡 protection 
index and the percentage change in firm sales. Column 1 of Table D10 indicate that 
earnings sensitivity to changes in sales is significantly less for firms protected by the 
UTSA. In particular, interpreting the estimated coefficients implies that, prior to state-
level enactment of the UTSA, a 1% decrease in sales is associated with a 1.28% 
decrease in earnings for a firm with an average change in sales. However, UTSA 
                                                 
40 My motivation for testing the operating leverage of better protected firms stems from the likelihood 
that fixed expenses on maintaining secrecy (such as attorney fees and security guards, systems, etc.) are 
plausibly reduced after the passage of the UTSA. 
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protected firms experiencing a change in sales realize a 0.21% reduction in operating 
leverage. Column 2 suggests that large firms covered by the UTSA do not experience a 
differential reduction in operating leverage. Thus, the evidence suggest that the UTSA 
reduced operating leverage for all protected firms, but only the largest companies are 
able to capitalize (e.g., R&D expenditure (Png 2017a), and debt ratios). Moreover, the 
coefficient on the IDD indicator variable is insignificant. 
 Next, we investigate the relation between the probability of default and trade 
secrets protection. If a firm, in which trade secrets are a very important form of IP 
protection, experiences an increase in the strength of secrecy laws, this should reduce 
the misappropriability of future cash flows, and, all else equal, reduce the likelihood of 
bankruptcy. We use the following regression model to test this prediction: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏. 𝑜𝑓 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑗𝑡+1 = 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜔𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑈𝑇𝑆𝐴𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑈𝑇𝑆𝐴 × 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 
                                                       𝛼𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑗𝑡 ,                                                          (3) 
where 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏. 𝑜𝑓 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑡+1 is the next period probability of default proxied by the 
inverse modified Altman’s Z-score (Mackie-Mason 1990), and the remaining variables 
are identical to those specified in the full leverage model.  
 First, however, in column 3 of Table D10, we examine if the UTSA lowers the 
likelihood of bankruptcy for the average firm in our sample, excluding the interaction 
term effect, 𝛽3. The coefficient on the protection index is negative but not significantly 
different from zero. Further, the interaction 𝑈𝑇𝑆𝐴𝑠𝑡 × 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏. 𝑜𝑓 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑡 is positive 
but insignificant. Next, we estimate model 3 in column 4, and show that large firms 
protected by the UTSA are associated with a 10.5 (=0.049 × 2.137) percentage point 
decrease in next year’s probability of default for every one standard deviation increase 
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in Ln(Sales). So far, these findings suggest that large firms located in UTSA passing 
states increase financial leverage as a response to the reduction in their financial distress 
costs. In contrast, firms located in IDD passing states do not have lower next period 
Prob. of Default in our sample. 
The next test examines if a reduction in future cash flow volatility is a channel through 
which trade secrets protection reduces bankruptcy costs. We employ the following 
model: 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑗𝑡+1 = 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜔𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑈𝑇𝑆𝐴𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑈𝑇𝑆𝐴 × 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑗𝑡  ,      
                                                           (4) 
where 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡+1 is the rolling standard deviation of firm 𝑖′𝑠 operating cash flows over the 
past ten years leaded one-year into the future, and the other regressors are identical to 
the main debt ratio regressions.41 Columns 5 and 6 in Table D10 indicates that large 
firms protected by the UTSA associate with a reduction of 1.1 (=0.004 × [6.545-3.717]) 
percentage points in the volatility of cash flows for a move from the 25th to the 75th 
percentile in Ln(Sales). We interpret this finding as firms with stronger trade secrets 
protection are less at risk for rival firms misappropriating secrets and thus more likely to 
sustain the indefinite stream of future cash flows generated by the economically 
valuable, confidential information. Overall, the findings in Table D10 are consistent 
with increased trade secrets protection for larger firms decreasing operating leverage, 
the probability of default, and the volatility of cash flows. Also of note, consistent with 
Klasa et al. (2018), we do not find evidence that the positive relation between IDD and 
financial leverage stems from a reduction in bankruptcy costs, as none of the 
                                                 
41 In addition, our results are robust to estimating the cash flow volatility measure over the past five years 
instead. 
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coefficients of interest predict a significant reduction in any of the three default cost 
proxy regressions. 
5.7 UTSA, Probability of Default and Financial Leverage 
In this section, we further explore if the trade-off theory of capital structure 
(Myers 1977) is a potential channel that explains our results by testing if firms 
characterized as having higher likelihoods of default, that become better protected by 
the UTSA increase their financial leverage. That is, we center the inverse of modified 
Altman’s Z-Score with its sample mean, and then interact it with the UTSA index. 
Then, we regress Book Leverage and Market Leverage, separately, on UTSA × Prob. of 
Default plus control variables to determine if in fact there is a positive and significant 
relation between financial leverage and default risky firms that experience an increase 
in trade secrets protection. As in the previous tests, we include the full spectrum of 
control variables, firm and year fixed effects, and cluster robust standard errors by state 
of location. The results are presented in Table D11. 
 Column 1 of Table D11 indicates that current period book leverage is adjusted 
upward for firms that are located in UTSA passing states and concurrently have higher 
inverse modified Z-scores. For instance, a one standard deviation increase in Prob. of 
Default leads to a 12.8 (=0.025 × 5.117) percentage point increase in Book Leverage. 
Column 2 finds a qualitatively similar coefficient of 0.019, significant at the 5% level, 
for a predictive regression in which the dependent variable is leaded one period (t+1). 
Columns 3 and 4 are identical to those described above with the one exception that 
market leverage is specified on the left-hand side. Again, the results suggest that firms 
more likely to file for bankruptcy increase their debt ratios after their trade secrets 
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become better protected. These results, in conjunction with those reported in Section 
5.2-6, provide suggestive evidence that large firms located in UTSA adopting states 
adjust their financial leverage upward because their bankruptcy costs are reduced, 
consistent with trade-off theory.42 
5.8 UTSA, Firm Size and Long-Term Firm Value 
The previous findings indicate that increases in trade secrets protection are met 
with a proliferation of debt for large firms. To assess the economic significance of these 
results we explore the firm value implications of the UTSA index interacted with firm 
size. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study the effect of trade secrets 
protection on long-term firm value. However, previous research has investigated if the 
IDD was beneficial for shareholders in the short-run using an event study methodology. 
Klasa et al. (2018) and Qiu and Wang (2017) both find positive and significant 
abnormal stock returns for firms headquartered in states that announce the adoption of 
IDD. The latter paper also finds a negative and significant market reaction for firms 
located in states around the rejection date of the IDD. These findings are not directly 
comparable to those we present in Table D12 for the following three reasons. First we 
study an entirely different law which protects trade secrets differently than the IDD. 
This is evidenced in the findings above as we document that states with IDD are less 
likely to adopt the UTSA. Further, even after controlling for the doctrine, there is an 
effect of the statutes for large firms on capital structure decision-making, Second, we 
are considering the long-term value implications proxied with Tobin’s Q and Total 
Tobin’s Q, whereas the other studies focus on short-term stock returns. Lastly, the 
                                                 
42 We also run regressions of Book Leverage and Market Leverage, both contemporaneous and leaded 
one-period, on the IDD indicator variable interacted with Prob. of Default and find insignificant 
coefficients.  
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channel in which Klasa et al. (2018) identifies – conservatism – is different than what 
we find – trade-off theory – and argue is the reason for the possible changes in long-
term firm value.  
 In order to study the value implications of the UTSA for large firms we estimate 
the following model: 
𝑄𝑖𝑠𝑗𝑡 = 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜔𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑈𝑇𝑆𝐴𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑈𝑇𝑆𝐴 × 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑗𝑡 ,     (5) 
where 𝑄𝑖𝑡 is one of two measures for firm 𝑖, located in state 𝑠, operating within industry 
𝑗, in period 𝑡. The first proxy for firm value is the standard measure of Tobin’s Q used 
frequently by the governance literature (e.g., Straska and Waller 2014, and Cremers, 
Litov, and Sepe, 2017) and specified in Fama and French (1992), whereas the second is 
a new measure introduced by Peters and Taylor (2017)43, defined at Total Tobin’s Q or 
Total Q for short, which is estimated to account for intangible assets. Table C2 in the 
appendix provides descriptions of each. In addition, equation 5 identically specifies the 
other regressors as in the main debt ratio regressions, with the one exception of 
excluding M/B and replacing it with Book Leverage. Table D12 reports the staggered 
DID regression estimates from the above model 5.   
 Columns 1 and 4 in Table D12 explores if there is any effect of UTSA on firm 
value for the average firm in our sample. We find a positive and insignificant result with 
Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable, and a negative and insignificant coefficient for the 
Total Tobin’s Q regression. Also of note, we specify the IDD indicator variable and find 
a positive, but insignificant estimate in both specifications. Thus, while IDD has been 
found to increase financial leverage (Klasa et al. 2018), we don’t find any long-term 
                                                 
43 we thank Ryan Peters and Lucian Taylor for making their Total Q measure available on WRDS: 
http://www.whartonwrds.com/datasets/included/luke-taylors-total-q/   
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value implications for the average firm in our sample. Next, in columns 2 and 5, we 
interact the UTSA index with the centered Ln(Sales) measure, include control variables 
for Profitability, Book Leverage, Fixed Assets, Div Payer, and Mod Z-score, and find a 
positive coefficient, significant at the 1% level. Finally, we append the full spectrum of 
controls, including state, political, and industry variables, in columns 3 and 6, and find 
that large firms that become better protected experience increases in long-term value. 
For example, an increase in Ln(Sales) from its median to the 75th percentile yields a 
27.6 (=0.198 × [6.545 – 5.153]) percentage point rise in Tobin’s Q and a 38.4 
percentage point improvement in Total Tobin’s Q (=0.276 × [6.545 – 5.153]), 
respectively. The results from Table D12 indicate that better trade secrets protection, 




We examine the effect of increased trade secrets protection on financial 
leverage. In order to deal with endogeneity and isolate causal relationships, our 
identification strategy exploits the staggered adoption of state-level trade secrets laws. 
The UTSA increased the protection of trade secrets for firms by precisely defining a 
trade secret, outlining what constitutes misappropriation, and clarifying the rights and 
remedies of firms victimized by competitors, hence decreasing the resources required to 
prevent theft and recover losses. We find suggestive evidence for its exogeneity as an 
instrument using a Cox proportional hazard model, in which firm-level, state-level, and 
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industry-level financial leverage ratios are unable to explain its adoption, providing 
support against reverse causality.  
 Based on survey evidence from the BRDIS and recent empirical work by Png 
(2017a, 2017b), Dass et al. (2015), and Figueroa and Serrano (2013), we consider the 
impact of the UTSA on large firm’s capital structure decision-making. We employ a 
difference-in-differences framework in order to contrast the book and market leverage 
ratios of firms with higher levels of sales located in states covered by legislation with 
firms headquartered in states without such coverage. We find an economically and 
statistically significant increase in both measures of debt for large UTSA firms. These 
results hold even after controlling for another trade secrets law, the IDD. Moreover, we 
document, using a dynamic regression specification, that the effect transpires one year 
or more after the adoption of the law. Most importantly, there is no significant relation 
in the year prior to its passage, assuaging concerns of lobbying and anticipatory effects. 
In addition to the falsification tests, we further use alternative definitions of leverage 
and size to interpret the findings causally. 
 We also explore the effect of R&D intensity, and pre-existing patent portfolios 
on leverage for firms covered by the UTSA. Our results suggest that firms with higher 
levels of R&D expenditure and increased protection decrease leverage, consistent with 
the literature on financing innovation. Further, we show a positive relation with 
financial leverage and UTSA covered firms with greater amounts of patents, citation-
weighted patents, and stock market-weighted patents, consistent with Png (2017b), and 
Dass et al. (2015). Next, we examine the impact of UTSA on operating leverage, 
probability of default, and cash flow volatility. Overall, the results from these tests 
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suggest that the UTSA decreases operating leverage, and large firms protected by these 
laws have lower likelihoods of bankruptcy and reduced risk in future streams of 
operating cash flows. We show that firms with higher likelihoods of default adjust their 
debt ratios upward after becoming protected by the state statute. In tandem, this 
evidence seems to suggest that large firms are increasing their financial leverage in 
response to a reduction in bankruptcy costs, consistent with the trade-off theory of 
capital structure. We find that this relation yields positive long-term firm value effects. 


















Chapter 3: Shadow Pills and Long-Term Firm Value 
 
1. Introduction 
Law and finance scholars agree that the poison pill (formally known as a 
“shareholder rights plan”) is among the most powerful anti-takeover defenses (Carney, 
2000; Coates, 2000; Daines, 2001; Bebchuk, Coates, and Subramanian, 2002; Cremers 
and Ferrell, 2014). While details vary across different implementations of the pill, the 
basic defensive mechanism provides existing shareholders, but not a hostile bidder, with 
stock purchase rights that entitle them to acquire newly issued shares at a substantial 
discount in the “trigger” event that an hostile bidder obtains more than a specified 
percentage of the company’s outstanding shares (see generally Fleischer & Sussman 
2013, §5.01[B][1][2]).44 As a result, poison pills grants the board of directors the ability 
to substantially dilute the ownership stake of a hostile bidder, de facto giving the board 
veto power over any hostile acquisition.  
Empirical studies have attempted to investigate whether the adoption of a poison 
pill is beneficial or detrimental to shareholder interests45 since the use of the pill was 
validated by the Delaware Supreme Court in 1985.46 Although earlier findings were 
largely inconclusive, over the past decade these studies have consistently found that the 
adoption of a pill is negatively correlated with firm value (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 
                                                 
44 This is the “flip-in” poison pill that has become largely majoritarian; the earlier “flip-over” poison pill 
provided for the same right but only if the hostile bidder, after acquiring the target’s stock, effected a 
merger with an affiliate. 
45 For example, see Ryngaert (1988); Malatesta and Walkling (1988); Karpoff and Malatesta (1989); 
Ambrose and Megginson (1992); Bhagat and Jefferis (1993); Dowen, Johnson and Jensen (1994); 
Comment and Schwert (1995); Bizjak and Marquette (1998); Brickley, Coles, and Terry (1998); Carney 
and Silverstein (2003); Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003); Chi (2005); Danielson and Karpoff (2006); 
Heron and Lie (2006), (2015); Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2009); Cremers and Ferrell (2014). 
46 This was the landmark decision in Moran v. Household, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). 
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2003; Chi, 2005; Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell, 2009; Cremers and Ferrell, 2014). 
However, this result is difficult to interpret, as the decision to adopt a pill is 
endogenous. In particular, poison pills can be unilaterally adopted at any time by the 
board of directors, so that even firms that do not currently have a poison pill in place 
always have a “shadow pill” (Coates, 2000). The availability of the shadow pill 
exacerbates endogeneity concerns, as reverse causality or other omitted variables might 
explain both the board’s decision to adopt a pill and the reported negative association 
between the adoption of a poison pill and firm value (Comment and Schwert, 1995; 
Bhagat and Jefferis, 2002; Catan, 2017).  
In this paper, we contribute to the debate on the association between poison pills 
and firm value by shifting the focus of attention from “visible” pills to shadow pills – 
studying the effect of poison pills that arises from the right to adopt the pill (which right 
constitutes the shadow pill) rather than the actual adoption of a pill. We do so by 
investigating the value implications of state-level poison pill laws that were enacted in 
35 U.S. states over the period 1986 to 2009, consistent with a large body of studies that 
exploits the variation from state antitakeover legislation as a natural experiment (see 
Karpoff and Wittry, 2017 for a description of these studies). Poison pill laws sanctioned 
the validity of adopting a visible pill, explicitly allowing the board to discriminate 
against one or more classes of shareholders in issuing rights plans and therefore 
strengthening the relevance of the shadow pill. In recent papers, Karpoff and Wittry 
(2017) and Catan & Kahan (2016) argue that poison pill laws provide plausibly 
exogenous variation in firms’ takeover protection and thus constitute a valid natural 
experiment. The present paper, as far as we know, is the first study to consider the 
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effect of poison pill laws – and thus the relevance of the shadow pill – on long-term 
firm value, as proxied by both Tobin’s Q and stock returns. 
Our main finding is that the passage of poison pill laws results in an 
economically and statistically significant increase in the Tobin’s Q of the firms 
incorporated in the states where these laws were enacted, while also leading to 
enhanced operational efficiency for such firms. In particular, the increase in Tobin’s Q 
is more pronounced in more innovative firms or firms where stakeholder investments 
are more relevant (e.g., with a large customer or in a strategic alliance). 
Overall, our results are consistent with the “bonding hypothesis” of takeover 
defenses (Shleifer and Summers, 1988; Laffont and Tirole, 1988). Under this 
hypothesis, empowering the board to commit the firm to a business strategy that cannot 
easily be reversed through a takeover promotes the undertaking of long-term projects 
and stronger stakeholder relationships, increasing firm value. Other recent papers have 
documented empirical support for the bonding hypothesis, including Johnson, Karpoff 
and Yi (2015, 2016) for takeover defenses at the IPO stage and Cremers, Litov, and 
Sepe (2017) for the adoption and removal of staggered boards by mature firms.  
We begin our analysis by investigating the likelihood of the passage of a state-
level poison pill law conditional on state-level firm, legal and economic characteristics. 
With the exception of the prior adoption of directors’ duties statutes (which allow the 
board to consider non-shareholder interests), we find no other significant predictors for 
the adoption of poison pill laws, suggesting that their adoption is largely exogenous to 
the market and economic environment in which these laws were introduced.  
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We next show that poison pill laws meaningfully change firms’ takeover 
protection, as we find that firms incorporated in states adopting poison pill laws are 
more likely to adopt a visible poison pill than firms incorporated in states without this 
legislation. Low prior firm value is also a statistically significant predictor for the 
adoption of a poison pill defense, as previously found in Cremers and Ferrell (2014). 
This finding supports the view that the negative association between the adoption of a 
poison pill and lower firm value reported in prior studies may be attributable to reverse 
causality (Cremers and Ferrell, 2014; Catan, 2017). It also implies that while having a 
“perpetual” visible pill in place might be a reflection of bad governance, the adoption of 
a poison pill may not directly cause lower firm value, in contrast with the (causal) view 
that the adoption of a poison pill leads to greater entrenchment of directors and 
managers (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell, 2009). 
We then move to the heart of the analysis, estimating the effect of poison pill 
laws on the long-term value of firms incorporated in the enacting states over the period 
1983 to 2012 using pooled panel Tobin’s Q regressions that include firm and year fixed 
effects. We find that the passage of poison pill laws results in a positive and statistically 
significant increase in firm value for our full sample of firms. The increase in Tobin’s Q 
is also economically significant at 5.6% relative to the sample average Tobin’s Q. 
However, when we disentangle the effect of first-wave poison pill laws (passed in 1986 
– 1990) and second-wave poison pill laws (passed during 1995 – 2009), we find that 
only the second-wave laws result in a positive and statistically significant increase in 
firm value, while the first-wave laws have an insignificant coefficient.  
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These results are robust to various methodologies, including the incorporation of 
possible selection effects through the creation of a matched sample, where the “treated” 
firms that are incorporated in each of the 35 states with poison pill laws are matched to 
“control” firms with similar observable ex-ante characteristics but incorporated in a 
state without a poison pill law in the post five-year period around the adoption date of a 
poison pill law by the treated firms’ state of incorporation. While the difference in the 
Tobin’s Q between treated and control firms – as well as pre-event trends of other 
important firm characteristics – is insignificant in the three-year period preceding the 
law passage in the state of the treated firms, the difference is significantly positive in the 
three-year period following the law passage. We further show that stock returns give 
similar results as using Tobin’s Q in a long-term stock return event study surrounding 
the adoption of poison pill laws that employs long (short) portfolios that buy (sell) 
treated (control) stocks from the matched sample group around the time their (matched 
sample counterpart’s) state of incorporation adopts a poison pill law.  
We explain our result that the increase in Q is driven by the second-wave poison 
pill laws by carefully considering the changing legal context between the two waves, 
especially pertaining to the state of Delaware, where most publicly traded firms are 
incorporated. Due to the pervasive influence of Delaware case law over other 
jurisdictions (Cremers and Ferrell, 2014), there are institutional reasons to believe that 
the validity of the pill even outside Delaware was fairly clear from 1985 until at least 
1988, when two Delaware decisions injected novel uncertainty by restricting a board’s 
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ability to maintain the pill.47 Therefore, during the 1985 to 1988 period that covers most 
of the first-wave poison pill laws, most firms – whether incorporated in Delaware or 
elsewhere – already had access to an effective shadow pill and, in many cases, also had 
adopted a visible pill, which likely reduced the importance of introducing poison pill 
laws.  
By 1995, which marks the beginning of the second wave of poison pill laws, it 
had plausibly become clearer what states had endorsed a pro-pill policy (namely those 
who had passed a poison pill law during the first wave) and which had not. As a result, 
the second-wave laws significantly strengthened the shadow pill for the firms 
incorporated in the enacting states, especially considering that firms in these states were 
less likely to have a visible pill in place before the passage of the second-wave poison 
pill laws. 
Next, we examine two possible economic channels through which a shadow pill 
could contribute to firm value, respectively reflecting the “bargaining power 
hypothesis” of Stulz (1988) and Harris (1990) and the “bonding hypothesis” of Shleifer 
and Summers (1988) and Laffont and Tirole (1988). The bargaining power hypothesis 
suggests that dispersed shareholders are at a disadvantage when faced with the decision 
to tender their shares in a potential acquisition, so that providing them with the ability to 
form a collusive response creates value by obtaining the best offer price for their shares. 
The bonding hypothesis, instead, posits that limiting the short-term ability of 
                                                 
47 These decisions are City Capital Assocs. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988) (requiring 
redemption of the pill by the board) and Grand Metro., Pub. Ltd. Co. v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049 






shareholders to disrupt the firm’s long-term strategy can bond other stakeholders more 
closely to the firm, thereby improving firm value. Consistent with the latter hypothesis, 
we find that firms incorporated in a state that adopted a poison pill law and in which 
stakeholder relationships are likely more relevant – such as firms that have a large 
customer, are in a strategic alliance, where long-term investments are more important or 
that have more complex operations – experience a higher increase in Q and operational 
efficiency. Conversely, we do not find evidence supporting the bargaining power 
hypothesis, as firms incorporated in states with poison pill laws and also being more at 
risk of a future takeover do not have differentially higher Tobin’s Q or takeover 
premiums than similar companies incorporated in states without such legislation. 
While ours is the first study to consider the value implications of poison pill 
laws (or the shadow pill), we are not the first to exploit the exogenous variation created 
by these laws. Karpoff and Malatesta (1989) analyze the effect of all state antitakeover 
legislation enacted from 1982 to 1987 (including the passage of poison pill laws in Ohio 
and Wisconsin) on stock prices, finding that state-level and firm-level takeover defenses 
are substitutes. Cain, McKeon, and Solomon (2017) study 16 different state-level 
antitakeover laws (including poison pill laws) and court rulings over the period 1965 
through 2014, and find that poison pill laws did not impact hostile takeover activity, but 
do not consider their specific impact on firm value. Karpoff and Wittry (2017) and Fich, 
Harford and Yore (2017) also consider the adoption of poison pill laws. However, in 
comparison with Karpoff and Wittry (2017), we include both first-wave and second-
wave poison pill laws spanning the sample period 1983 to 2012, whereas they consider 
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the period 1976 to 1995 that only included first-wave state laws.48 Further, we focus 
exclusively on the effect of poison pill laws, whereas Fich, Harford and Yore (2017) use 
these as a robustness check within their study of the impact of antitakeover protection 
more generally on the marginal value of cash. 
Finally, our results add to the literature examining the relationship between 
takeover defenses and shareholders wealth. Our study finds no support for the 
“managerial entrenchment” hypothesis (Manne, 1965; Cary, 1969; Easterbrook and 
Fischel, 1991; Bebchuk, Coates, and Subramanian, 2002), but rather supports the view 
that takeover defenses might serve a positive corporate governance function for some 
subset of firms, consistent with other recent studies of such defenses (Cen, Dasgupta, 
and Sen, 2015; Johnson, Karpoff, and Yi, 2015, 2016; Fich, Harford, and Yore, 2017; 
Cremers, Litov, and Sepe, 2017; Catan, 2017). 
 
2. Legal Background 
The landmark 1985 decision of the Delaware Supreme Court in Moran v. 
Household International affirmed the validity of the poison pill for Delaware firms and 
promoted the widespread adoption of the pill both in Delaware and outside Delaware 
(Helman and Junewicz, 1987; Fleicher, Hazard, and Klipper, 1988). Most law and 
finance scholars, however, describe the legal status of the pill outside Delaware as 
uncertain until states adopted poison pill laws that validated the use of the pill in each 
enacting state (Catan and Kahan, 2016; Cain, McKeon, Solomon, 2017; Karpoff and 
                                                 
48 The literature typically refers to state antitakeover laws passed after 1982 as “second-generation” laws, 
where the “first-generation” laws were invalidated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Edgar v. Mite Corp. on 
June 23, 1982 (see Karpoff and Wittry (2017) for a more detailed discussion); other studies further 
classify the most recent statutes as “third-generation” state takeover laws.  
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Wittry, 2017). These laws belong to the broader category of antitakeover laws that a 
large number of states enacted during the takeover era. In particular, the most prevalent 
forms of other antitakeover laws are business combination statutes, control share 
acquisition statutes, fair price statute and directors’ duties (or corporate constituency) 
statutes.49  
The argument usually adduced to defend the uncertain status of the poison pill 
outside Delaware before the enactment of poison pill laws is that state courts’ decisions 
invalidated the use of this defense in the states of New York, New Jersey, Georgia, 
Wisconsin, Colorado, Virginia and Indiana50 between 1986 and 1989 (Karpoff and 
Wintry, 2017; Catan and Kahan, 2016, p. 636). However, the uncertainty created by 
these decisions did not last long, as each of these states passed a poison pill law shortly 
after the related invalidating court decision. For example, while the New York Supreme 
court invalidated the use of the pill in June 1988 (in Bank of New York Co. v. Irving 
Bank Corp.),51 the state of New York passed a poison pill law in December of the same 
year.  
More generally, we argue that the “pervasive” authority attributed to Delaware 
judicial decisions over non-Delaware corporations (see Cremers and Ferrell, 2014) 
points to the opposite conclusion that the validity of the poison pill was fairly certain in 
                                                 
49 Like poison pill laws, the first three forms provide for a direct defense against a potential takeover 
threat, while directors’ duties laws only enable directors to act in the interests of all stakeholders rather 
than just shareholders. Of course, in practice, this further degree of freedom, offer directors more leeway 
to justify the adoption of antitakeover measures. 
50 Catan and Kahan include the Seventh Circuit’s decisions in Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 637 
F. Supp. 406, 409, 416 (N.D. Ill), aff' d 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986) concerning Indiana among the 
decisions that validated the pill (Catan and Kahan, 2016, p. 636). However, while the court in CTS Corp. 
did not hold the pill invalid per se, it still found the pill to be a violation of directors’ fiduciary duties 
under the specific circumstances of the case.  
51 Bank of New York Co. v. Irving Bank Corp., 142 Misc.2d 145, 536 N.Y.S.2d 923 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1988) 
(New York law). 
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the aftermath of Moran both in Delaware and outside Delaware. Indeed, the widespread 
adoption of visible poison pills, even in non-Delaware firms, in the years immediately 
following Moran supports the view that Moran was understood to apply to non-
Delaware firms as well. This interpretation also finds support in the evidence that state 
courts’ decisions frequently referenced Moran in poison pill rulings.52  
Further, in the period 1986-1990 state courts’ decisions also intervened to 
uphold, rather than reject, the validity of the pill under the laws of Maine, Maryland, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Texas and Wisconsin. This evidence seems to indicate that not 
only the validity of the pill was possibly not uncertain before those decisions, but the 
pill certainly gained validity in those states after approval by a state court’s decision.  
Still, under the view that Delaware common law shapes corporate law in all 
other states, Delaware decisions that followed Moran could have mattered more for the 
uncertainty of the pill in other states than earlier state courts’ decisions in those very 
same states. In particular, in the fall of 1988 the Delaware courts issued two decisions – 
City Capital Associates v. Interco Inc. (November 1, 1988)53 and Grand Metropolitan 
PLC v. Pillsbury Co. (November 1, 1988)54 – that injected unexpected uncertainty 
around the use of the poison pill, although mostly affecting the redemption of the pill 
rather than its validity per se (Fleischer & Sussman 2013, §5.08[B][2][A]).55 In both of 
these decisions, the Delaware court halted the continued use of a visible poison pill that 
                                                 
52 For example, in Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. NL Industries Inc., the US District Court for the Southern 
District of New York (New Jersey law) held the pill invalid by reasoning that the factual circumstances of 
the case were different from Moran. See Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. NL Industries Inc., 644 F.Supp. 1229 
(S.D.N.Y.1986) (New Jersey law); Asarco Inc. v. Court, 611 F.Supp. 468 (D.N.J.1985). 
53 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
54 558 A.2d 1049 (1988). 
55 While the issue of the validity of the pill attains a board’s legitimate ability to adopt a pill, pill 
redemption cases concern the board’s ability to keep a pill in place once confronted with an actual 
takeover threat. 
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was preventing an unsolicited tender offer, which prompted considerable comment and 
even induced corporate lawyers to recommend firms to move out of Delaware 
(Fleischer & Sussman 2013, §5.08[B][2][A]). This could plausibly explain why several 
states decided to adopt poison pill laws around 1988-1990, as the viability of the poison 
pill as a strong defense was no longer assured after Interco and Pillsbury. 
The Interco and Pillsbury decisions were later reversed by the 1990 Delaware 
court decision in Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc.,56 which some 
commentators read as granting the board an unconstrained power “to just say no” to 
unsolicited tender offers (Bebchuk, Coates, Subramanian, 2002). Several other 
commentators, however, maintain that the Delaware jurisprudence on pill redemption 
cases remains in an unsettled state and tend to depend on fact-specific circumstances 
that have limited general applicability (Fleischer & Sussman 2013, §5.08[B][2][A]). For 
these reasons and because Delaware never adopted a poison pill law, Delaware 
represents a rather unique poison pill “case.” Outside Delaware, however, after the first-
wave of poison pill laws ended in 1990, the sorting between pro-pill and anti- (or no) 
pill states was completed, with no other passage of a poison pill law until 1995 (when 
the second wave of poison pill laws began). 
 
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
3.1 Data 
We use several data sources to construct our main data sample, which covers the 
period 1983 to 2012. We start by gathering comprehensive data on firm-level visible 
                                                 
56 571 A.2d 1140, 1152-55 (Del. 1990). 
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poison pills, covering 4,796 unique firms between 1976 and 2016.57 In particular, our 
visible poison pill variable, Poison Pill Firm-Level, is a dummy that equals one if the 
firm has adopted a poison pill, and is derived from combining data from two 
institutional data providers, four previous academic studies, and our own hand-collected 
sample. 
The institutional data sources are the SDC Corporate Governance and the 
Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) Governance databases,58 which cover the 
periods 1976 to 2015 and 1990 to 2015, respectively. We supplement these data with 
the poison pill data from Comment and Schwert (1995), Caton and Goh (2008), 
Cremers and Ferrell (2014), and Cremers, Litov and Sepe (2017). These studies’ 
datasets range from 1983 to 1995, 1990 to 2004, 1978 to 2006, and 1978 to 2015, 
respectively. Lastly, using extensive Factiva searches, we add hand-collected data on 
firm-level poison pill data in the period 1994 to 2008 for firms with unavailable data 
from any of the sources above. Table E1 provides a brief definition for Poison Pill 
Firm-Level as well as all of the other variables in the study. 
Our main independent variable, Poison Pill Law, captures whether the firm is 
incorporated in a state that has passed either a first-wave or second-wave poison pill 
law. We obtain information on whether states have passed poison pill laws from 
Barzuza (2009), Cain, McKeon and Solomon (2017) and Karpoff and Wittry (2017). 
Figure F1 provides a U.S. map depicting the dispersion of adopting states. The adoption 
month and years provided by Karpoff and Wittry (2017) are reported in Table F1. To 
                                                 
57 Firms with missing firm-level poison pill data are excluded from the main sample. 
58 The ISS data consists of the current Governance data set which spans the period 2007 to 2016, and the 
Governance Legacy database, maintained at the time by the Investor Responsibility Research Center 
(IRRC) and covering the time period 1990 to 2006.  
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ensure that we use historically accurate accounts of firms’ incorporation status, we 
supplement the current incorporation data provided by Compustat with historical 
incorporation information from Compact Disclosure for the period 1988 to 2006, and 
from the CRSP Historical U.S. Stock database from 1990 to 2012.59 Combining the 
poison pill adoption dates and historical incorporation data, we then construct the 
indicator variable, Poison Pill Law, set equal to one for all affected firms in the year of 
and after the respective adoption date, and otherwise equal to zero. Accordingly, all 
firms incorporated in states without poison pill laws have this indicator variable set to 
zero.  
We further differentiate the coverage of poison pill laws by two distinct periods, 
or “waves,” of adopting states – that is, following a cohort criterion. The first wave 
period, Poison Pill Law First Wave, comprises the 23 states that passed poison pill 
legislation during the time period 1986 to 1990, and the second wave, Poison Pill Law 
Second Wave, includes the 12 states enacting poison pill laws in the 1995 to 2009 
period. 
Consistent with prior work examining the corporate value implications of 
corporate governance arrangements (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Morck, Shleifer, and 
Vishny, 1988; Lang and Stultz, 1994; Yermack, 1996; Daines, 2001; and Gompers, 
Ishii, and Metrick, 2003), we measure firm value (our main dependent variable) using 
Tobin’s Q (Q). Following Fama and French (1992), we measure Q as the ratio of 
market to book value of assets using financial data from Compustat. Additionally, in 
robustness tests, we also use data from the CRSP database to analyze the evolution of 
                                                 
59 We backfill firm-year incorporation data prior to 1988 in our main sample with the oldest (first) data 
point on historical incorporation from either the Compact Disclosure or historical CRSP databases.   
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stock returns (Monthly Stock Returns) surrounding the adoption of poison pill statutes 
(see subsection 5.2.3 below). 
We also include a number of control variables shown by the corporate 
governance literature to be related to Tobin’s Q. Our default specifications include the 
following controls: Ln(Assets), Ln(Age), Sales Growth, Loss, Debt-to-Equity, Firm 
Liquidity, CAPX/Assets, R&D/Sales, Institutional Ownership, State-Year Q, and 
Industry-Year Q. Data for most of the controls come from Compustat, with the 
exception of the institutional ownership variable, which is obtained from Thomson 
Reuters. In particular, State-Year Q and Industry-Year Q attempt to capture local time-
varying state of location and three-digit SIC code industry shocks (following Giroud 
and Mueller, 2010). In some additional specifications, we control for other most 
common forms of state-level takeover laws adopted by the firm’s state of incorporation: 
Business Combination Law, Control Share Law, Directors’ Duties Law, and Fair Price 
Law, defined as in Karpoff and Wittry (2017).  
3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Our main data sample is composed of 33,826 firm-year observations from 3,423 
publicly traded industrial firms, excluding utilities and financial companies (SIC codes 
4900–4999 and 6000–6999, respectively), incorporated in the U.S. and without missing 
data for the main variables outlined above over the time period 1983 to 2012.  
Our sample period begins three years before the states of Indiana and Ohio 
adopt the first state poison pill laws, and ends three years after the state of Wyoming 
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enacts the most recent one.60 Table F2, Panel A, reports the summary statistics for the 
full sample. The average Q for all firm-years is 1.86 with a standard deviation of 1.25. 
On average, the percentage of firm-year observations in which a company had a visible 
poison pill in place is 39.1%. Figure F2 provides a more detailed view of the substantial 
time variation in firm-level visible poison pills over the period 1983 to 2015. Over the 
period 1983 to 1990, which roughly covers the so-called takeover era of the 
corporation, there is a precipitous increase in the fraction of firms in the sample with a 
visible poison pill, with this fraction going from less than 10% in 1985 to more than 
70% by 1990. This is followed by a gradual decline, where in 1999 the fraction of firms 
in the sample with a poison pill in place is roughly 40%. After that, the fraction of firms 
with a visible poison pill registers only slight variations until 2005, when it starts to 
decline steadily, with less than 10% of the firms in the sample having a poison pill in 
place by 2015.  
We further refine our investigation into the time series variation of firm-level 
poison pill adoptions in our sample by considering new pill adoptions. Panel A of 
Figure F3 depicts the percentage of corporations that adopted a new poison pill 
provision each year from 1983 to 2015. From this panel, it is evident that the majority 
of new pills in our sample were adopted from 1985 to 1988, in the apex of the takeover 
era and when the legal certainty of the provision was fairly clear under the ruling in 
Moran. After 1988, the instances of new adoptions became less frequent, with fewer 
than 4% of sample firms adopting a new poison pill between 1992 and 2015. This 
provides some insight that the majority of poison pills in place in the late 1990s through 
                                                 
60 Beginning the sample period in 1983 also has the advantage of not overlapping firm-year observations 
with first-generation state antitakeover laws, and their effective 1982 invalidation by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Edgar v. Mite Corp. (Karpoff and Wittry, 2017). 
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early 2000s, as shown in Figure F2, are likely existing pills that had yet to expire or 
were reinstated from earlier initial adoptions. We also decompose the percentage of 
firms dropping an existing pill in our sample from 1983 to 2015 in Panel B of Figure 
F3. In this panel, we provide evidence that firms began dropping (either by expiration or 
early removal) existing poison pills much more commonly from 1997 to 2002 (and also 
from 2008 to 2015); a stylized fact which is undetectable from inspecting Figure F2 
alone. 
These firm-level dynamics can plausibly be explained by an increase in the use 
of the (visible) poison pill after its introduction and during the period in which takeover 
activity was most intense. After that we observe a natural decline, paralleling the 
decline in hostile takeovers, while the most dramatic decline of the past decade is 
plausibly attributable to the increase in shareholder proposals to remove poison pills and 
the hostility to the pill of proxy advisory firms (Catan, 2017). 
Table F2, Panel A, also shows that the average number of firms incorporated in 
states that adopted a poison pill law in the full sample is 28.4%. Relatedly, Figure F4 
shows the average number of affected firms over the period 1983 to 2015. With the 
passage of the first-wave laws, the percentage of firms in the sample that are covered by 
the poison pill legislation increases from about 6% in 1986 to nearly 35% by 1990. We 
then observe a gradual decline in covered firms until the second wave of laws, when the 
percentage of affected firms in the sample increases from 25% in 1995 to 37% in 2007. 
By 2015, the average proportion of firms incorporated in states with a poison pill law 
equals 30%. 
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We follow-up on Figure F4 by reporting summary statistics for our main sample 
split by the first and second wave periods, where the former spans firm-year 
observations from 1983 to 1994, and the latter contains the sample points between 1995 
and 2015. In this panel, we present the mean, standard deviation, and number of 
observations for each time split cohort, as well as the differences across the waves with 
respective t-statistics indicating if those differences are statistically significant. 
Providing some initial univariate evidence that firm characteristics are substantially 
different across the first and second wave of poison pill laws, we document that every 
variable, except Firm Liquidity, is different at the 5% significance level or higher. 
Accordingly, in all of our tests we explore whether the effect of poison pill laws on 
shareholder value changes based on which year the firm’s incorporating state adopted 
its poison pill law.  
Next, in Table F2, Panel C, we split the full sample by treatment status, where a 
firm is treated if it is incorporated in a state that adopted a poison pill law, and is a 
control otherwise. As observed in Section 2 above, while Delaware first endorsed the 
validity of the poison pill in the 1985 landmark decision in Moran, it never passed a 
poison pill law. We also saw that the redemption of the pill remains an unsettled issue 
in Delaware. We accordingly choose to assign Delaware firms to the group of control 
firms in the pooled panel regressions, with the Poison Pill Law indicator variable being 
set equal to zero for Delaware firms.61 We provide the mean, standard deviation and 
total number of observations for the treated and control groups, and in the last two 
columns of the panel, report the differences between the groups and a corresponding t-
                                                 
61 We provide a robustness check for this methodological assumption in the supplementary appendix by 
excluding firms incorporated in Delaware entirely. Our results are qualitatively similar in these 
specifications. 
111 
statistic testing if those difference are significant. The two groups have statistically 
insignificant differences in average firm value. This is also the case for Ln(Assets) and 
Firm Liquidity. In contrast, all other variables are different at the 10% significance level 
or higher. Hence, Table F2, Panel C, underlines the importance of controlling for these 
variables in the pooled panel regressions. In Section 4.4, we explicitly address these 
differences in several matched samples, including a propensity score matched sample 
with nearest neighbor matching. 
 
4. Identification Strategy and Empirical Methodology 
4.1 Explaining the Adoption of Poison Pill Laws 
The main working assumption of our identification strategy is that poison pill 
laws provided an exogenous shock to the takeover protection of firms incorporated in 
the enacting states (Karpoff and Wittry, 2017), with this shock affecting firm value. 
Therefore, a crucial step in providing evidence for the validity of our identification 
strategy is to investigate whether states were more likely to adopt poison pill laws based 
on differences in the ex-ante value of the incorporated firms. Indeed, should we find 
that states were more likely to adopt poison pill laws if the firms incorporated in the 
state had relatively high (low) value, that could potentially explain an association 
between the adoption of a poison pill law and firm value (i.e., reverse causality). More 
generally, if firm- or state- level economic and legal differences can explain the 
propensity of states to pass a poison pill law, this would undermine our assumption that 
poison pill laws provided an exogenous shock to takeover protection.  
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We estimate a linear probability model of the adoption of poison pill legislation 
on state-level averages of incorporating firm characteristics, state-level legal and macro 
factors, as well as incorporation state and year fixed effects. Our main sample covers 
the period 1983 to 2012, where all firm-year observations are excluded from the 
analysis after the incorporating state passes a poison pill law (i.e., a “failure” event 
occurs). In all specifications, we include incorporation state and year fixed effects and 
estimate standard errors using independent double clustering on the incorporating state 
and year level. We also lag all our predictor variables one period, and for those that are 
continuous, we standardize them to have a mean of zero and unit variance. The results 
of these tests are presented in Table F3.  
Columns (1) and (2) reports the estimates for the entire sample period. Column 
(1) includes the annual averages of incorporating state-year firm characteristics and 
industry-level merger and acquisition activity, while column (2) includes controls for 
other antitakeover laws and macro factors at the state level.  In columns (1) and (2), the 
only significant predictor of a poison pill law is whether the adopting state has already 
passed a directors’ duties law. In particular, consistent with our exogeneity assumption, 
the average incorporating state-year Q is not a significant determinant of passing a 
poison pill law.  
 Columns (3) and (4) repeat the analysis but specific to the period 1983 –1994, 
which covers the first-wave poison pill laws. We find similar results and, in particular, 
that the average annual level of the incorporating state’s Q does not predict the adoption 
of a first-wave poison pill law. We also find, however, a few significant determinants. 
For example, column (3) shows that if the average debt-to-equity of all firms 
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incorporated within a state in a given year (Incorp State-Year Debt-to-Equity) is higher, 
it is less likely that a state will adopt a poison pill law. However, this significance does 
not hold after controlling for other state institutional and macro factors (see the controls 
for Business Combination Law, Directors’ Duties Law and Ln(Incorp State Per Capita 
GDP) in column (4)).  
 Lastly, columns (5) and (6) report the estimated marginal effects in the period 
1995 – 2012, which covers the second-wave poison pill laws. In these specification, 
none of the predictor variables in column (5) are significant, while in column (6), where 
we add the full set of controls, we find that a state is more likely to enact poison pill 
legislation if it has already passed a directors’ duties law, and it is less likely to adopt 
this legislation if it has a fair price law or a higher per capita GDP. In both columns (5) 
and (6), however, the incorporating state-year level of Tobin’s Q does not predict the 
adoption of a second-wave poison pill law. Overall, we conclude that there is no 
evidence for reverse causality, and that the results are consistent with our main 
identification assumption.62 
4.2 Do Poison Pill Laws Matter for Firm-Level Pills? 
The next step in our identification strategy is verifying that poison pill laws did 
affect the actual adoption of poison pills by firms incorporated in the enacting states. 
Specifically, as poison pill laws sanctioned firms’ right to adopt a visible poison pill in 
                                                 
62 In subsection 8.3, we provide additional evidence for the validity of our identification strategy by 
testing the timing of the change in firm value relative to the timing of the passage of the relevant poison 
pill law. Organizationally, we choose to present these results after first documenting that poison pill laws 
are indeed value relevant. However, for the purpose of this section, we briefly note our suggestive 
evidence from Table F15 that the effect of poison pill laws on Q transpires after the passage of the laws 
and not before. This offers some reassuring evidence that both the affected and unaffected firms’ value 
would have evolved in a similar fashion absent the adoption of this legislation (i.e., the parallel trends 
assumption likely holds). 
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the enacting states – thus strengthening those firms’ shadow pill – we would expect 
firms in states with a poison pill law to be more likely to have a poison pill in place. To 
verify this hypothesis, in Table F4 we regress Poison Pill Firm-Level on whether a firm 
is incorporated in a state with a poison pill law, along with control variables and firm 
and year fixed effects.  
In columns (1) through (3), we examine the marginal effect of a poison pill law 
on the firm-level decision to adopt a pill provision over the entire period 1983 to 2012. 
The first two columns indicate that firms incorporated in a state with a poison pill law 
are 6% to 7.3% more likely to have a visible poison pill in place than companies 
incorporated in states without such legislation. Column (3) appends controls for the 
existence of other state antitakeover laws (Karpoff and Wittry, 2017) and still finds a 
positive and significant relation between poison pill laws and the adoption of firm-level 
pills, consistent with the assumption that these laws identify valid external shocks to 
firms’ takeover protection.  
We next consider whether the documented relationship is “wave” specific, 
separately considering Poison Pill Law First Wave and Poison Pill Law Second Wave, 
which respectively capture whether a company is incorporated in a state that passed a 
poison pill law in the period 1986 – 1990 or 1995 – 2009. Columns (4) through (6) 
presents the estimates from these linear probability model specifications, where the final 
column adds controls for other antitakeover laws. 
With or without the additional state laws’ controls, we find that the adoption of a 
visible pill for firms incorporated in the first-wave enacting states are not affected by 
the passage of poison pill laws, while companies incorporated in second-wave enacting 
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states are 7% to 12.4% more likely to have a visible pill in place after the adoptions of 
such laws. These findings are consistent with Figure F2, which shows that the majority 
of firms during the first wave period already had a visible poison pill in place prior to 
the adoption of the state poison pill law, with the result that the incremental impact of 
poison pill laws was likely significantly reduced (Karpoff and Malatesta, 1989; Karpoff 
and Wittry, 2017). Conversely, the average proportion of firms with a visible poison pill 
decreases significantly in the second-wave period, suggesting that poison pill laws 
enacted during this period had a greater impact.  
Further, given the reverse causality concerns affecting any estimates of the 
effect of visible poison pills, we also examine the marginal effect of firms’ 
predetermined Q on the firm-level decision to adopt a pill provision. In all our 
specifications, we find that having a relatively low firm value is a statistically 
significant predictor for the adoption of a poison pill defense, consistent with Cremers 
and Ferrell (2014). This finding provides suggestive evidence supporting the view that 
the negative association between the adoption of a visible poison pill and lower firm 
value reported in prior studies is indeed likely attributable to reverse causality (Catan, 
2017). 
We also supplement the above tests for reverse causality between the adoption 
of a visible pill and firm value by estimating a pooled panel regression of Q on dummy 
variables indicating the relative year in which a firm adopts a new poison pill, along 
with year and industry-year fixed effects (following Catan, 2017). The relative year 
dummies include indicators for up to 10 years before and after pill adoption, and the 
industry grouping is defined at the three-digit SIC code level. We also estimate robust 
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standard errors with clustering performed by firm. Consistent with the reverse causality 
hypothesis, Figure F5 provides suggestive evidence that firm value is significantly 
higher in the two to five years before a firm decides to deploy a poison pill. Meanwhile, 
the Tobin’s Q of companies is insignificantly different in the year before, year of, and 
up through five years after the pill’s adoption.  
4.3 Pooled Sample 
Our baseline empirical methodology to identify the effect of the staggered 
adoption of poison pill laws on firm value employs a differences-in-differences research 
design in a pooled panel over the period 1983 to 2012. This approach closely follows 
Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004), in which companies incorporated in states 
that eventually enacted a poison pill law are considered as part of the group of 
unaffected firms until their legislatures pass such a law. Once these previously 
unaffected firms become covered by poison pill laws, they enter the affected (or treated) 
group. For example, firms incorporated in Texas have their Poison Pill Law indicator 
variable set equal to zero in the period prior to 2003, whereas after Texas adopts its 
poison pill law in 2003 the indicator variable switches to one for the remaining ten 
years in the pooled panel (2003 – 2012). Accordingly, companies incorporated in states 
that never passed a poison pill law are always coded as an unaffected (or control) firm. 
Specifically, we estimate the following pooled panel regression model: 
                 𝑄𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜔𝑡 + 𝛽𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡 ,                      (1) 
where 𝑄𝑖𝑠𝑡 measures firm value for firm 𝑖 in incorporating state 𝑠 during year 𝑡, and 
𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑠𝑡 is an indicator variable for whether the state in which a company is 
incorporated has adopted a poison pill law as of year 𝑡. The set of control variables 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 
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includes the dummy for firm-level poison pills as well as other firm and institutional 
characteristics that the extant literature has shown to correlate with firm value. In 
addition, we control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity within different firms 
using firm fixed effects 𝛾𝑖 (Gormley and Matsa, 2014), and for time-variant 
heterogeneity in unobserved factors that could affect all firms with year fixed effects 
𝜔𝑡. Finally, following Petersen (2009), we estimate robust standard errors clustered at 
the firm level.  
 Regression model (1) captures the average effect of poison pill laws on Q over 
the entire period 1983 to 2012. However, given that 23 of the states adopted the statutes 
prior to 1991 and 12 states enacted this legislation after 1994, we explore whether the 
value implications estimated using model (1) are time specific, examining whether 
poison pill laws differentially affected firm value in the two waves of laws. In 
particular, we estimate the following pooled panel model:  
𝑄𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜔𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝐿𝑎𝑤 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑠𝑡 +
                                𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝐿𝑎𝑤 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑊𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡 ,                       (2) 
where 𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝐿𝑎𝑤 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑊𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡 captures the poison pill laws for firms 
incorporated in first-wave adopting states, and 𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝐿𝑎𝑤 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑊𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡 
captures the poison pill laws for firms incorporated in second-wave adopting states, 
with i indexing firms, s indexing state of incorporation, and t indexing years. Controls 
and estimated standard errors are the same as in model (1). 
4.4 Matched Sample 
A concern with the pooled panel research design described in Section 4.3. is that 
any estimation of the value relevance of poison pill laws might be confounded by other 
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events that take place over the long-time period of our sample, 1983 to 2012. Therefore, 
we additionally employ a differences-in-differences methodology in a matched sample 
that consists of treated and control firms in the period surrounding the passage of poison 
pill laws. The use of the matched sample mitigates the possibility that some other 
unobserved shocks differentially affect the firms in the states adopting and not adopting 
a poison pill law, where such shocks are unrelated to the poison pill law but happened 
to occur around the same time. Our working hypothesis here is that such unrelated 
shocks would arguably affect the treated and control firms similarly, if the control firms 
are ex-ante similar to the treated firms. 
In constructing our matched sample, we match all sample firms in each of the 35 
adopting states to a control firm in a state that does not have a poison pill law during the 
five-year period after the state of incorporation of the treated firm adopts a poison pill 
law. We use propensity scores with nearest neighbor matching on Q and Ln(Assets) and 
exact matching on firm-level poison pill status and two-digit SIC codes in the year prior 
to the adoption of a poison pill law by the affected firms’ incorporating state. With this 
matched sample, we estimate the following regression model:  
         𝑄𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜔𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡 ,              (3) 
where 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 is an indicator variable equal to one in the year of and the three-year 
period after a poison pill law is passed for both treated and control firms, and zero 
otherwise, and 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 is an indicator variable equal to one for firms 
incorporated in a state that adopts a poison pill law in the period when the law is 
enforceable and otherwise set to zero, for firm 𝑖, in incorporating state 𝑠, in year 𝑡. 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 is omitted from model (4) due to multicollinearity with its firm fixed effect. All 
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other control variables are the same as those employed in the pooled panel regressions 
described in Section 4.3, and so are the estimated standard errors. Lastly, we also 
investigate the value relevance of poison pill laws in the matched sample for the 
different waves. 
 
5. Main Results 
5.1 Pooled Sample 
5.1.1 Poison Pill Laws and Firm Value 
Table F5 reports the differences-in-differences estimates of the effect of the 
adoption of poison pill laws on long-term firm value of firms incorporated in the 
enacting states over the period 1983 to 2012. In separate specifications, we decompose 
the effect of first-wave (1986 – 1990) from second-wave (1995 – 2009) laws. 
Distinguishing by waves matters in light of the different legal contexts in which the 
first-wave and second-wave laws were introduced (see Section 2).  
Preliminary, it is worth observing that, consistent with Cremers and Ferrell 
(2014) and Catan (2017), we find that the association of Poison Pill Firm-Level and Q 
is negative and significant in every specification. However, in light of the results of 
Table F4, where we find that having a relatively lower Q is a statistically significant 
predictor of the adoption of a visible pill, and Figure F5, where we show that firm value 
is significantly higher in the two to five years before the adoption of a visible pill, the 
negative association between visible poison pills and firm value in Table F5 may be 
endogenous and due to reverse causality.  
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Moving to our main results, in columns (1) and (2), we find that the adoption of 
a poison pill law is followed by a positive and statistically significant increase in Q for 
firms incorporated in the enacting states. This result is robust to controlling for other 
main state antitakeover laws in column (3), following Karpoff and Wittry (2017). 
Economically, and relative to the sample mean’s Tobin’s Q of 1.859, our estimates 
suggest an increase in value of 5.6% (=0.105/1.859) for firms covered by poison pill 
laws.  
Next, in columns (3) through (6), we investigate whether firms protected by 
first- and second- wave poison pill laws experience differential changes in value.63 
Focusing on column (6), which controls for the other state-level antitakeover statutes, 
we find that the passage of a poison pill law in the second-wave jurisdictions results in a 
positive and statistically significant increase in Q for firms incorporated in those 
jurisdictions, with a percentage effect of 10.9% (=20.2/1.859). Conversely, the 
coefficient for firms incorporated in states that adopted poison pill laws during the first 
wave is insignificant, suggesting that the positive effect of poison pill laws on firm 
value is entirely driven by the second-wave laws.  
As we argue in Section 2, the results of our Q regressions reflect the different 
legal contexts underlying the enactment of the first-wave and second-wave poison pill 
laws (Karpoff and Wittry, 2017). Thus results for first-wave poison pill laws are on 
average insignificant because (i) poison pill laws enacted before 1988 plausibly did not 
add much protection in light of the then relative certain validity of the pill after the 
                                                 
63 Table G8 in the supplementary appendix reports the pooled panel regression results split by the time 
periods 1983 to 1991 and 1994 to 2012, as opposed to Table F5, which considers the entire sample period 
1983 to 2012, but splits the waves using indicator variables. While we prefer the specification in Table F5 
as it requires that all of the controls have the same coefficients, Table G8 shows that the results are robust 
to either design. 
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decision in Moran, and (ii) the effects of the poison pill laws enacted between 1988 and 
1990 are in any event difficult to capture because many of these laws were introduced 
either shortly after related state courts’ decisions invalidating the poison pill or the 1988 
Delaware decisions injecting uncertainty in the use of the pill. Conversely, the second-
wave laws added greater incremental protection at a time when the legal uncertainty of 
poison pills had been clear in these states for some time.  
5.1.2 Poison Pill Laws, Firm-Level Pills and Firm Value 
Our next test considers whether the passage of poison pill laws (strengthening 
the shadow poison pill) has different value implications depending on whether a firm 
has adopted a visible poison pill. Table F6 presents the results for the pooled panel 
regressions of Q on various poison pill law indicator variables interacted with Poison 
Pill Firm-Level. Columns (2) and (4) include the other state antitakeover laws as 
controls.  
In columns (1) and (2), we do not find evidence of value implications for firms 
incorporated in a state with a poison pill law and a pill in place, as all of the estimates 
are positive but statistically insignificant. However, the Poison Pill Law indicator 
variable is positive and significant with point estimates ranging from 0.098 to 0.115. 
Poison Pill Firm-Level also continues to be negatively and significantly correlated with 
Q. Thus, these results seem to suggest that the value of a shadow pill is not affected by 
the actual adoption of a pill, confirming the assumption derived from institutional 
reasons that all the effect of poison pills arises from the availability of the right to adopt 
a pill rather than the actual adoption of the pill (Coates, 2000; Catan 2017). At the same 
time, when combined, again, with the results of Table F4 and Figure F5 on the likely 
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reverse causality of the negative association between the adoption of a visible poison 
pill and firm value, the results of Table F6 seem to indicate that when a firm does adopt 
a visible poison pill, it means that things have already gone awry. 
In columns (3) and (4), we then separate again the poison pill law indicator 
variable for the first- and second- waves, finding results similar to those in columns (4) 
– (6) of Table F5 and columns (1) and (2) of Table F6. Indeed, firms incorporated in 
states that adopted poison pill laws in the second-wave period (1995 – 2009) experience 
positive and statistically significant increases in Q of 24.1 to 28.1 percentage points, 
while results for the firms covered by the first-wave laws are insignificant. Furthermore, 
neither firms covered by the first-wave laws or second-wave laws and with firm-level 
pills show a statistically significant differential effect on value, adding further support 
for the view that the power of the pill rests in the availability of the shadow pill. 
5.2 Matched Sample 
5.2.1 Summary Statistics 
As described in Section 4.4, a potential concern affecting the results for our 
pooled sample is that we might be capturing some spurious correlation between Poison 
Pill Law and some other confounding events that also relates positively with Q over the 
sample period 1983 to 2012. To address this concern, we create a matched sample of 
treated and control firms with equidistant pre- and post- treatment windows surrounding 
the 35 poison-pill-law adoption dates and under the additional criteria specified in 
Section 4.4.  
In particular, our matched sample includes treated firms that are incorporated in 
states with poison pill laws and control firms that are from incorporating states that did 
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not pass a poison pill law at any time up to at least five years after the adoption of a 
poison pill law by the matched firms’ incorporating state. For example, Michigan 
passed a poison pill law in July of 2001. Therefore, we match all firms incorporated in 
Michigan in the year prior to adoption (2000) to its nearest neighbor from a pool of 
control firms incorporated in either one of the 15 states that never passed a poison pill 
law or to a company incorporated in a state that adopted this law after July of 2006 
(Vermont and Wyoming). Consistent with our analysis for the pooled sample, we 
further break up the matched samples by the first and second wave of poison pill laws.  
Panel A of Table F7 provides the summary statistics for the resultant matched 
samples in the year prior to treatment (t-1). Columns (1) – (3) are for the full sample, 
whereas columns (4) – (6) and (7) – (9) are specific to the first- and second- wave 
periods, respectively. In the first three columns, we also show full sample variable 
averages for treatment and control firms, along with the corresponding differences in 
means. In column (3), we report the estimated t-statistics in parentheses below the 
differences and indicate statistical significance, if necessary.  
Results for Panel A of Table F7 show that our treatment and control firms are 
similar. In particular, Q, Poison Pill Firm-Level, and Ln(Assets) are not significantly 
different between the two groups. Furthermore, these variables are similar between 
treatment and control firms within the two separate wave periods. Despite the 
statistically insignificant differences between the treatment and control firms within the 
full, first-wave, and second-wave samples, we continue to include all of the control 
variables in our matched sample regressions for robustness. Panel B of Table F7 
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presents the summary statistics for all firm-year observations in the full, first wave, and 
second wave matched samples. 
5.2.2 Poison Pill Laws and Firm Value 
Table F8 reports the point estimates for the matched sample regressions with 
pre- and post- treatment windows of three years, consistent with our pooled panel 
regressions beginning three years before the enactment of poison pill laws by the first 
adopting states (i.e., Indiana and Ohio) and ending three years after the last passage of a 
poison pill law. In columns (1) and (2), we regress Q on Treat × Post, where the treat 
indicator variable always equals one for firms incorporated in poison pill law states and 
zero for the control firms, and the post indicator variable equals one in the year of the 
adoption and afterwards for both groups, and zero otherwise. We omit Treat from the 
regression specification due to multicollinearity with its firm fixed effect, but include 
Post and year fixed effects, and the estimated standard errors are robust to 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, with clustering performed at the firm level.  
The results of Table F8 shows that our main result – that firm value increases 
after the state in which the firm is incorporated passes a poison pill law –continues to 
hold in our matched sample. In particular, in column (2), where we include controls for 
the other state antitakeover laws, the estimates suggest that treatment firms experience 
an increase in Q of 10.3 percentage points.  
In columns (3) and (4), we consider the treatment effect of poison pill laws on 
firm value for the 23 first-wave adopting states. Consistent with the pooled panel 
regressions, there are no significant value implications stemming from poison pill laws 
in this earlier period. However, moving to columns (5) and (6) for the second-wave 
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period, we find that firms incorporated in second-wave adopting states have increases in 
Q of 12% (=0.227/1.892) to 12.8% (=0.243/1.892), relative to the sample mean. This 
provides further support that our findings in the pooled panel regressions are not an 
artifact of spurious correlation.  
In our final analogue to the Table F5 results, we test for differential value 
implications of first- versus second- wave laws in columns (7) and (8) in the full 
matched sample. In these specifications, the point estimates provide more evidence that 
the entirety of the positive value implications takes place in firms incorporated in the 12 
second-wave adopting states, while the Treat × Post × Poison Pill Law First Wave 
triple interaction term is statistically and economically insignificant.  
5.2.3 Portfolio Analysis 
As a robustness check to the Q regressions, we perform a long-term stock return 
event study surrounding the adoption of poison pill laws using our matched sample of 
treatment and control firms. Following previous studies (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 
2003; Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell, 2009; Cremers and Ferrell, 2014; Cremers, Litov, 
and Sepe, 2017), we construct long (short) portfolios of stocks from the matched sample 
treatment (control) group around the time their (matched sample counterpart’s) 
incorporating state adopts a poison pill law. Table F9 presents the abnormal returns of 
value weighted portfolios for the long, short, and long-short portfolios, respectively.64  
Consistent with our Q analysis, we split the portfolio results by full sample, first- and 
second- wave periods, in the respective panels.  
                                                 
64 We provide results pertaining to equally weighted portfolios in Table G9 of the supplementary 
appendix, where the findings are qualitatively similar to those using the CRSP value weighted market 
factor. 
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In Panel A of Table F9, we report the results from the above portfolios for the 
full matched sample, where we start holding the relevant stocks 6 months before the 
event date until 24 and 36 months post adoption date, respectively. We consider both 
the four-factor Carhart (1997) and three-factor Fama-French (1993) models to estimate 
abnormal returns. For both holding periods and across models, we find that treated 
firms earn positive and significant abnormal returns, whereas the control group does 
not. In addition, when we test our investment strategy of longing the treated companies 
and shorting the control companies, we find positive and significant abnormal returns. 
These results are consistent with those in our Q regressions, in spite of the inherently 
noisy nature of abnormal returns estimated from a relatively limited number of stocks in 
each portfolio (on average 62 to 72 stocks, depending on the length of our holding 
period).  
In Panels B and C of Table F9, we separately consider the portfolios in the first- 
and second-wave periods. Again, consistent with the Q regressions and our 
considerations about the importance of the different legal contexts pertaining to the 
passage of the first- and second- wave poison pill laws, all of the abnormal returns for 
the long, short and long-short portfolios in the first-wave sample are statistically 
insignificant. In contrast, the second-wave long portfolios are positive and statistically 
significant in the “6m24” holding period portfolios. Meanwhile, the short portfolios are 
always insignificant, whereas the long-short portfolios are positive and significant in 
both the four-factor and three-factor models and in both holding periods. Overall, we 
conclude that the portfolio analysis yields congruent results with those in the Q 
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regressions, and provides further robustness to our main finding that poison pill laws 
have positive corporate value implications.65 
6. Shadow Pills and the Channels of Value 
6.1 Hypotheses 
In this section, we investigate possible explanations for our finding of a positive 
relation between firm value and the adoption of poison pill laws – that is, the 
strengthening of a firm’s shadow pill. In particular, drawing on the existing theoretical 
literature, we explore two potential hypotheses for the value relevance of a stronger 
shadow pill: the “bargaining power hypothesis” and the “bonding hypothesis,” 
respectively. The first hypothesis is rooted in the rationale that having the right to halt a 
takeover increases the ability of a target’s board of directors to “bargain” with a 
potential bidder and, ultimately, extract a higher purchasing price for the benefit of the 
target’s shareholders (Stulz, 1988; Harris, 1990). The second hypothesis posits that 
shareholders are made better off by takeover deterrents since these mechanisms allow a 
firm to “bond” itself to operational strategies that otherwise would be at risk of reversal 
by an acquiring organization (Shleifer and Summers, 1988; Laffont and Tirole, 1988). 
We test each hypothesis as a source of value of the shadow pill in our matched sample. 
6.1.1 The Bargaining Power Hypothesis 
Our first empirical test of the bargaining power hypothesis explores whether the 
right to adopt a poison pill, as sanctioned by the adoption of a poison pill law, alters the 
likelihood that a treated firm will: (1) receive a bid (Bid) and/or (2) be successfully 
acquired (Complete). We obtain data on M&A activity from the SDC M&A and CRSP 
                                                 
65 We additionally provide results for a second alternative measure of firm value, Total Tobin’s Q (as 
proposed by Peters and Taylor, 2017) in Table G10 of the supplementary appendix. Our main pooled 
panel and matched sample results hold in these specifications.  
128 
(delisting code in the 200s) databases. Bid (Complete) is defined as an indicator variable 
equal to one if a target firm announces that it has received a bid (has a completed bid) in 
the SDC M&A database or has a delisting code in the 200s of the CRSP database, and 
zero otherwise. In order for a bid to be considered in our sample we require that all 
targets are U.S. firms and that the size of the deal is at least $100 million. Moreover, we 
only include bids that are for at least a 50% controlling stake in the target. Table F10 
presents the results, where we specify year fixed effects in all four columns and three-
digit SIC code industry fixed effects in columns (2) and (4) of each respective panel. 
In columns (1) and (2) of Table F10, Panel A, we find that treated firms in the 
full matched sample are equally likely to receive a takeover bid as control companies, 
as the coefficient on Treat × Post is statistically insignificant. Similar results obtain in 
columns (3) and (4), indicating that poison pill laws neither deter nor bring about 
successful acquisitions. Congruent with our earlier approach in this study, we also 
consider the differential impact of first- (Panel B) versus second- (Panel C) wave poison 
pill laws. As in Panel A, we do not find evidence that incorporation in a state that 
passed a poison pill law in either the first- or second-wave periods alters a firm’s 
likelihood of receiving a takeover bid or being successfully acquired. Consistent with 
previous empirical studies (Ambrose and Megginson, 1992; Bhagat and Jefferis, 1993; 
Comment and Schwert, 1995; Heron and Lie, 2006), we also show that Firm-Level 
Poison Pill does not significantly alter the propensity to receive a bid or to be 
successfully acquired. 
Nevertheless, the standalone evidence from Table F10 is a necessary but 
insufficient condition to determine the merits of the bargaining power hypothesis as a 
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potential source of value for the positive association between poison pill laws and Q.66 
Fully testing this hypothesis also requires an investigation into the ability of the 
bargaining mechanism to actually create value. We explore this next in Table F11, 
where we analyze the value implications of poison pill laws for firms at risk of takeover 
bids.  
In particular, Table F11 shows results for two separate sets of tests. The first 
empirical specification regresses Q on Treat × Post interacted with two proxy variables 
for M&A activity. The first proxy variable is Incorp State-Year M&A Volume, which is 
measured as the ratio of completed M&A dollar volume to total market capitalization 
per state of incorporation in a given year. The second proxy variable is Industry-Year 
M&A Volume, defined as the ratio of completed M&A dollar volume to total market 
capitalization per Fama-French 49 industry grouping in a given year (following 
Cremers, Litov, and Sepe, 2017).67 The second set of tests considers the impact of Treat 
× Post on takeover premiums for the 1-Day Premium, 1-Week Premium, and 4-Week 
Premium respectively. These dependent variables (which are all from the SDC M&A 
database) capture the premium associated with the offer price to the target’s respective 
closing price 1-day, 1-week, and 4-weeks prior to the announcement date. 
Panel A of Table F11 presents the results for our first empirical specification. 
Columns (1) and (2) suggest that poison pill laws do not provide differential value gains 
for treated firms that are more susceptible to receiving takeover bids in the full matched 
sample, as the coefficient estimates on the triple interaction terms are negative and 
                                                 
66 The standalone evidence from Table F10 is, however, inconsistent with the managerial entrenchment 
hypothesis (Cary, 1969).   
67 We assign Industry-Year M&A Volume by Fama-French 49 industry grouping since we exactly match 
on two-digit SIC codes in the matched sample. 
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insignificant for both of our M&A activity proxies.  The next two columns consider the 
effect of first-wave poison pill laws on the Tobin’s Q of firms that are more likely to 
experience takeover activity. In particular, column (4) shows that treated firms that 
experience a one standard deviation increase in Industry-Year M&A Volume exhibit a 
reduction in Q of 3.1% (=0.901× 0.050)/1.458) relative to the sample average. Finally, 
columns (5) and (6) document the absence of a differential impact of second-wave 
poison pill laws on treated firms that are more susceptible to a takeover.  
Panel B of Table F11 then shows results for the effect of poison pill law 
treatment status on target firms’ takeover premiums in the full matched sample.68 The 
first two columns indicate that a stronger shadow pill does not result in a higher one-day 
takeover premium relative to control firms without access to a correspondingly strong 
shadow pill. Moving to columns (3) and (4) and then (5) and (6), we find again no 
evidence suggesting that the shareholders of treated companies benefitted from an 
enhanced ability to bargain with bidding firms. These results hold with or without 
controls for the other four antitakeover laws. However, we do find some evidence 
consistent with Heron and Lie (2006, 2015) that one-day and one-week takeover 
premiums are positively correlated with the adoption of visible poison pills (see 
columns (1) and (3)). 
Hence, we conclude that, overall, we do not find evidence that poison pill laws 
increase the treated firms’ bargaining power relative to the bargaining power of firms 
                                                 
68 Given that our pool of matched firms is restricted to companies with non-missing firm-level poison pill 
data and that we are estimating regressions around tight three-year windows, we only have 129 deals with 
non-missing premium data. As such, we focus only on the full matched sample since further splitting by 
waves reduces the sample points even further. 
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incorporated in states without such legislation, as neither the treated firms’ Tobin’s Q 
nor their takeover premiums are significantly affected by the passage of these laws.  
6.1.2 The Bonding Hypothesis 
As the bargaining power hypothesis seems unable to explain the positive value 
implications of poison pill laws, we move to investigating the bonding hypothesis as a 
potential source of value. As mentioned above, this hypothesis posits that companies 
shielded from the threat of takeover are more apt to commit to specific operational 
strategies, which would promote increased firm value. To test if this is the case in our 
sample, we explore whether the ability to bond to given corporate policies through a 
more certain right to adopt a poison pill results in gains in either operational efficiency 
or Tobin’s Q.  
6.1.2.1 Poison Pill Laws and Operational Efficiency 
In Table F12, we employ four dependent variables of operational efficiency. The 
first proxy is return on assets (ROA) scaled by the book value of assets. Second, we 
consider net profit margin (NPM) scaled by sales. Third, we specify operating margin 
(OM) measured as operating income after depreciation and amortization over total sales. 
Fourth, we use sales growth, which is defined as the difference between next-period and 
current-period sales divided by this period’s sales. Lastly, we lead these measures by 
one-year since the impact of the poison pill laws on corporate policy likely occurs with 
a lag. 
Panel A of Table F12 shows the matched sample regression estimates for our 
four operational efficiency measures on Treat × Post in the full sample. We find that 
firms incorporated in a poison pill law adopting state experience statistically significant 
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increases in three of four of these measures relative to the sample mean. For example, in 
column (1), we show that the right to adopt a poison pill increases ROA by 6.9% 
(=0.009/0.130). Similar instances of increases in operational efficiency hold for 
columns (2) (NPM) and (4) (SG), respectively.  
Further, we test for differential effects of first- versus second-wave poison pill 
laws in Panels B and C, and find, again, that the entirety of the increases in operational 
efficiency occurs for firms incorporated in states adopting laws during the second-wave 
period (1995 to 2009), as all four columns in Panel C suggest positive and significant 
increases in ROA, NPM, OM, and SG. On the other hand, Treat × Post is insignificant 
in each of columns (1) – (4) in Panel B. In sum, Table F12 provides some initial 
evidence supporting the bonding hypothesis, indicating that treated firms, which are 
arguably better able to commit to corporate strategies via the access to a stronger 
shadow pill, experience increases in operational efficiency.  
6.1.2.2 Poison Pill Laws, Innovative Activity and Firm Value 
If shadow poison pills serve as a commitment device that better enables the 
board to consider the long-term interests of the firm’s stakeholders, as implied by the 
bonding hypothesis, then poison pill laws could matter more for innovation-intense 
firms. Indeed, innovation often requires firm-specific investments by top employees, 
suppliers, customers, or strategic alliance partners. As a result, a shadow pill could be 
useful to prevent the ex-post expropriation of the stakeholders’ firm-specific 
investments in firms more engaged in innovative or informationally complex business 
projects.  
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We test this specification of the shadow pill’s bonding hypothesis using the 
following three proxies. The first proxy is R&D/Sales for the intensity of corporate 
expenditures on research and development activities (Bushee, 1998; Chan, Lakonishok, 
and Sougiannis, 2001; Eberhart, Maxwell, and Siddique, 2004), which we construct 
using financial data from Compustat. The second proxy, Intangible Capital/Assets, is a 
“catch-all” measure of the complexity of firm operations and asymmetric information 
(Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999; Duru, Wang, and Zhao, 2013). We build 
Intangible Capital/Assets using the data provided by Peters and Taylor (2017) on 
WRDS, with this measure being a component of their Total Tobin’s Q (Total Q) 
measure. Our third proxy Knowledge Capital/Assets is another “catch-all” measure for 
the complexity of firm operations and asymmetric information, as it is designed to 
estimate both the significance of knowledge capital like R&D and intellectual property 
assets, as well as the complex nature behind their use. This measure is again provided 
by Peters and Taylor (2017) on WRDS, as it constitutes another input in their 
construction of Total Q.  
Panel A of Table F13 shows the results for each of these proxies for innovative 
activity interacted with Treat × Post in the full period matched sample. Again, 
consistent with the bonding hypothesis of the shadow pill, columns (1) – (3) indicate 
that all three of our proxies for innovative actvity measures interacted with the 
difference-in-differences estimator have a positive and significant relation with Q. For 
example, in column (2), a one standard deviation increase in Intangible Capital/Assets 
results in a differential increase in Q of 8.2% (=0.394×0.339/1.638) for firms 
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incorporated in states with a poison pill law relative to matched controls with average 
intangible assets. 
Panel B of Table F13 reports the estimates from splitting the matched samples 
into the first- and second- wave adoption periods.69 Columns (1) and (3) show that 
companies with higher levels of R&D/Sales and Knowledge Capital/Assets experience 
an increase in Q after the passage of a poison pill law even during the first-wave period. 
Specifically, firms with R&D/Sales that is one standard deviation higher than the mean 
experience an 8.24% (=3.336×0.036/1.458) higher Q if they are incorporated in a state 
with a first-wave poison pill law relative to firms with average R&D and absent such 
legislation. In columns (4) – (6), the three interaction coefficients are again positive and 
statistically significant for firms incorporated in states that adopted a second-wave 
poison pill law. Hence, while on average the first-wave poison pill laws were not 
followed by significant changes in firm value, changes in value are similar across the 
two waves for innovation-intense firms, suggesting that access to a stronger shadow pill 
has especially important relevance for such firms.  
6.1.2.3 Poison Pill Laws, Stakeholder Relationships and Firm Value 
Our next set of specifications to test the shadow pill’s bonding hypothesis 
include three different proxies intended to measure more directly the importance of 
stakeholder relationships. The first, Large Customer, is a proxy variable for the 
significance of customers in generating financial value. Large Customer equals one if 
the firm has a large customer based on the Compustat segment level database (Johnson, 
Karpoff, and Yi, 2015; Fich, Harford, and Yore, 2017), where we obtain customer sales 
                                                 
69 Table G11 of the supplementary appendix further splits our results in the full sample by wave using the 
quadruple interaction term Treat × Post × Innovative Activity Proxy × Poison Pill Law First Wave.   
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data from the historic Compustat Segment tapes. The second proxy, Strategic Alliance, 
is constructed to indicate whether the business has a long-term partnership with another 
company (Bodnaruk, Massa, and Simonov, 2013). This indicator variable is set equal to 
one if the firm participates in an active strategic alliance, and zero otherwise (Johnson, 
Karpoff, and Yi, 2015; Fich, Harford, and Yore, 2017). The data for this measure comes 
from the Thomson Reuters SDC M&A database. Finally, we capture the level of 
importance of employees for a corporation using Compustat financial data about the 
ratio of selling, general and administrative expenses over the book value of total assets, 
Labor Capital (Lev and Radhakrishnan, 2005; Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou, 2013). 
Table F14 presents the matched sample regressions of Q on our three proxies for 
stakeholder relationships over the full sample interacted with the dummy variables 
indicating the passage of poison pill laws. In particular, Panel A of Table F14 considers 
the full period matched sample, with the full set of control variables including the 
indicator variables for other state-level antitakeover laws. Consistent with the bonding 
hypothesis of the shadow pill, we find in column (1) that firms incorporated in states 
with poison pill laws and with a Large Customer experience an increase in Q of 6.35% 
(=0.104/1.638) relative to the sample mean. Similarly, column (2) indicates that 
affected firms in a strategic alliance also experience a significant rise in firm value. 
Lastly, column (3) shows that a one standard deviation increase in Labor Capital yields 
an 8.3% (=0.635 × 0.213/1.638) gain in Q for firms covered by poison pill laws.  
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In Panel B of Table F14, we then disentangle our analysis for the first- and 
second- wave matched samples.70  A quick glance at columns (1) – (3) and (4) – (6) 
suggests that the larger increase in Q for firms with stronger stakeholder relationships, 
as captured by any of our three proxies, is again entirely driven by the firms 
incorporated in states that adopted a poison pill law during the second wave.  
 
7. Shadow Pills in the Shadow of Common Law 
Throughout our analysis, we find that the positive value effect of poison pill 
laws is driven by the second-wave adoptions that took place over the period 1995 to 
2009. In Section 2, we provide a justification for this difference that considers the 
different legal contexts underlying the enactment of the first-wave and second-wave 
poison pill laws. In brief, under the pervasive influence of Delaware case law, there are 
institutional reasons to believe that the validity of the pill even outside Delaware was 
fairly clear after the 1985 decision in Moran and until at least 1988, when subsequent 
Delaware decisions (Interco and Pillsbury Co.) re-injected uncertainty into the validity 
of the pill. Therefore, during the 1985-1988 period in which most of the first-wave 
poison pill laws were enacted, many firms arguably already had an effective shadow pill 
in place, which likely reduced the importance of introducing poison pill laws. 
Conversely, by the start of the second wave of poison pill laws in 1995, states that had 
not yet adopted a poison pill law had clearly selected an anti (or at least not-openly 
favorable) poison pill policy, so that second-wave laws significantly strengthened 
access to the shadow pill for the firms incorporated in the enacting states. 
                                                 
70 Table G12 of the supplementary appendix further splits our results in the full sample by wave using the 
quadruple interaction term Treat × Post × Stakeholder Relationship Proxy × Poison Pill Law First 
Wave. 
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In this section, we offer two formal statistical tests of this legal argument. The 
first test considers an adjustment to our first- and second-wave cohorts, defining the 
former to span the period 1986 to 1988 and the latter to consist of laws adopted from 
1989 to 2009. Additionally, in this set-up, we either exclude Delaware firms entirely or 
exclude them from the sample during the first wave of poison pill laws and include 
them as controls during the second wave. The second test constructs a poison pill 
validity index (PPV Index) that aims to capture the relative certainty in the legality of 
the shadow pill to test whether it is value relevant for affected firms.71   
7.1 Poison Pill Laws, Wave Adjustments and Firm Value 
In this subsection, we test whether our main results are robust to redefining the 
first and second wave periods around the 1988 Delaware decisions that injected novel 
uncertainty on firms’ ability to maintain a pill (Interco and Pillsbury Co.). Indeed, 
following these decisions, eleven states (or 31.4% of the total affected states) adopted 
poison pill laws in 1989. Therefore, as a robustness check, we redefine the first-wave 
period to include all adopting states from 1986 to 1988 and the second wave to include 
                                                 
71 In addition to our main legal justification for the differential impact of the first-wave and second-wave 
poison pill laws, we observe that there could also be a complementary economic explanation: that the 
firms affected by the first-wave and second-wave laws were different in relevant characteristics. As we 
document in Table G13 of the supplementary appendix, when we test for pre-treatment year (t-1) 
differences between the first- and second-wave treated firms and then the first- and second-wave control 
firms, we find significant differences in firm characteristics across the two waves, which is consistent 
with an economic explanation of the differential effect of poison pill laws by wave. Under this 
explanation, poison pill laws might entail a tradeoff. As highlighted by the takeover literature (see, e.g., 
Manne, 1965; Shleifer and Vishny, 2002), takeovers might have emerged as a response to re-evaluate 
undervalued assets, either due to managerial entrenchment or the existence of inefficient conglomerates. 
Accordingly, while takeover defenses, including poison pill laws, on the one hand display beneficial 
commitment effects, on the other they may also reduce the likelihood that undervalued assets might be 
put to more efficient uses through a takeover. This interpretation could explain why column 4 of Table 
F11, which shows results for the interaction between first-wave poison pill laws (which were enacted 
during the apex of the takeover era, unlike the second-wave laws) with Industry-Year M&A Volume has a 
negative and statistically significant effect on Q.   
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all adopters after 1988 (i.e., from 1989 to 2009). Table F15 reports the results from this 
robustness test. 
Panel A of Table F15 presents both pooled panel and matched sample results 
where we exclude Delaware firms in the first-wave period reflecting that Delaware does 
not have a poison pill law yet is informed by Moran, and include these companies as 
control observations in the second-wave period reflecting the uncertainty injected over 
the use of the pill by the 1988 Delaware courts’ decisions. Column (1) indicates that this 
different approach to first- and second- wave periods as well as to the position of 
Delaware yields qualitatively similar results to those in column (1) of Table F5. In 
addition, the specifications in columns (2) and (3) demonstrate that our main pooled 
panel results are also robust to the redefinition of the wave periods. For example, in 
column (2) we find that firms incorporated in second-wave adopting states (in this 
setup, 1989 to 2009) experience positive increases in Q of 10.5% (=0.155/1.471), 
relative to the sample median. We further obtain similar results in the matched sample 
regressions (columns (4) – (6)).   
Panel B of Table F15 provides additional robustness that our findings are not 
specific to the inclusion of Delaware firms in the second-wave period, as qualitatively 
similar results hold in both the pooled panel and matched sample tests when we exclude 
Delaware firms from both wave periods. For instance, we document increases in Q of 
11.7% (=0.214/1.822) for companies incorporated in second-wave adopting states, 
relative to its year before treatment matched sample mean.  
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7.2 PPV-Index and Firm Value 
The second test in support of our justification for the differential impact of first-
wave and second-wave poison pill laws employs a poison pill validity index (PPV 
Index) designed to capture changes across time and states of incorporation in the 
validity of the shadow pill. Methodologically, we use poison pill laws and poison pill 
case law information from Cain, McKeon, and Solomon (2017) and build an index that 
ranges from zero to three, where higher index values capture an enhancement in the 
strength of the right to adopt a poison pill or its effectiveness as a takeover defense.  
Panel A of Table F16 describes the construction of the PPV-Index. Under the 
thesis of the pervasive influence of Delaware case law (Cremers and Ferrell, 2014), we 
first assume that the Delaware Supreme Court decision in Moran increased the validity 
of poison pills for both Delaware and non-Delaware incorporated firms (see Section 2). 
However, we also attempt to capture here the view that the validity of the pill remained 
more uncertain in non-Delaware states before the enactment of poison pill laws (Catan 
& Kahan, 2016; Karpoff and Wittry, 2017, Cain, McKeon, and Solomon, 2017), 
assuming that firms incorporated outside of Delaware are less certain of the 
effectiveness of poison pills. Hence, the PPV-Index is set equal to one for Delaware 
companies after Moran and to one-half for all others.  
Next, in order to reflect the impact of validating or invalidating state court 
decisions, we increase the value of the PPV-Index to one whenever a state experiences a 
court case that reinforces the validity of the shadow pill. On the other hand, when a state 
court case invalidates the use of poison pills we adjust the PPV-Index to zero for firms 
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incorporated in that state. New Jersey is an example of such a state as their court system 
ruled against pill provisions in the same year as Moran. 
Further, following Cain, McKeon, and Solomon (2017), we hypothesize that the 
legal status of the poison pill outside Delaware was subsequently clarified by the 1990 
Georgia-Pacific v. Great Northern72 decision under Maine law, which ruled the view 
that the poison pill is invalid not to “represent statements of the current law on the 
issue” (Cain, McKeon, and Solomon, 2017, p. 471). Indeed, Cain, McKeon, and 
Solomon (2017) posit that this decision was the last state-level judicial challenge to the 
validity of the poison pill. On this premise, we then code the PPV-Index as equal to one 
for firms incorporated in Maine (similar to firms incorporated in Delaware after Moran) 
and also update the index value to one for all the firms incorporated in states with 
neither a poison pill law nor validating or invalidating case law at the time of the 
Georgia-Pacific decision (reflecting the assumption in Cain, McKeon, and Solomon 
(2017) that the validity of the shadow pill was no longer in doubt after Georgia-
Pacific).  
   In our final adjustments to the PPV-Index we increase the total value of the 
measure to two for companies incorporated in states that adopted a poison pill law, as 
the statutes sanctioned the certainty of the pill validity above and beyond the decisions 
of state courts. Lastly, we code the index to three if a corporation is incorporated in a 
state that has either a poison pill law or court case that validates the use of strong poison 
pills (e.g., a dead-hand or no-hand pill).73 Finally, we scale this total score by three to 
have a measure that ranges between zero and one. 
                                                 
72 Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 728 F. Supp. 807, 811 (D. Me. 1990) (Maine law). 
73 Dead-hand and no-hand pills, which are prohibited under Delaware case law, allow for a board to 
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In Panel B of Table F16, we then examine the relation between the PPV-Index 
and firm value. The first two columns include companies incorporated in the state of 
Arizona and code their index value to two after the state adopts a poison pill law (again 
as in Cain, McKeon, and Solomon, 2017). However, as Karpoff and Wittry (2017) do 
not list Arizona as adopting pill legislation, and after our own reading of the law we 
interpret the language as ambiguous. Thus, in the last two columns we exclude Arizona 
firms from the regressions entirely to make sure our results are robust to this possible 
measurement error.74  
In columns (1) and (2) we find that companies incorporated in states with a 
higher PPV index (i.e., a more effective poison pill) experience significant increases in 
firm value. For instance, in the second column, which include controls for other state 
antitakeover laws, Q increases by 2.4% (=0.133×0.333/1.859) when a firm is 
incorporated in a state that goes from the Georgia-Pacific levels of certainty (PPV-
Index=1/3) to that engendered by a poison pill law (PPV-Index=2/3). The point 
estimates in columns (3) and (4), which exclude Arizona firms, are nearly identical to 
those that include Arizona firms. Overall, we find that increases in the relative strength 
of the right to adopt a poison pill or its effectiveness as a takeover defense is positively 
related to Q.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
provide that the pill survives for a certain period even after the adopting directors are voted off the board. 
74 The entirety of our analysis is robust to the inclusion or exclusion of firms incorporated in the state of 
Arizona. 
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8. Robustness Analysis 
8.1 Higher Dimensional Fixed Effects 
To begin our checks of robustness, we evaluate the concern that the positive 
value relation we document in subsection 5.1.1 between Q and Poison Pill Law might 
be the result of an unobserved and time-varying industry characteristic. Following 
Catan (2017) and Karpoff and Wittry (2017), we re-specify our model from this earlier 
subsection with higher-dimensional industry-year fixed effects, where the industry 
grouping is designated by three-digit SIC codes. We also include all of the control 
variables we have maintained throughout our analysis and estimate robust standard 
errors with firm-level clustering.  
Table F17 presents the pooled panel results.75 Columns (1) through (3) 
document that, on average, poison pill laws remain value enhancing for the shareholders 
of affected firms even after controlling for unobserved time-varying heterogeneity 
within industry. In particular, considering the specification in column (3), which 
includes controls for other antitakeover laws (Karpoff and Wittry, 2017), we find that 
firms incorporated in states that adopt poison pill laws experience a statistically and 
economically significant increase in value of 8.2% (=0.120/1.471), relative to the 
sample median Tobin’s Q. The last three columns show the familiar evidence that the 
effect of poison pill laws is entirely driven by the second-wave laws, whereas the first-
wave laws have no statistically significant impact.  
                                                 
75 We are less concerned of an unobserved and time-varying industry factor driving our results in the 
matched sample since we match firms exactly on industry dummies. 
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8.2 Without Same Year, Multi-Law Adopters 
Our main focus in this study is establishing the causal effect of poison pill laws 
on long-term firm value. However, a potential concern of our empirical strategy is that 
many of the states that adopted poison pill laws also adopted other antitakeover 
legislation in the same year. For example, on July 18, 1989, Massachusetts enacted at 
once business combination, directors’ duties, and poison pill laws. Therefore, to provide 
additional evidence that our main results are not confounded by these other state 
antitakeover laws we exclude all firms incorporated in states that adopt business 
combination, control share, and/or fair price laws in the same year that they enact 
poison pill legislation.76  
Table F18 presents the results. In columns (1) and (2), we report the findings 
from pooled panel regressions of Q on Poison Pill Law. We find that our main results 
are robust to the exclusion of same year, multi-law adopting states, with (in column (1)) 
and without (in column (2)) firms from Delaware as controls. Columns (3) and (4) 
present the matched sample results. Again, we show that the effect of poison pill laws 
on firm value is positive and statistically significant, and unlikely to be confounded by 
the adoption of multiple antitakeover laws in the same year.77 
                                                 
76 We do not exclude corporations from states that simultaneously adopt poison pill and directors’ duties 
laws, as the latter is fundamentally different from the other four antitakeover laws (business combination, 
control share, fair price, and poison pill). Indeed, directors’ duties laws do not per se provide an 
antitakeover defense, but rather offer directors more leeway to justify the adoption of antitakeover 
measures by enabling them to justify the adoption of such measures based on the best interests of all 
stakeholders rather than just shareholders. Nine states meet this criterion and are excluded from the 
analysis in Table F18: Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, 
South Dakota, and Wisconsin. 
77 Further, Table G15 of the supplementary appendix investigates the effect of poison pill laws with 
heterogenous provisions on firm value. We find no differential effect on Q. 
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8.3 Timing of Firm Value Implications 
In Section 4.1 we describe our identification strategy and address potential 
concerns that threaten the causal interpretation of our results. To the best of our 
knowledge, we provide the first empirical evidence that researchers wanting to use this 
natural experiment should be sure to specify firm-level pills in their regression models 
(otherwise OVB is present), and that the adoption of these laws does not suffer from 
reverse causality with Q or other firm characteristics. The final important step in 
demonstrating the validity of this experiment is to offer suggestive evidence that the 
parallel trends assumption holds.  
Table F19 presents results from these tests. Following the existing literature 
(e.g., Giroud and Mueller, 2010; Serfling, 2016; Klasa, Ortiz-Molina, Serfling, and 
Srinivasan, 2018), we investigate the dynamics of the firm value implications stemming 
from poison pill laws. The idea of this test is that absent the adoption of these laws, the 
Q of the affected firms (incorporated in the actual enacting states) would have evolved 
in a similar fashion to that of the unaffected firms (incorporated in states without poison 
pill laws at the time of the analysis). We implement this research design by inaccurately 
assigning poison pill law status to affected firms a year before ([-1]) the actual adoption 
occurs, and zero otherwise, and name this indicator variable Poison Pill Law[-1]. In 
addition, we create the indicator variables Poison Pill Law[0] and Poison Pill Law[1+], 
which accurately assign poison pill law status to affected firms in the year of adoption 
([0]), and one or more years after adoption ([1+]), respectively, and otherwise set these 
variables equal to zero. If there is no effect on the Poison Pill Law[-1] coefficient, the 
trends between these two groups of firms can be assumed to be parallel in Q before 
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treatment occurs. Further, if the point estimate on Poison Pill Law[1+] is positive and 
significant, this can be assumed to suggest that the reason why we have detected a 
statistically significant positive difference between the affected and unaffected firms is 
due to the passage of the poison pill laws. 
In columns (1) and (2), we consider the timing of the value relevance of pills 
over 1983 to 2012. Specifically, column (2), which adds controls for other state 
antitakeover laws, displays a positive but insignificant estimate for the placebo variable, 
Poison Pill Law[-1]. In contrast, the “true” treatment assignment variable, Poison Pill 
Law[1+], documents a positive and statistically significant increase in Q of 12.4 
percentage points. Further, we evaluate the timing of the effect by wave adoption (in 
columns (3) – (4) and (5) – (6) respectively). Consistent with the findings throughout 
our study, there is no positive value implications of poison pill laws in the first wave, in 
either the placebo or actual variables, while the second-wave period shows a positive 
and statistically significant point estimate of 0.236 to 0.285, and no statistically 
significant effect on the placebo coefficient.  We therefore conclude that we present the 
first empirical evidence that the poison pill law natural experiment is plausibly 
exogenous to corporate value, and hence, our findings can be interpreted as providing 
causal evidence for the shareholder value of the shadow poison pill. 
8.4 Shadow Pills and Staggered Boards 
Analyzing the function of the shadow pill vis-à-vis other governance provisions 
is outside the scope of this work. In practice, however, the adoption of a poison pill is 
frequently accompanied by the adoption of a staggered board (Cohen and Wang, 2013). 
This is because the combination of these defenses substantially reduces the chances that 
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a potential bidder might be able to have the pill removed (i.e., by replacing a majority of 
directors) through the ballot box, therefore strengthening the anti-takeover force of a 
visible poison pill (Bebchuk, Coates, and Subramanian, 2002; Bebchuk and Cohen, 
2005). We accordingly investigate here the combined impact of the shadow pill and 
staggered boards on firm value. Our conjecture is that unlike visible poison pills, 
shadow pills might act more as substitute than complementary antitakeover measures. 
We again base our conjecture on the bonding hypothesis of takeover defenses, under 
which the shadow pill and the staggered board provide effective, and independent, 
commitment devices. Conversely, under the classic view of the visible pill and the 
staggered board, both these measures would be necessary when they are used for 
entrenchment purposes. Table F20 examines these empirical predictions. 
 In columns (1) and (2), we explore whether poison pill laws and staggered 
boards have standalone explanatory power for long-term firm value. In particular, 
column (2) specifies indicator variables for Poison Pill Law and Staggered Board, as 
well as the full set of controls including the other antitakeover law dummies, and firm 
and year fixed effects. We find that the adoption of a poison pill law remains a positive 
and significant determinant of Q. We also find Poison Pill Firm-Level remains 
negatively associated with Q. In addition, we confirm the prior work of Cremers, Litov, 
and Sepe (2017), finding that the adoption (dismissal) of a staggered board results in 
higher (lower) firm value, with an economic impact of 6% (=0.111/1.859).  
 In columns (3) and (4), we explore the respective heterogeneous effects of 
having both a stronger right to adopt a pill (via the enactment of a poison pill law) and a 
staggered board, as well as a visible pill and a staggered board, on firm value, i.e., 
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Poison Pill Law × Staggered Board and Poison Pill Firm-Level × Staggered Board 
(shown in column 4). We document a lack of statistical evidence that firms in 
jurisdictions which passed poison pill laws experience additional differential gains in 
value if they have a staggered board or not (point estimate=-0.009 and t-stat=-0.16).  
Furthermore, we do not find any increase in value for firms with both a visible pill and a 
staggered board.  The lack of statistical significance of the interacting terms does not 
contradict the bonding hypothesis, as this hypothesis posits that the right to adopt a 
poison pill and the adoption of a staggered board serve a similar purpose (and are hence 
substitute, rather than complementary measures). Nevertheless, the results of Table F20 
suggest that more research is needed to better understand the relationship between 
shadow pills and staggered boards. 
8.5 Additional Robustness 
In addition to the three robustness checks detailed above, we include five 
additional tables in the supplementary appendix (Tables G16 – G20) verifying the 
strength of our main results. In particular, in Tables G16 – G18 we document that our 
methodological choice to include firms incorporated in the state of Delaware (Poison 
Pill Law = 0) as control firms does not alter the value relevance of the poison pill laws 
in the pooled panel regressions and in the matched sample, as our results are robust to 
the exclusion of Delaware firms. Finally, in Tables G19 – G20 we report the results for 
a placebo test in the matched sample, where we purposefully move back the actual 
adoption date by five years. That is, the pseudo adoption date equals the actual adoption 
date minus five years. We then estimate the matched sample regressions over plus and 
minus three-year windows around the pseudo adoption date and find insignificant point 
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estimates on the Treat × Post coefficient, providing further support for the parallel 
trends assumption in our matched sample. 
 
9. Conclusion 
Consistent with the entrenchment hypothesis of takeover defenses, existing 
poison pill studies document that the adoption of a pill is negatively correlated with firm 
value. However, this result is difficult to interpret, as the decision to adopt a pill is 
endogenous. Indeed, because a board of directors can unilaterally adopt a poison pill at 
any time, even firms that do not currently have a poison pill in place always have a 
“shadow pill.” 
In this paper, we contribute to the debate on the association between poison pills 
and firm value by shifting the focus of attention from visible pills to shadow pills – that 
is, studying the right to adopt the pill (which right constitutes the shadow pill) rather 
than the actual adoption of a pill. We do so by exploiting the natural experiment 
provided by the staggered adoption of poison pill laws that validated the use of the pill, 
and thus strengthened the relevance of the shadow pill, in 35 U.S. states over the period 
1986 to 2009.  
We document that the availability of a stronger shadow pill results in an 
economically and statistically significant increase in firm value for the firms 
incorporated in the enacting states, especially for firms more engaged in innovation or 
with stronger stakeholder relationships. This suggests that a stronger shadow pill 
benefits shareholders in some subsets of firms, even if the (endogenous) adoption of a 
visible pill does not. Overall, our results that the shadow pill serves a positive corporate 
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governance function for some subset of firms are most consistent with the “bonding 
hypothesis” of takeover defenses, under which the right to adopt a pill increases firm 
value by re-empowering the board against short-term shareholder interference that can 
be disruptive of a firm’s commitment toward more stable stakeholder relationships or 
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Appendix A: Chapter 1 Variable Definitions 
Table A1: Variable Definitions 
 
This table provides definitions for all the variables used in Chapter 1 and Tables B1 through 
B17, and G1 through G8. 
 
Dependent Variables  Definition 
Tobin’s Q Market value of assets (at – book equity + market equity 
(prcc_f*csho)) divided by the book value of assets (at). 
Book equity and this measure, in general, follows Fama 
and French (1992). 
 
Ln(Patent) The natural logarithm of one plus a patent count variable, 
as constructed in Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001), and 
Kogan et al. (2017). Source: 
https://iu.app.box.com/v/patents (available for the period 
1926 to 2010). This variable is also specified as an 
interaction variable in a separate analysis. 
 
Ln(CW Patent) The natural logarithm of one plus citation-weighted 
patents, as constructed in Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg 
(2001), and Kogan et al. (2017). Source: 
https://iu.app.box.com/v/patents (available for the period 
1926 to 2010). This variable is also specified as an 
interaction variable in a separate analysis.   
 
Ln(SM Patent) The natural logarithm of one plus stock market-weighted 
patents, as constructed in Kogan et al. (2017). Source: 
https://iu.app.box.com/v/patents (available for the period 
1926 to 2010). This variable is also specified as an 
interaction variable in a separate analysis. 
 
ROA Income before extraordinary items (ib) plus depreciation 
and amortization (dp) divided by book value of assets (at). 
ROA is also included as a control variable when 
Profitability is not specified as a dependent variable. 
 
NPM Net profit margin defined as operating income before 
depreciation and amortization (oibdp) divided by net sales. 
 
OPM Operating profit margin defined as total revenue (sale) 
minus the cost of goods sold (cogs) minus selling, general, 
and administrative expenses (xsga) all scaled by total 
revenue (sale). 
 
Z–score 𝑍-score is a measure to indicate the likelihood of a 
company going bankrupt or having significant financial 
distress defined as 1.2*(wcap/at) + 1.4*(re/at) + 
3.3(ebit/at) + 0.6(prcc*csho/lt) + 1.0(sale/at). 
 
OCF Ratio Operating cash flow ratio defined as operating cash flow 
(ocf) divided by current liabilities (lct). 
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Table A1 – (Continued) 
Loss An indicator variable set to one if a firm has negative net 
income (ni) during a fiscal year, and zero otherwise; also 
a control variable in the Tobin’s Q regressions. 
 
R&D Research and development expense (xrd) divided by the 
value of sales (sale). R&D/Sales is also included as a 
control variable when not specified as a dependent 
variable. 
 
CAPX Capital expenditures (capx) divided by the value of total 
book assets (at). CAPX/Assets is also included as a 
control variable when not specified as a dependent 
variable. 
 
Invest Rate Capital expenditures (capx) plus acquisitions (aqc) minus 
the sale of property (sppe), over the book value of assets 
(at). 
 
Advertise Advertising expense (xad) divided by the value of total 
book assets (at). 
 
Organization Selling, general and administrative expense (xsga) 
divided by the value of total book assets (at). 
 
Labor Number of employees (emp) divided by real assets (at), 
where assets are adjusted using 2015 dollars. 
 
Monthly Stock Returns Monthly stock returns of a portfolio created by either (i) 
longing the stocks of firms headquartered in APM 
adopting states, (ii) shorting the stocks of companies from 
either the neighboring state(s) of APM law adopters, or 
non-manufacturing corporations located in a state that 
passes an APM statute, and (iii) combining both (i) and 
(ii) into a long-short investment strategy. In all three 
portfolios, I begin the holding period 12 months before 
the adoption date and continue to hold until 36 months 
after the laws are enacted (“12m36”). 
 
Total Tobin’s Q Total Tobin’s Q equals the market value of outstanding 
equity (prcc_f*csho) plus the book value of debt (dltt + 
dlc) minus the firm’s current assets (act) divided by the 
sum of physical (ppegt) and intangible capital. Intangible 
capital is defined as the sum of externally purchased 
(intan) and internally created intangible capital 
(knowledge plus organizational capital). This measure 
(q_tot) is proposed by Peters and Taylor (2017) and is 






Table A1 – (Continued) 
Main Explanatory Variables  
APM Law An indicator variable equal to one if a firm is 
headquartered in a state that has adopted an anti-plug 
molding (APM) law, and zero otherwise. I use the state 
specific statute names provided by Sganga (1989) and 
Carstens (1990) to perform a LexisNexis Academic “State 
Statutes and Regulations Search” to obtain the adoption 
month/years and confirm stipulated product coverage. 
 
All Item APM Law An indicator variable equal to one if a firm is 
headquartered in a state that has adopted an APM law 
which protects all manufacturing items, and zero 
otherwise. 
 
Boat Hull APM Law An indicator variable equal to one if a firm is 
headquartered in a state that has adopted an APM law 
which explicitly stipulates protection for boat hulls and 
components, and zero otherwise. 
 
Alpha Monthly portfolio abnormal returns, estimated using the 
four-factor Carhart (1997) and three-factor Fama-French 
(1993) models, respectively. 
Main Interaction Variables  
Post 88 An indicator variable equal to one if the year of 
observation occurs after 1988, and zero otherwise. 
 
Research Quotient (RQ) A continuous variable measuring the percentage increase 
in revenue from a 1% increase in R&D. That is, it 
measures the output elasticity of R&D (Knott (2008)). 
This measure (aggbeta_lxrd) is available on WRDS from 
1971 to 2015. 
 
RQ Median An indicator variable equal to one if a firm’s Research 
Quotient is  above the 50th percentile of all companies in 
the sample, in a given year, and zero otherwise. 
 
RQ High An indicator variable equal to one if a firm’s Research 
Quotient is in the top 33rd percentile of all companies in 
the sample, in a given year, and zero otherwise. 
Control Variables  
Size The natural logarithm of the value of total book assets 
(at) in millions, where assets are adjusted using 2015 
dollars. 
 
Ln(Age) The natural logarithm of one plus the number of firm-year 
observations since the firm’s first appearance in 
Compustat. 
 
Debt-to-Equity Long-term debt (dltt) divided by book equity, where book 




Table A1 – (Continued) 
Operating Cash-Flow Operating cash flow equals the summation of income 
before extra items (ibc), extra items and discontinued 
operation (xidoc), depreciation and amortization (dpc), 
deferred taxes (txdc), equity in net loss (esubc), gains in 
sale of PPE and investment (sppiv), other funds from 
operation (fopo), other sources of funds (fsrco) minus the 
change in working capital (dWC), all scaled by last year’s 
book value of assets (at), following Chang et al. (2014). 
 
HHI The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for a particular industry 
defined as the sum of squared market shares for all firms 
in a three-digit SIC industry. The market share of firm i is 
defined as the value of sales (sale) of firm i divided by 
the total value of sales (sale) in the industry of firm i. 
 
Sales Growth The natural logarithm of the value of sales (sale) in 
millions in year t divided by the value of sales (sale) in 
millions in year t-1. 
 
Firm Liquidity Current assets (act) minus current liabilities (lct) divided 
by the value of total book assets (at). 
 
Industry-Year Tobin’s Q Control for industry shocks, measured as the mean of 
Tobin’s Q in firm i's three-digit SIC industry in a given 
year, excluding firm i from the calculation. 
 
RQ Medium An indicator variable equal to one if a firm’s Research 
Quotient is in between the upper and bottom 33rd 
percentiles of all companies in the sample, in a given 
year, and zero otherwise. 
 
RQ Low An indicator variable equal to one if a firm’s Research 
Quotient is in the bottom 33rd percentile of all companies 
in the sample, in a given year, and zero otherwise. 
Predictor Variables  
SY Tobin’s Q The average Tobin’s Q of all firms headquartered within a 
state, in a given year. 
 
SY ∆ Tobin’s Q The average change in Tobin’s Q of all firms 
headquartered within a state, in a given year. 
 
SY Industry-Year Tobin’s Q The average Industry-Year Tobin’s Q of all firms 
headquartered within a state, in a given year. 
 
SY Size The average natural logarithm of total assets of all firms 
headquartered within a state, in a given year, where assets 
are adjusted using 2015 dollars. 
 
SY Ln(Age) The average natural logarithm of one plus the number of 
firm-year observations since the firm’s first appearance in 




Table A1 – (Continued) 
SY HHI The average Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of all firms 
headquartered within a state, in a given year. 
 
SY Sales Growth The average sales growth of all firms headquartered 
within a state, in a given year. 
 
SY Loss The average percent of all firms headquartered within a 
state experiencing negative net income, in a given year. 
 
SY Debt-to-Equity The average debt-to-equity of all firms headquartered 
within a state, in a given year. 
 
SY Firm Liquidity The average firm liquidity of all firms headquartered 
within a state, in a given year. 
 
SY R&D/Sales The average ratio of research and development 
expenditure to sales of all firms headquartered within a 
state, in a given year. 
 
SY CAPX/Assets The average ratio of capital expenditure to total assets of 
all firms headquartered within a state, in a given year. 
 
Ln(GDPPC) The natural logarithm of a headquartering state’s GDP (in 
thousands) divided by its total population. I use data from 
the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
 
State GDPG The headquartered state-level GDP growth rate over the 
fiscal year. I use data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis. 
 
UTSA Index The change in state-specific trade secrets protection after 
the enactment of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), 
following Png (2017a, 2017b). 
 
IDD Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine indicator variable, which 
equals one if it is recognized by a state and zero 
otherwise, following Klasa et al. (2018). 
 
R&D Tax Credit An indicator variable set to one if a state has adopted a 
tax credit for research & development expenditure, and 
zero otherwise, following Wilson (2009). 
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Appendix E: Chapter 3 Variable Definitions 
Table E1: Variable Definitions 
 
This table provides definitions for all the variables used in Chapter 3 and Tables F1 through 
F20, and G9 through G20. 
 
Dependent Variables Description 
Tobin’s Q Market value of assets (at – book equity + market equity 
(prcc_f*csho)) divided by the book value of assets (at). 
Book equity and this measure, in general, follows Fama 
and French (1992).  
 
Monthly Stock Returns Monthly stock returns of a portfolio created by either (i) 
longing the stocks of matched firms incorporated in 
poison pill law adopting states, (ii) shorting the stocks of 
matched companies incorporated in states without poison 
pill legislation, and (iii) combining both (i) and (ii) into a 
long-short investment strategy. In all three portfolios, we 
begin the holding period 6 months before the adoption 
date and continue to hold until 24 (“6m24”) or 36 
(“6m36”) months after the laws are enacted. 
 
Takeover Bid (Bid) Bid is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm receives 
a takeover bid as catalogued by the SDC M&A database 
and CRSP delisting codes (200s), and zero otherwise. 
 
Takeover Complete (Complete) Complete is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm is 
successfully acquired as catalogued by the SDC M&A 
database and CRSP delisting codes (200s), and zero 
otherwise.  
 
1-Day Premium Premium of offer price to target closing stock price 1-day 
prior to the original announcement date, expressed as a 
percentage. Data comes from the SDC M&A database. 
 
1-Week Premium Premium of offer price to target closing stock price 1-
week prior to the original announcement date, expressed 
as a percentage. Data comes from the SDC M&A 
database. 
 
4-Week Premium Premium of offer price to target closing stock price 4-
week prior to the original announcement date, expressed 
as a percentage. Data comes from the SDC M&A 
database. 
 
Return on Assets (ROA) Operating income before depreciation and amortization 
(oibdp) divided by the book value of assets (at). 
 
Net Profit Margin (NPM) Net income (ni) divided by the value of sales (sale). 
 
Operating Margin (OM) Operating income after depreciation and amortization 




Table E1 – (Continued) 
Sales Growth (SG) The natural logarithm of the value of sales (sale) in 
millions in year t divided by the value of sales (sale) in 
millions in year t-1; also specified as a control in Tobin’s 
Q regressions. 
 
Total Tobin’s Q Market value of outstanding equity (prcc_f*csho) plus the 
book value of debt (dltt + dlc) minus the firm’s current 
assets (act) divided by the sum of the book value of 
property, plant, and equipment (ppegt), and the 
replacement cost of intangible capital (the sum of the 
firm’s externally purchased and internally created 
intangible capital), follows Peters and Taylor (2017). This 
measure (q_tot) is available on WRDS from 1950 to 
2015. 
Main Explanatory Variables Description 
Poison Pill Law An indicator variable equal to one if a firm is 
incorporated in a state that has adopted a poison pill law, 
and zero otherwise. We use adoption dates provided by 
Cain, McKeon and Solomon (2017) and Karpoff and 
Wittry (2017).  
 
Poison Pill Law First Wave An indicator variable equal to one if a firm is 
incorporated in a state that passes a poison pill law during 
the period 1986 to 1990, and zero otherwise. We use 
adoption dates provided by Cain, McKeon and Solomon 
(2017) and Karpoff and Wittry (2017). 
 
Poison Pill Law Second Wave An indicator variable equal to one if a firm is 
incorporated in a state that passes a poison pill law during 
the period 1995 to 2009, and zero otherwise. We use 
adoption dates provided by Cain, McKeon and Solomon 
(2017) and Karpoff and Wittry (2017). 
 
Alpha Monthly portfolio abnormal returns, estimated using 
either the four-factor Carhart (1997) and three-factor 
Fama-French (1993) models, respectively. 
 
Poison Pill Law First Wave 
Adjusted 
An indicator variable equal to one if a firm is 
incorporated in a state that passes a poison pill law during 
the period 1986 to 1988, and zero otherwise. We use 
adoption dates provided by Cain, McKeon and Solomon 
(2017) and Karpoff and Wittry (2017). 
 
Poison Pill Law Second Wave 
Adjusted 
An indicator variable equal to one if a firm is 
incorporated in a state that passes a poison pill law during 
the period 1989 to 2009, and zero otherwise. We use 
adoption dates provided by Cain, McKeon and Solomon 




Table E1 – (Continued) 
PPV-Index We create a poison pill validity index (PPV-Index) using 
poison pill statute and poison pill case information 
provided by Cain, McKeon, and Solomon (2017). The 
PPV-Index captures the relative change or strength of 
poison pill validity over time and by state of 
incorporation. For a detailed description of the PPV-
Index, see Panel A of Table F17. 
Main Interaction Variables Description 
Incorp State-Year M&A Volume The ratio of mergers & acquisitions’ dollar volume in 
SDC to the total market capitalization from Compustat 
per state of incorporation, in a given year. We only 
include ordinary stocks (i.e., we exclude American 
depositary receipts (ADRs) and real estate investment 
trusts (REITs)). Further, we only consider SDC 
transactions that are completed and where the acquirer 
achieves control of the target; also included as a predictor 
variable. 
 
Industry-Year M&A Volume The ratio of mergers & acquisitions’ dollar volume in 
SDC to the total market capitalization from Compustat 
per Fama-French 49 industry groupings, in a given year. 
We only include ordinary stocks (i.e., we exclude 
American depositary receipts (ADRs) and real estate 
investment trusts (REITs)). Further, we only consider 
SDC transactions that are completed and where the 
acquirer achieves control of the target; also included as a 
predictor variable. 
 
Large Customer An indicator variable equal to one if a firm has at least 
one large customer based on the Compustat Customer 
Segments database. 
  
Strategic Alliance An indicator variable equal to one if the firm is in an 
active strategic alliance based on the SDC Strategic 
Alliances database. 
 
Labor Capital Selling, general and administrative expenses (xsga) 
scaled by the book value of assets (at). 
 
R&D/Sales Research and development expense (xrd) divided by the 
value of sales (sale). 
 
Intangible Capital/Assets Firm’s intangible capital estimated replacement cost 
scaled by the book value of assets (at). The measure 
(K_int) is available on WRDS from 1950 to 2015, from 
Peters and Taylor (2017). 
 
Knowledge Capital/Assets Firm’s knowledge capital replacement cost scaled by the 
book value of assets (at). The measure (K_int_Know) is 




Table E1 – (Continued) 
Staggered Board An indicator variable equal to one if the board is 
staggered in year t, and zero otherwise. Data come from 
Cremers, Litov, and Sepe (2017). 
Control Variables Description 
Poison Pill Firm-Level An indicator variable equal to one if a firm has adopted a 
poison pill. We use data from ISS (formerly Riskmetrics), 
Cremers and Ferrell (2014), Cremers, Litov and Sepe 
(2017), SDC’s Corporate Governance and M&A 
databases, Comment and Schwert (1995), Caton and Goh 
(2008) and hand-collected information from Factiva.  
 
Ln(Assets) The natural logarithm of the value of total book assets 
(at) in millions, where assets are adjusted using 2015 
dollars. 
 
Ln(Age) The natural logarithm of one plus the number of firm-
year observations since the firm’s first appearance in 
Compustat. 
 
HHI The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for a particular industry 
defined as the sum of squared market shares for all firms 
in a three-digit SIC industry. The market share of firm i is 
defined as the value of sales (sale) of firm i divided by 
the total value of sales (sale) in the industry of firm i. 
 
Loss An indicator variable set to one if a firm has negative net 
income (ni) during a fiscal year, and zero otherwise. 
 
Debt-to-Equity Long-term debt (dltt) divided by book equity, where book 
equity is calculated as in Fama and French (1992). 
 
Firm Liquidity Current assets (act) minus current liabilities (lct) divided 
by the value of total book assets (at). 
 
CAPX/Assets Capital expenditures (capx) divided by the value of total 
book assets (at). 
 
Institutional Ownership The percent ownership of a firm by its institutional 
owners, measure by their equity ownership in their 13F 
holdings reports from Thomson Reuters, weighted by the 
firm’s market capitalization. 
 
State-Year Tobin’s Q Control for local shocks, measured as the mean of 
Tobin’s Q in the firm’s state of location in a given year, 
excluding the firm itself. 
 
Industry-Year Tobin’s Q Control for industry shocks, measured as the mean of 
Tobin’s Q in the firm’s three-digit SIC industry in a given 




Table E1 – (Continued) 
Business Combination Law An indicator variable equal to one if a firm is 
incorporated in a state that has adopted a business 
combination law, and zero otherwise. We use adoption 
dates provided by Cain, McKeon and Solomon (2017) 
and Karpoff and Wittry (2017). 
 
Control Share Law An indicator variable equal to one if a firm is 
incorporated in a state that has adopted a control share 
law, and zero otherwise. We use adoption dates provided 
by Cain, McKeon and Solomon (2017) and Karpoff and 
Wittry (2017). 
 
Directors’ Duties Law An indicator variable equal to one if a firm is 
incorporated in a state that has adopted a directors’ duties 
law, and zero otherwise. We use adoption dates provided 
by Karpoff and Wittry (2017). 
 
Fair Price Law An indicator variable equal to one if a firm is 
incorporated in a state that has adopted a fair price law, 
and zero otherwise. We use adoption dates provided by 
Cain, McKeon and Solomon (2017) and Karpoff and 
Wittry (2017). 
 
Incorp State-Year Q   The average Tobin’s Q of all firms incorporated within a 
state, in a given year. 
 
Incorp State-Year Poison Pill Firm 
Level 
The average percent of all firms incorporated within a 
state with an existing poison pill in-place, in a given year. 
 
Incorp State-Year Ln(Assets) The average natural logarithm of total assets of all firms 
incorporated within a state, in a given year, where assets 
are adjusted using 2015 dollars. 
 
Incorp State-Year Ln(Age) The average natural logarithm of one plus the number of 
firm-year observations since the firm’s first appearance in 
Compustat of all firms incorporated within a state, in a 
given year. 
 
Incorp State-Year HHI The average Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of all firms 
incorporated within a state, in a given year. 
 
Incorp State-Year Sales Growth The average sales growth of all firms incorporated within 
a state, in a given year. 
 
Incorp State-Year Loss The average percent of all firms incorporated within a 
state experiencing negative net income, in a given year. 
 
Incorp State-Year Debt-to-Equity The average debt-to-equity of all firms incorporated 
within a state, in a given year. 
 
Incorp State-Year Firm Liquidity The average firm liquidity of all firms incorporated 
within a state, in a given year. 
 
Incorp State-Year CAPX/Assets The average ratio of capital expenditure to total assets of 
all firms incorporated within a state, in a given year. 
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Table E1 – (Continued)  
Incorp State-Year R&D/Sales The average ratio of research and development 
expenditure to sales of all firms incorporated within a 
state, in a given year. 
 
Incorp State-Year Institutional 
Ownership 
The average percentage of institutional ownership of all 
firms incorporated within a state, in a given year. 
 
R&D Tax Credit An indicator variable set to one if a state has adopted a 
tax credit for research & development expenditure, and 
zero otherwise; Data comes from Wilson (2009). 
 
Percent Incorp State Republican The proportion of incorporated state-level representatives 
in the U.S. House of Representatives whom belong to the 
Republican party, in a given year. We use data from the 
Book of the States for this measure. 
 
Ln(Incorp State Per Capita GDP) The natural logarithm of an incorporating state’s GDP (in 
thousands) divided by its total population. We use data 
from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
 
Incorp State GDP Growth The incorporated state-level GDP growth rate over the 
































































































































































































































































































Appendix G: Chapter 1 and 3 Supplementary Tables 
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